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The Productivity Commission
The Productivity Commission, an independent Commonwealth agency, is the
Government’s principal review and advisory body on microeconomic policy and
regulation. It conducts public inquiries and research into a broad range of economic and
social issues affecting the welfare of Australians.
The Commission’s independence is underpinned by an Act of Parliament. Its processes
and outputs are open to public scrutiny and are driven by concern for the wellbeing of
the community as a whole.
Information on the Productivity Commission, its publications and its current work
program can be found on the World Wide Web at www.pc.gov.au or by contacting
Media and Publications on (03) 9653 2244.FOREWORD III
Foreword
Over the past decade, a number of reports by the Commission and its predecessors
have looked at aspects of Australia’s health care system. These include: Exports of
Health Services (IC 1991); The Pharmaceutical Industry (IC 1996); Stocktake of
Progress in Microeconomic Reform (PC 1996); Private Health Insurance (IC
1997); and Productivity Commission  Submission to the National Review of
Pharmacy (PC 1999b). The Commission also acts as Secretariat for the Review of
Commonwealth/State Service Provision’s work on monitoring the performance of
health and other government services (SCRCSSP 1999).
This research report on Australia’s private hospital industry had its origins in the
Commission’s private health insurance inquiry. That inquiry raised a range of issues
relating to demand for, and the efficiency of, private hospital services; and the
nature of contracting between hospitals, health funds and doctors. This report
addresses those and other relevant issues.
The primary objectives of the report are informational: to provide a comprehensive
overview of the private hospital industry and to detail the key factors affecting its
performance. While the report draws attention to a number of related policy issues
warranting examination, it does not contain any detailed policy analysis or
recommendations.
The report draws extensively on unpublished data contained in the Australian
Bureau of Statistic’s Private Hospital Expenditure collection and the Department of
Health and Aged Care’s Casemix Protocol collection. As such, it is likely to be of
interest to those in the industry as well as in government. The report has also
benefited from information provided in informal discussions between the
Commission and government officials and members of the industry. The
Commission is grateful to all those organisations and individuals who contributed.
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Glossary
Accreditation Verification by either the Australian Council on Healthcare
Standards or the International Standards Organisation that a




An establishment which provides at least minimal medical,
surgical or obstetric services for inpatient treatment and/or




Abbreviation for the Health Legislation (Private Health
Insurance Reform) Amendment Act 1995. Amongst other
things, this Act provides the legislative basis for contracting




Average number of days spent by individual patients in a
particular hospital or group of hospitals.
BOO(T) facility Facility treating public patients financed, built and run by a
private operator in return for patient payments from the State
government concerned. Depending on the nature of the
particular contract, ownership of the facility may transfer to the
State government at the end of the contract period.
Casemix Describes the mix and types of patients treated by a hospital
according to their medical conditions. Casemix is often




Revenue of a hospital segmented according to the hospital’s
clinical mix of services.
Co-located
private hospital
Private hospital sited on the premises of a public hospital to
form a joint medical facility or precinct. The two hospitals may
sometimes share infrastructure and services.VIII GLOSSARY
Compensable
patient
Patient whose medical and hospital costs are met by a third
party motor vehicle or workers’ compensation insurer.
Competitive
neutrality
Term used to describe a market outcome in which no
individual supplier is advantaged or disadvantaged by
government regulations, subsidies, taxation arrangements and
the like.
Copayment Portion of the cost of an insured health service met by the user.
Diagnosis related
group (DRG)
Basis for a clinical classification of services provided in
hospitals. The criteria for developing groupings are that they
are clinically meaningful and involve similar resource use.
DVA patient War veteran or war widow/widower eligible for free hospital
treatment through the Repatriation Private Patient Scheme run




An establishment performing minor operations and other
procedures not requiring an overnight stay, which is not part of
any private hospital providing overnight care.
For-profit group
hospital
A for-profit private hospital whose proprietor owns other




A for-profit private hospital whose proprietor does not own




Organisation registered under the National Health Act to
provide health insurance meeting some or all of the cost of
treatment provided to insured private patients in either public
or private facilities, as well as contributing to the cost of a
range of ancillary medical and dental services provided outside
a hospital setting.GLOSSARY IX
HPPA Hospital Purchaser Provider Agreement. Describes a
contractual arrangement between a health fund and a hospital
under the provisions of the Health Legislation (Private Health
Insurance Reform) Amendment Act 1995. Where an HPPA is in
place, and unless the agreement specifies a pre-determined
patient copayment, the hospital must accept the HPPA price as
full payment by the fund for the episode of care for eligible
contributors.
MPPA Medical Purchaser Provider Agreement. Describes a
contractual arrangement under the Health Legislation (Private
Health Insurance Reform) Amendment Act 1995 between a
health fund and a doctor, covering the provision of medical
services to contributors in hospitals. If an MPPA is in place, a
health fund is able to pay medical benefits in excess of the
Medicare schedule fee, thus allowing for the elimination of
out-of-pocket expenses for patients (or limiting them to a pre-
determined copayment).
Occupancy rate Number of patient days provided by a hospital expressed as a
percentage of the total number of bed days potentially
available in that hospital.
PA Practitioner Agreement. Describes a contractual arrangement
under the Health Legislation (Private Health Insurance
Reform) Amendment Act 1995 between a hospital and a doctor
allowing hospitals to receive payment under HPPAs for
medical services provided by the doctor.
Patient revenue Revenue from patients received by a hospital for
accommodation and other fees.
Psychiatric
hospital
An establishment devoted primarily to the treatment and care
of inpatients with psychiatric, mental, or behavioural disorders.
Other not-for-
profit hospital
A not-for-profit private hospital owned by someone other than
a religious order or charitable organisation. Bush nursing,
community and memorial hospitals account for most of the
facilities in this grouping.X GLOSSARY
Recoveries Private hospital income from items such as staff meals and
accommodation, facility fees paid by medical practitioners, and
patient payments for telephone, TV hire and prostheses.





A not-for-profit private hospital owned and operated by a
religious or charitable body. Some of these belong to groups or
chains, such as St John of God, Sisters of Mercy or Sisters of
Charity. Others operate as independent hospitals.
Self-paying
patient
Private hospital patient (or private patient in a public hospital)
without private health insurance who meets the full cost of
his/her treatment.
Separations Number of patients treated in a hospital in any particular time
period.
Specialised unit Unit within a hospital providing specialised equipment and
back-up staff. Examples include intensive care, coronary care
and neo-natal units.SUMMARY XI
Summary
Private sector involvement in the provision of hospital services takes a number of
forms — including the delivery of services to some public patients. However, the
treatment of fee-paying patients in ‘traditional’ private hospitals is by far the most
important.
Private hospitals currently provide 30 per cent of acute hospital beds and treat 45
per cent of all surgical patients. Moreover, demand for private hospital services has
been growing much faster than demand for public hospital services. Reflecting this,
the private hospital share of total expenditure on hospital services increased from 18
per cent in 1991–92 to 22 per cent in 1996–97 (figure 1).


















































Data source: AIHW, Health Expenditure Bulletin No. 15, 1997-98.
Like their public sector counterparts, private hospitals are undergoing some
significant structural changes:
·  Procedures performed without the need for an overnight hospital stay are
accounting for an increasing proportion of activity.
·  At the same time, procedures performed on overnight patients are becoming
more complex.XII SUMMARY
·  Changes to the relationship between private hospitals and the health funds have
increased the pressure on hospitals to deliver their services efficiently.
·  Private hospitals are increasingly co-locating with public hospitals to allow for
the sharing of facilities and equipment and to provide greater convenience for
doctors and patients. These co-locations have had significant ramifications for
the viability of smaller, stand-alone, private hospitals.
Yet despite these changes, it is more than a decade since the last major independent
study of the ‘private hospital industry’, undertaken by a Senate Standing
Committee.
This report attempts to fill this information gap. Amongst other things, it:
·  provides a statistical overview of the industry, drawing on a range of previously
unpublished data;
·  examines some indicators of the industry’s financial performance, efficiency and
quality of service (though it does not attempt to benchmark private hospitals
against the public hospital system);
·  looks at some of the key factors affecting performance; and
·  draws attention to some policy issues germane to the industry’s future
performance. The report does not, however, contain any detailed analysis of
these issues or provide policy recommendations.
Structure of the private hospital industry
In 1997–98, there were 317 private acute care and psychiatric hospitals providing
treatment to both overnight and day patients and 175 freestanding day facilities. The
acute care and psychiatric hospitals are responsible for the large bulk of industry
activity, accounting for around 85 per cent of total separations and more than 95 per
cent of total industry revenue (table 1).
There are four main ownership types in the industry — for-profit group, for-profit
independent, religious/charitable, and other not-for-profit hospitals. Together, for-
profit group and religious/charitable operators provide around 80 per cent of
available beds in private acute care and psychiatric hospitals. Individual hospitals
range in size from very small facilities of fewer than 25 beds to major facilities with
several hundred beds.SUMMARY XIII
  Table 1 A profile of the private hospital industry, 1997–98
  Acute care and psychiatric hospitals  
  Number    317
  Number of beds     23 091
  Separations (‘000)     1585
  Revenue  ($m)    3517
  Employment    41 566
  Freestanding day hospitals   
  Number    175
  Separations (‘000)     272
  Revenue  ($m)    145
  Employment    1220
The private hospital industry has grown considerably during the 1990s — available
beds in private acute care and psychiatric hospitals have increased by more than 10
per cent, separations have grown by nearly 40 per cent and revenue has risen by
more than 60 per cent (figure 2).
Figure 2 Increase in private hospital activity, 1991–92 to 1997–98






















A feature of this expansion has been an increase in the diversity and complexity of
services offered, including the emergence of intensive care, cardiac and oncology
units. Such specialised units were once rare outside the public sector.
Another major development has been the strong growth in day procedures, in large
part as a result of technological advances that have increased the range of treatments
that can be provided without the need for an overnight hospital stay. Between
1991–92 and 1997–98, the number of same day patients treated in private acute
care, psychiatric and freestanding day hospitals more than doubled. Indeed, the
increase of 400 000 same day patients in acute care and psychiatric hospitalsXIV SUMMARY
accounted for virtually all of the growth in total patient numbers in these hospitals
over that period.
The market for private hospital services
The markets in which private hospitals compete are not homogeneous. Hospitals
offering only general surgery and common specialised services such as obstetrics,
tend to compete with other hospitals in the same region. In contrast, the small
number of hospitals offering ‘super specialties’ — such as cardiac procedures —
compete for patients from a much broader geographic area.
While such market segmentation is not unusual, the private hospital market is
different from many non-hospital markets in two important respects:
·  First, in consultation with their patients, doctors make most of the treatment
decisions and therefore have a major impact on the demand for a private
hospital’s services.
·  Second, more than three-quarters of private hospital patients have private
hospital insurance, with some of the rest receiving treatment as either war
veterans or under some form of compensation arrangement. This means that the
costs of private hospital treatment are largely determined by negotiations
between third parties, rather than by direct interaction between patients and
service providers.
Financial performance
Total private hospital revenue in 1997–98 was more than $3.6 billion — a real
increase of more than 45 per cent since 1991–92. Most of this growth reflected
increased patient numbers in acute care and psychiatric facilities — average patient
charges in the acute care sector rose by only about 2 per cent in real terms over the
period. In contrast, in the much smaller day hospital sector, a real increase in
average patient charges of some 38 per cent magnified the impact on revenue of a
large rise in patient numbers (table 2). This significant increase in average charges
reflects the increasing sophistication of treatments performed on a same day basis.
Average per patient cost in acute care private hospitals rose by just under 8 per cent
in real terms between 1991–92 and 1997–98. Higher non-labour costs — due in part
to technological changes — were the major driver of this increase. In day facilities,
the real increase in average per patient cost was some 40 per cent over the same
period.SUMMARY XV
Table 2 Some financial performance indicators for the private hospital
industry
a, 1991–92 and 1997–98
1991–92 1997–98
Acute care and psychiatric hospitals  
Total revenue
b ($m) 2177   3517
Average revenue per admission (1991–92 dollars) 1881   1979
Average patient charge per admission (1991–92 dollars) 1793   1828
Average recurrent expenditure per admission (1991–92 dollars) 1689   1819
Freestanding day hospitals  
Total revenue
b ($m) 45   145
Average revenue per admission (1991–92 dollars) 369   477
Average patient charge per admission (1991–92 dollars) 332   457
Average recurrent expenditure per admission (1991–92 dollars) 287   402
a The consumer price index has been used as the deflator in the 1991–92 price equivalent calculations.
b Includes non-patient revenue such as income from investments and donations.
The average net operating margin for acute care and psychiatric hospitals declined
from 10.2 per cent in 1991–92 to 8.1 per cent in 1997–98. Profitability in
freestanding day facilities declined even more significantly over this period. That
said, the average operating margin for day facilities of 15.8 per cent in 1997–98 was
still close to double that in the acute care sector (figure 3).
Figure 3 Private hospital net operating margins




































a Total revenue less total recurrent expenditure as a proportion of total revenue.
Other performance indicators
The efficiency of private hospitals has improved during the 1990s:XVI SUMMARY
·  While average costs per separation have increased, when allowance is made for
greater patient complexity, unit costs have declined. For example, between
1993–94 and 1996–97, real casemix-adjusted costs per separation in acute care
hospitals fell by 3 per cent.
·  Average length of patient stay (casemix-adjusted) fell from 4.3 days in 1993–94
to 3.7 days in 1996–97.
There are, however, marked variations in outcomes within the industry. In
particular, for-profit group hospitals tend to have the lowest costs and have been
mainly responsible for the industry-wide reductions in casemix-adjusted costs.
But considerable caution is required in drawing any conclusions about the relative
efficiency of for-profit private hospitals and their not-for-profit counterparts.
Observed differences in unit costs could reflect a range of factors other than
variations in efficiency. One relevant consideration is service quality, although
determining the contribution (if any) of quality differentials to variations in hospital
costs is very difficult. Indeed, indicators of the quality and appropriateness of
private hospital care are limited, even at the industry-wide level. Nevertheless, one
indicator of quality is that nearly 70 per cent of private acute care and psychiatric
hospitals are accredited by either the Australian Council on Healthcare Standards or
the International Standards Organisation.
Factors influencing private hospital performance
Regulatory requirements
The operation of Medicare, the institutional and funding arrangements for public
hospitals and the regulation of the private health insurance sector, all have
significant impacts on outcomes in the private hospital industry.
There are also regulations that directly influence the operations of private hospitals.
These include:
·  State and Territory licensing provisions for private hospitals, which mandate
compliance with a range of operational and quality requirements. In most
jurisdictions, they also incorporate controls on the number and geographical
location of private hospital beds; and
·  Commonwealth legislation governing the relationships between private
hospitals, doctors and health funds.SUMMARY XVII
These regulations are variously directed at ensuring the provision of safe, high
quality private hospital services, promoting equitable access to these services and
providing incentives for efficient service delivery.
However, the industry and some commentators have raised concerns about aspects
of the regulatory framework.
Contractual relationships
Contractual and other arrangements between private hospitals and doctors and
health funds influence outcomes in the industry in a number of ways. For example:
·  Arrangements with doctors on such things as terms of access to hospital
facilities, and equipment and staffing levels, can have significant ramifications
for hospital costs.
·  The level of remuneration for treating insured patients which is provided for in
contracts with health funds can be crucial to a hospital’s financial viability.
In this latter regard, private hospital operators claim that the current contracting
framework gives the funds too much negotiating power, which they are using to
unfairly reduce rates paid to hospitals.
Determining whether the balance of negotiating power is appropriate is far from
easy. While the current contracting framework (introduced in 1995) may well have
shifted the balance towards the health funds, the funds still need contracts with
sufficient hospitals in each geographic area to offer their members adequate
coverage. Thus, the negotiating strength of individual hospitals will depend on the
services they provide and the degree of competition they face from other hospitals.
More generally, a negotiating framework that allowed hospitals to readily pass on
any cost increases to health funds and their members would not be in the interests of
the community.
That said, there may be a case for examining some aspects of the current contracting
framework. For example, private hospitals (other than those in the same ownership
group) are not allowed to share information with other hospitals on the outcomes of
rate negotiations with the health funds. While this prohibition may help to preclude
collusion between hospitals, it may also impose costs by making it more difficult
for hospitals to determine what performance improvements are necessary to secure
contracts with the funds.XVIII SUMMARY
Demand drivers
While future demand for private hospital services will depend crucially on the
regulatory and health policy framework, there will also be some broader influences
at work:
·  Continued growth in incomes will increase demand for health care, including
private hospital services. This is particularly the case given the discretionary
component of many private hospital treatments — some may be genuinely
optional from a health perspective while, in other cases, treatment at some
personal cost in a private hospital is a way of avoiding queues in the public
hospital system, or gaining access to a higher standard of accommodation.
·  Technological developments will provide new treatment options. Some of these
will increase the range of services that private hospitals can offer. Some will
improve the safety of treatments and the likelihood of successful outcomes. And
some will reduce the time spent in hospital and thereby the cost of treatments.
Technological changes are also likely to facilitate an even greater emphasis on
day surgery.
A number of commentators have suggested that ageing of the population will be
another significant influence on demand for private hospital services into the next
century. However, there is evidence that the primary effect of ageing is to delay the
onset of high expenditure on health care, rather than to increase its duration. The
significant recent growth in per capita health expenditures in the over 65 age group
appears to have more to do with the expanded range of treatment options and to
income growth, than to ageing as such.
A future policy agenda
As noted, this report does not include detailed policy analysis or contain any policy
recommendations.
However, the Commission has briefly explored a number of policy issues that are
important to private hospitals and which may warrant closer assessment, including:
·  whether it is appropriate for governments to restrict the number of private
hospital beds;
·  the implications of differences in licensing requirements across jurisdictions and
between day hospitals and acute care hospitals;
·  a lack of competitive neutrality, both within the private hospital sector —
particularly as regards input tax exemptions for not-for-profit hospitals — and
between private and public hospitals competing for private patients;SUMMARY XIX
·  the efficacy of the legislative framework underpinning agreements between
private hospitals and doctors and health funds, including the effects of controls
on information sharing by stand-alone hospitals;
·  how to improve quality and clinical indicators for hospital services and make
more information available to consumers, health funds and other interested
parties; and
·  the arrangements governing the supply of medical specialists available to work
in private (and public) hospitals.INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
The private sector’s role in the delivery of hospital services takes a number of
forms. Apart from the treatment of fee-paying patients in ‘traditional’ private
hospitals, private operators deliver services to some public patients under a variety
of contract arrangements with government. And, private contractors provide various
clinical and non-clinical services to many public hospitals.
While private sector involvement in the delivery of public patient services is
increasing, the treatment of private patients continues to be its most important role.
Private hospitals provide 30 per cent of acute hospital beds and account for 45 per
cent of all surgical episodes.
Like its public sector counterpart, the ‘private hospital industry’ is undergoing some
significant structural changes. Private hospitals are performing more complex
procedures, the importance of day surgery is growing, hospitals’ relationships with
health funds are changing significantly, and co-located public and private hospitals
are becoming increasingly common.
Yet despite these changes, and the importance of private hospitals to Australia’s
overall health care system, the last major independent study of the industry was
more than a decade ago (SSCPHNH 1987). This report presents up-to-date
information on the nature and role of the industry.
1.1 Scope of the report
Australia needs a private hospital industry that delivers high quality, cost efficient
and appropriate services and that is responsive to its customers needs. The first part
of this report looks at how well the industry is performing against these broad
criteria.
But it is also important to look forward. Indeed, from a policy perspective, the
future development of the industry and the role of government in helping to shape
that development are crucial. To this end, the second part of the report looks at
some key influences on the private hospital industry’s future performance.2 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
IN AUSTRALIA
However, the report does not contain any detailed analysis of these issues or
provide policy recommendations. Rather, it sets out an agenda for further research
and analysis and identifies areas where better information is needed to inform
policy choices.
In looking at the industry, it is important to recognise that private hospitals are not
homogeneous. The size of hospitals, the services they provide and ownership
structures vary considerably. And, with increasing contracting out of the financing
and operation of public facilities, the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’
hospitals is becoming blurred. The report draws attention to the implications of
differences within the private hospital industry for performance, as well as for
future policy arrangements. While the report does not benchmark the performance
of private hospitals against that of public hospitals, it draws attention to the inter-
relationships between the two hospital systems and the institutional and funding
arrangements applying to them.
1.2 Information sources
Each year since the early 1990s, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has
collected information on the structure and performance of the private hospital
industry. The results of this annual survey are published in Private Hospitals,
Australia.
However, to facilitate a more comprehensive analysis of the industry, the
Commission has drawn together a range of previously unpublished data.
·  It obtained a large amount of unpublished data from the 1991–92 and 1996–97
ABS surveys. These data cover such things as staffing, costs and revenues,
patient characteristics and types of treatment. The data differentiate between
hospitals according to ownership, size, casemix and the like.
·  The Commission also accessed material from the Hospital Casemix Protocol
collection maintained by the Commonwealth Department of Health and Aged
Care (DHAC). This collection contains data from all the health insurance funds
on hospital charges, benefits paid, types of procedures and patient
characteristics, for the different types of private hospital.
·  One of the major health funds assisted the Commission by augmenting the data
supplied to the DHAC.
The Commission supplemented this information with ‘desk top’ research and
interviews with: private hospital owners, managers and staff; the major health
funds; Commonwealth and State government officials; industry bodies andINTRODUCTION 3
associations; quality accreditation agencies; and academics. The Commission
thanks those organisations and individuals who contributed to the report.
1.3 Report outline
As noted above, the first part of the report examines the nature and performance of
the private hospital industry:
·  Chapter 2 looks at the different forms of private sector involvement in the
provision of hospital services, the structure of the ‘private hospital industry’ and
how the industry is evolving over time.
·  Chapter 3 discusses the markets for private hospital services. As well as
examining differences in the types of services provided and the geographical
distribution of private hospitals, it looks at the characteristics of private hospital
patients, the doctors providing services to them and the health insurance funds.
·  Chapter 4 provides an overview of the industry’s financial performance,
including information on its revenues, costs and profitability.
·  Chapter 5 looks at broader economic and social performance indicators,
including cost-efficiency and service quality.
The second part of the report examines some of the key influences on the industry’s
performance:
·  Chapter 6 describes the industry-specific regulatory arrangements, as well as
noting some broader health care policies impinging on demand for private
hospital services.
·  Chapter 7 discusses the nature and implications of the relationships between
private hospitals, doctors and the health funds.
·  Chapter 8 looks briefly at some of the non-policy influences on future demand
for private hospital services, including income growth and distribution,
technological change and the ageing of Australia’s population.
Drawing on this analysis, the final chapter canvasses a future policy agenda for the
private hospital industry.THE PRIVATE
HOSPITAL INDUSTRY
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2 The private hospital industry
This chapter examines the structural characteristics of the private hospital industry,
and how these are changing over time.
However, these changes are occurring against a backdrop of broader developments
in the private sector’s role in the delivery of hospital services. The chapter therefore
commences with a brief discussion of that changing role.
2.1 The private sector’s role in the delivery of hospital
services
Traditionally, private hospitals were primarily involved in the provision of services
to fee-paying private patients. The treatment of public patients free of charge was
largely the responsibility of public hospitals, which also provided care for a
significant number of fee-paying patients.
In recent years, the role of public hospitals in treating private patients has declined
significantly — in 1997–98, around 19 per cent of insured separations were in
public institutions, compared with 36 per cent in 1993–94 (AIHW, Australian
Hospital Statistics).
Conversely, governments are looking increasingly to the private sector to help
provide public health care services. In keeping with this trend, the private sector’s
role in the delivery of public hospital services is becoming more important.
A number of factors have contributed to this change, including:
·  (self imposed) funding constraints on governments which have limited their
capacity to invest in new or expanded public hospital facilities;
·  the perception that private involvement will lead to higher quality care and/or
better value for money because of sharper efficiency incentives and the scope for
private firms to exploit synergies from bundling construction, financing and
hospital operations.
For their part, private hospital operators have seen the development of links with the
public sector as a way of augmenting demand for their services and skills.6 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
IN AUSTRALIA
A variety of arrangements now exist that involve a mix of public and private
participation in ownership, management, delivery of services and financing of
hospitals. The key types of arrangements can be characterised as follows.
Traditional public hospitals
According to the AIHW (1999a) a public hospital is:
An establishment controlled by State and Territory health authorities which provides
acute care. It provides free shared-ward accommodation and treatment by a hospital-
appointed doctor. In addition it provides, to those who choose to be private patients,
private ward accommodation and/or doctor of choice.
In the limiting case, a public hospital’s services would be provided without any
private sector involvement.
However, many public hospitals contract out some non-clinical services such as
catering, cleaning and information technology support. And, private health care
companies supply clinical services such as pathology to some public facilities.
Public hospitals contract out services for a variety of reasons, including
opportunities to reduce costs, improve service quality and increase flexibility.
Franchised public hospital services
Franchising is an extended form of contracting out. In essence, it involves a state
government contracting out the entire management of an existing public hospital to
a private health care company. For instance, in 1995, Health Care of Australia
(HCOA) leased the Mersey Hospital in the north of Tasmania.
BOOT-type arrangements
BOO and BOOT arrangements extend the franchising approach by introducing
private sector financing to the construction and operation of facilities for treating
public patients. Under such arrangements, the private sector builds and finances
new hospital facilities to treat public patients in return for the right to operate the
facilities and receive patient payments from state governments:
·  Under a BOO arrangement, the private sector Builds, Owns and Operates a
hospital facility. The state government then purchases public hospital services
for a specified period of time. When the agreement expires or is terminated, the
private company or consortium retains ownership of the facility.THE PRIVATE
HOSPITAL INDUSTRY
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·  A BOOT project is the same except that, at the end of the contract period,
ownership transfers to the state government.
  Some examples of existing BOO and BOOT projects are given in box 2.1. New
projects expected to come into operation in the next few years include the Mildura
Base Hospital (Victoria) and the Robina Public Hospital (Queensland).
Box 2.1 Examples of BOO/BOOT hospital projects
  Hawkesbury Hospital, Windsor (BOOT): The hospital functions as a not-for-profit
private hospital, with a contract to supply acute care hospital and community health
services for public patients for 20 years — after which, the New South Wales
Government will assume ownership. The hospital, opened in 1996, has 127 beds. It
replaced the old 96 bed Hawkesbury Public Hospital. Only the Uniting and Catholic
Churches were invited to tender, with the latter winning the contract. The hospital is
operated by the Hawkesbury District Health Service — a wholly owned subsidiary of
Catholic Health Care.
  Port Macquarie Base Hospital (BOO): This 161 bed hospital is owned and operated
by HCOA. Opened in 1994, it provides services for public and private patients. It has a
20 year services agreement with the New South Wales Department of Health for the
provision of services to public patients.
  Latrobe Regional Hospital (BOO): This 257 bed hospital, which is owned and
operated by the Australian Hospital Care Group (AHC), opened in 1998. The Victorian
Government is purchasing public patient services from AHC for a 20 year period.
Joondalup (BOO): In April 1996, the Western Australian Government signed a 20 year
agreement with HCOA to upgrade the 84 bed Wanneroo Hospital. The contract
specifies that HCOA will finance, design, build, occupy and operate an upgraded
hospital providing 265 public beds and 70 private beds. The new facility opened in
March 1998.
Source: SCRCSSP 1998b
  Another variant of this approach is Build, Own, Lease-Back (BOLB). Here, the
private sector operator constructs the hospital and leases it back to the public sector
which runs the facility. The Mount Gambier hospital in South Australia operates
under this sort of arrangement.8 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
IN AUSTRALIA
Joint delivery of public and private hospital services by religious
groups
  Under arrangements with state and territory governments, more than 20
religious/charitable hospitals, including seven major teaching hospitals, provide
about 3000 beds for use by public patients.
  As a joint venture between the religious/charitable owners and governments, these
arrangements have much in common with BOOT-type facilities:
·  the owners finance the construction and operation of these facilities;
·  the government pays them for treating public patients;
·  there can often be one management structure covering both the public and
private components; and
·  the two components often share staff.
  However, in contrast to a BOOT-type facility, the private hospital component is
operated (and licensed) as a separate ‘private hospital’ within the hospital complex.
Thus, costs and accounts are separately maintained.
Traditional private hospitals
The AIHW (1999a) defines private hospitals as:
Privately owned and operated institutions catering for patients who are treated by a
doctor of their own choice. Patients are charged fees for accommodation and other
services provided by the hospital and relevant medical and paramedical practitioners.
Includes private freestanding day hospital facilities.
Hence, the key characteristics of a private hospital are: private ownership; private
management; doctor of choice; and charges for services rendered.
  The traditional private hospital grouping includes facilities that the public sector has
sold to private owners. Some of these facilities continue to provide some services to
governments under contract. Two examples are:
·  the Repatriation General Hospital, Hollywood, Western Australia, privatised in
1994; and
·  the Repatriation General Hospital, Greenslopes, Queensland, privatised in 1995.
Both were sold as part of a divestment program by the Commonwealth. Access for
veterans to these facilities continues through specific Hospital Services Agreements




The traditional private hospital group also includes hospitals that are co-located
with a public facility to form a joint medical facility or precinct. While there may be
some ‘sharing’ of facilities, the private hospital is not usually involved in the
delivery of any public hospital services. Moreover, co-located public and private
hospitals operate at arm’s length. Indeed, the Commonwealth has guidelines to this
effect, which it applies before ‘declaring’ a co-located private hospital for health
insurance purposes (see chapter 6). These are principally designed to reduce the
Commonwealth’s exposure to cost shifting. This could occur, for example, if
services that were formerly provided to public patients in the public hospital — at a
state government’s expense — are provided, after co-location, by the private
hospital (with the Commonwealth incurring some of the expense for the medical
services involved).
Co-location was rare in Australia a decade ago, but has gained popularity since the
mid 1990s, particularly in New South Wales and Victoria (see table 2.1).
The growth in co-locations reflects complementarities and economies of scope in
the provision of public and private hospital services:
·  Co-locations may reduce duplication of services and facilities and allow for
some sharing of costs.
·  Co-locations may help the public sector retain and/or attract medical specialists,
by providing them with convenient access to private patients. As well as
contributing to the quality of patient care, this may increase the viability of
teaching services, allow public hospitals to install better technology and assist in
nursing recruitment.
·  Apart from greater convenience in accessing their private patients, co-locations
offer medical specialists a back-up service in the public hospital in the event of
complications in treating those patients. Moreover, specialists may prefer to
work in conditions that enable them to interact with their peers and to have
access to a wider range of cases.
·  Access to a wider range of specialists and the security of a back-up service in the
public facility will, in turn, assist the private hospital to attract patients.
That said, co-locations can have downsides. Some free-standing hospitals have
claimed that the relationships between co-located private and public hospitals may
breach competitive neutrality principles (see chapter 7). Further, while co-locations
may be financially advantageous for state governments, the magnitude of the
benefit is likely to be reduced by some loss of private patient revenue in the co-10 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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located public facility. And, as noted above, co-locations give rise to potential cost
shifting problems.
Table 2.1 Some examples of recent hospital co-locations




Owner Name of co-located
public hospital
New South Wales
Armidale Private, Armidale 1998 32 HCOA New England Regional
North Shore Private, Sydney 1998 164 Ramsay Royal North Shore
Prince of Wales Private, Sydney 1997 168 HCOA Prince of Wales
Southern Highlands Private,
Bowral
1996 64 Alpha Bowral and District
St. George Private, Sydney
a 1995 206 HCOA St George
Victoria
Coonara Private, Melbourne 1988 34 Coonara
Private
Alfred
Frances Perry House, Melbourne 1998 55 HCOA Royal Women’s Hospital
Geelong Private, Geelong 1998 61 HCOA Geelong
Melbourne Private, Melbourne 1995 120 HCOA Royal Melbourne
Queensland
Caboolture Private, Caboolture 1999 44 HCOA Caboolture
South Australia
Flinders Private, Adelaide 1999 100 Ramsay Flinders Medical Centre










National Capital Private 1998 110 HCOA Canberra
a St George Private is located adjacent to the public hospital, but is not a co-location in the strict sense.
Source: DHAC Personal Communication.
2.2 Defining the private hospital industry for this study
  As noted above, the key distinguishing features of a ‘private hospital’ are that: it is
privately owned and managed; it charges for services rendered; and it offers patients
the choice of doctor. These features are used to define private hospitals for the
purposes of this report.THE PRIVATE
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  Under this definition, the following types of hospitals collectively comprise the
private hospital industry:
·  privately owned and operated hospitals (acute care, psychiatric and day) that
charge patients fees for accommodation and other services. (This group includes
facilities co-located with public hospitals and formerly government-owned
facilities sold to the private sector);
·  the private hospital component of religious/charitable hospitals; and
·  the private hospital component of BOOT-type facilities such as Hawkesbury,
Port Macquarie and Joondalup, where the public and private components are
owned and managed by the same operator.
  This definition is the same as that employed by the ABS and the Commonwealth
Department of Health and Aged Care from whom the bulk of data used in this
report is sourced. And, with the exception of BOOT-type facilities, the definition
also coincides with the types of institutions licensed as private acute care or
psychiatric hospitals by state/territory governments, plus freestanding day hospitals
approved by the Commonwealth. (BOOT-type facilities providing services to both
public and private patients are regarded by state governments as part of their public
health care systems.)
 2.3 Industry structure and activity
  This section describes the structure and activity of the private hospital industry on
an Australia-wide basis. (Industry data classified by state are provided in appendix
B). All of the data in this section comes from the ABS Private Hospitals collection.
Most of the tables are current to 1997–98. However, in those tables relying on
unpublished data from the collection, the latest year is 1996–97. This is also true of
the ABS data reported in subsequent chapters.
  Number of hospitals
  In 1997–98, there were 492 private hospitals in Australia. Of these, 294 were acute
care hospitals and 23 psychiatric hospitals. These hospitals are the principal focus of
this report. The remaining 175 hospitals were freestanding day facilities.
Acute care and psychiatric hospitals
  The number of acute care and psychiatric hospitals operating in 1997–98 was
virtually the same as in 1991–92.12 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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  However, the number of beds, separations, patient days and revenue all grew
significantly over this period (table 2.2). The principal measure of industry output
— hospital separations — increased by some 37 per cent, while revenue grew by
more than 60 per cent. The increase in activity was accompanied by a one-third rise
in employment.
  Table 2.2 Private hospital industry data, 1991–92 and 1997–98
  1991–92 1997–98 percentage change
  Hospitals
a (no.)   319   317   – 0.6
  Available beds
b (no.)   20 745   23 091   11.3
  Separations (‘000)   1157   1585   37.0
  Patient days (‘000)   4891   5859   19.8
  Revenue ($m)   2177   3517   61.6
  Employment (no.)   31 097   41 566   33.7
  a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
  b Average for the year.
  Source: ABS Private Hospitals 1991–92, 1997–98.
  Private hospital services are concentrated in the major population centres. In
1997–98, nearly two-thirds of private hospitals and 73 per cent of private hospital
beds were located in the capital cities. In per capita terms, there were 1.44 and 0.91
private acute care and psychiatric beds per 1000 population in capital cities and
other areas, respectively.
Freestanding day hospitals
  New technologies are increasing the number of treatments that can be provided on a
same day basis. As a consequence, there has been significant growth in the number
of freestanding day hospitals during the 1990s. Between 1991–92 and 1997–98, the
number more than doubled (from 72 to 175), with a further increase to 186 in
February 1999 (DHAC, personal communication).
  However, despite this growth in numbers, day hospitals still account for a relatively
small share of activity in the industry. For example, while representing around 35
per cent of private hospital establishments in 1997–98, they accounted for less than
15 per cent of separations and less than 4 per cent of industry revenue in that year.
  Size of private hospitals
  The average size of private hospitals has increased in recent years. Thus, while the
total number of acute care and psychiatric hospitals remained virtually the sameTHE PRIVATE
HOSPITAL INDUSTRY
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between 1991–92 and 1997–98, there was an 11 per cent increase in the available
number of beds, with the average hospital size increasing from 65 to 73 beds. These
increases mainly reflected the addition of a number of new large hospitals (over 100
beds) and the exit of some smaller hospitals (table 2.3).
  Table 2.3 Number of private hospitals
a and available beds, by hospital
size, 1991–92 and 1996–97
  Hospital size   1991–92    1996–97
 
    Hospitals   Beds    Hospitals   (1997–98)   Beds
  0–25 beds   68   1 056     67   (66)   985
  26–50 beds   100   3 787     90   (87)   3 476
  51–100 beds   98   7 096     96   (95)   7 027
  101–200 beds   40   5 359     49   (52)   6 837
  Over 200
beds
  13   3 447     17   (17)   4 641
  Total   319   20 745     319   (317)   22 966
  a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
  Source: ABS Private Hospitals 1991–92, 1997–98, and unpublished ABS data.
  The increased number of larger hospitals is reflected in a significant increase in
their activity and market share. For example, in 1997–98, private hospitals with
over 100 beds accounted for 58 per cent of industry separations, up from 48 per cent
in 1991–92 (table 2.4). This increase came at the expense of hospitals with 25–100
beds. The smallest private hospitals — up to 25 beds — increased their separations
by nearly 50 per cent, and maintained their market share.
  Ownership of private hospitals
  There are two broad ownership categories for private hospitals:
·  ‘for-profit’ facilities. This group can be further sub-divided into group/chain
hospitals and independents; and
·  ‘not-for-profit’ facilities, operated by religious/charitable organisations or other
not-for-profit entities.
  In 1997–98, there were 180 for-profit and 137 not-for-profit private acute care and
psychiatric hospitals in Australia. These numbers were little different from those in
1991–92.
  However, within the for-profit group, the number of group hospitals has increased
during the 1990s, and the number of independents declined (table 2.5).14 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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  Table 2.4 Patient days and separations, by private hospital
a size, 1991–92
and 1997–98
   1991–92    1997–98
 
   Patient
days
  Separations   Share of
separations
   Patient
days
  Separations   Share of
separations
   (‘000)   (‘000)   %   (‘000)   (‘000)   %
  0–25 beds   244   29   3   191   43   3
  26–50 beds   799   165   14    710   186   12
  51–100 beds   1 534   404   35    1 561   436   28
  101–200 beds   1 354   337   29    1 986   573   36
  Over 200
beds
  960   222   19    1 410   347   22
  Total   4 891   1 157   100    5 859   1 585   100
  a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
  Source: ABS Private Hospitals 1991–92, 1997–98.
  Table 2.5 Number of private hospitals
a and available beds, by hospital
ownership, 1991–92 and 1996–97
   1991–92    1996–97
 
   Hospitals   Beds   Average
bed size




  114   7 217   63    120   9 516   79
  For-profit
independent
  62   2 838   46    57   2 248   39
  Religious/
charitable
  75   8 138   109    75   8 825   118
  Other not-for-
profit
  68   2 552   38    67   2 377   35
  Total   319   20 745   65    319   22 966   72
  a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
  Source: Unpublished ABS data.
  Increases in the average size of for-profit group hospitals have been largely
responsible for the overall increase in average hospital size during the 1990s. That
said, religious/charitable hospitals are, on average, still considerably larger than
hospitals in the other ownership categories (table 2.5).
  As would be expected, the increase in the numbers and size of for-profit group
hospitals has been accompanied by a rise in their share of patient separations.THE PRIVATE
HOSPITAL INDUSTRY
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Indeed, by 1996-97, the market share of the for-profit groups rivalled that of
religious/charitable hospitals at a little over 40 per cent (table 2.6).
  Table 2.6 Patient days and separations, by private hospital
a ownership,
1991–92 and 1996–97
   1991–92    1996–97
 
    Patient
days
  Separations   Share of
separations
    Patient
days
  Separations   Share of
separations
   (‘000)   (‘000)   %   (‘000)   (‘000)   %
  For-profit
group
  1 588   410   35    2 393   639   42
  For-profit
independent
  617   143   12    500   127   8
  Religious/
charitable
  2 101   470   41    2 379   628   41
  Other not-for-
profit
  585   133   12    582   144   9
  Total   4 891   1 157   100    5 854   1 539   100
  a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
  Source: Unpublished ABS data.
  Private hospital services and procedures
  A feature of the expansion of the private hospital industry during the 1990s has
been an increase in the diversity and complexity of services offered. This has seen
more widespread availability of specialised facilities such as intensive care, cardiac,
neurological and oncology units (table 2.7).
  The principal procedures undertaken in private acute care hospitals in 1997–98 were
operations on:
·  the digestive system (20 per cent);
·  the musculoskeletal system (13 per cent);
·  the nose, mouth and pharynx (7 per cent);
·  female genital organs (7 per cent); and
·  the cardiovascular system (7 per cent).16 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Table 2.7 Private hospitals
a with specialised units
b, 1991–92 and 1997–98
1991–92 1997–98 Growth (per cent)
  Special care    
  Neonatal ICU   20   60   200
  Separate ICU   11   30   173
  Separate CCU   3  21   600
  Combined ICU/CCU   17   33   94
  High dependency unit   64   83   30
  Other    
  Cardiac surgery unit   4  15   275
  Neurosurgical unit   1  7  600
  Oncology unit   8  36   350
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b Only a selection of specialised unit types reported in the ABS data are shown in the table.
Source: ABS Private Hospitals 1991–92, 1997–98.
  By far the fastest growth in procedures performed in private acute care hospitals has
been in cardiovascular operations which have more than trebled during the 1990s.
Other procedures which have grown significantly faster than total separations
include digestive, respiratory and nervous system procedures and obstetrics. Further
information on procedures in private hospitals is contained in chapters 3 and 7 and
appendices A and B.
  Another significant development has been the growth of same day stays. This has
partly reflected the increase in separations in freestanding day facilities from a little
over 120 000 in 1991–92 to more than 270 000 in 1997–98. More than 55 per cent
of separations in day hospitals involve either digestive system or eye procedures.
  But even more significant has been the growth in same day separations in private
acute care (and psychiatric) hospitals. Between 1991–92 and 1997–98, the
proportion of same day patient separations in these hospitals increased from 27 to
45 per cent (table 2.8). Indeed, the increase in same day separations accounted for
most of the overall growth in demand for private hospital services — overnight
stays in private hospitals increased by only 3 per cent over this period. The large
difference in growth rates primarily reflects the previously noted technological
improvements that allow many procedures that used to require overnight stays to be
undertaken as day procedures.THE PRIVATE
HOSPITAL INDUSTRY
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  Table 2.8 Patient classification by procedure or treatment, private
hospitals
 a, 1991–92 and 1997–98
  Patient category   1991–92    1997–98
 
   Hospitals   Separations   Share of
separations
   Hospitals   Separations   Share of
separations
   no.   (‘000)   %   no.   (‘000)   %
  Overnight
patients
  319   846   73    317   872   55
  Advanced
surgery
  197   85   7   212   131   8
  Surgery   222   357   31    228   314   20
  Medical and
minor surgery
  291   321   28    285   329   21
  Obstetrics   111   57   5   119   63   4
  Psychiatric   36   18   2   40   20   1
  Rehabilitation   27   6  1   37   14   1
  Same day
patients
  159   311   27    285   713   45
  All patients   319   1 157   100    317   1 585   100
  a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
  Source: ABS Private Hospitals 1991–92, 1997–98.
 2.4 Mergers and hospital diversification
  Mergers and the diversification of hospital activities, particularly by group
hospitals, are also contributing to the changing nature of the private hospital
industry. These developments are outlined briefly below.
  Mergers and partnerships
  Mergers and partnerships offer a number of potential advantages to participating
hospitals. For example, such arrangements may:
·  create a wider base of activity over which to spread overheads;
·  improve bargaining power when dealing with health funds. (As discussed in
chapter 3, payments by the funds are the dominant source of revenue for most
private hospitals);
·  be more attractive for doctors, in turn potentially increasing the range of services
available; and18 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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·  provide an opportunity to increase the average casemix complexity of the
hospital’s procedures. As discussed later in the report, hospitals indicated that
complex procedures are more profitable than less complex ones.
  Reflecting these advantages, there have been several recent merger and partnership
type arrangements. For example, in 1998, the Sisters of Mercy combined with the
Sisters of Charity in Melbourne to merge Mercy Private and St Vincent’s Private.
  Diversification
  Some of the for-profit groups have broadened their operations to include other
health related activities. HCOA and Alpha have been the most active players in this
regard, acquiring a range of health care services, including GP services and
diagnostic services, such as pathology and radiology. Amongst other things, such
diversification may make hospital groups less dependent on the outcomes of
contract negotiations with the health insurance funds.
  Other hospital groups have sought to strengthen their market position by
diversifying their patient base. One example is Ramsay’s contract with the
Department of Veterans Affairs to treat war veterans.
  At the individual hospital level, one facility told the Commission that, in response to
increased competition from other hospitals, it had introduced an emergency
department. While this emergency department is unlikely to be profitable in its own
right, the hospital said that it provides a significant flow of patients to other parts of
the facility — approximately one in four emergency admissions at the hospital are
subsequently admitted as patients and 27 per cent of all bed days now originate
from the emergency department.PRIVATE HOSPITAL
MARKETS
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3 The market for private hospital
services
This chapter describes the market in which private hospitals operate (section 3.1)
and profiles the other key market participants — patients, health funds and doctors
(section 3.2).
3.1 Market definition
In looking at the market for private hospital services, two important features are the
nature of the activities (or the ‘products’ sold) and the geographic distribution of
those activities. These aspects are considered below.
It is also important to recognise that private hospitals face competition from the
public hospital system. For example, around 19 per cent of insured private patients
receive their treatment in public hospitals, (although whether many of these patients
are potential private hospitals customers has been the subject of debate — see
chapter 7). More generally, demand for private hospital services is influenced by the
availability of free treatment in public hospitals, including for those with private
health insurance who elect to be treated as public patients.
Product markets
Hospitals provide the infrastructure that allows doctors to treat patients. This
includes human resources — particularly nursing staff — as well as beds, theatres,
equipment and other facilities.
However, hospitals are not homogeneous institutions — the ‘infrastructure
packages’ available to doctors and their patients are typically tailored to meet
specific doctor/patient requirements.
Thus, while many private hospitals have the capacity to provide sophisticated
surgical procedures as well as basic medical treatments, in practice, the facilities
and services offered vary significantly. Indeed, many private hospitals target niche
markets using specialised equipment and back-up staff to differentiate their20 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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services. Table 3.1 provides an indication of the various sub-markets in which
private acute care hospitals compete.





Vic Qld SA/NT WA Tas Aust.
I n t e n s i v e  c a r e  ( I C U ) 1 2665103 0
Coronary care (CCU) 8723102 1
Combined ICU/CCU 11690433 3
High dependency 19 32 9 12 6 5 83
N e o n a t a l  I C U 1 6 1 6 1 64626 0
C a r d i a c  s u r g e r y 6441001 5
N e u r o s u r g i c a l 331000 7
S p e c i a l i s t  p a e d i a t r i c 46 1 10212 4




O n c o l o g y 6 1 682313 6
a Only a selection of specialised unit types reported in the ABS data is shown in the table.
Source: ABS Private Hospitals, 1997–98.
Geographic markets
In most jurisdictions, a considerable number of private hospitals offer advanced
surgery, surgery, medical, obstetrics and same day services (table 3.2). Less
complex surgical procedures and certain same day treatments are also available in
freestanding day hospitals. In contrast, the number of private hospitals that cater for
psychiatric, rehabilitation and nursing home type patients is far smaller.
However, such data are not, by themselves, a good indicator of competitive
pressures in the private hospital market. A patient’s choice of hospital is often
constrained by geographic considerations. Thus, the ACCC recently observed that
private hospitals compete ‘in a number of separate geographic markets, the
boundaries of which are dependent on the nature of the particular service being
considered.’ The ACCC went on to argue that:
·  For basic private hospital services such as general surgery and common
specialised services provided at most hospitals, the geographic market is limited
to the local region surrounding a particular hospital. In these cases, convenience
for patients — in terms of proximity to family and friends — and for doctors is
an important constraint on the geographic limits of the market.PRIVATE HOSPITAL
MARKETS
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Table 3.2 Number of private hospitals
a offering services according to





Vic Qld SA/NT WA Tas Aust.
Overnight patients
Advanced surgery 66 61 33 26 17 7 210
S u r g e r y 6 77 03 52 92 3 72 3 1
Medical
b 81 91 48 39 24 8 291
Obstetrics 25 36 20 17 12 3 113
P s y c h i a t r i c 1 2863513 5
Rehabilitation 12 12 3 3 0 2 32
Nursing home type 7 23 16 8 2 1 57
Same day patients 83 88 46 38 25 9 289
Total 89 101 50 42 27 10 319
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b Includes minor surgery.
Source: ABS unpublished data.
·  Conversely, for ‘super-specialised’ services — such as complex cardiac
procedures — the geographic market appears to be state-wide ‘as there are fewer
suppliers and patients must travel from regional areas to receive treatment.’
(ACCC, 1999b, p. 36)
Further, as noted above, demand for a private hospital’s services will also depend
on whether potential patients can readily access treatment in nearby public
hospitals.
3.2 Market participants
  Apart from the hospitals, several other parties are involved in the buying and selling
of private hospital services. They include the ‘ultimate consumer’ — the patient.
However, between the hospital and the patient there is always one other participant
(the doctor) and usually another (the health fund). Importantly, the hospital deals
with doctors and health funds on a regular basis, while it may see individual patients
only once or twice in their lifetime.
  From a policy perspective, two aspects of this arrangement are particularly
significant. First, doctors and health funds both often act as agents for the patient.
Second, responsibility for choosing the product — primarily assumed by the doctor
— is separate from responsibility for paying for it — primarily the role of the health
fund on behalf of its contributors. As discussed in chapter 7, these characteristics
have significant implications for the nature and level of competition in the private
hospital market and pose a number of challenges for hospitals.22 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Patients
  Various ABS and AIHW data indicate that patients with private health insurance
account for around 76 per cent of separations in private acute care and psychiatric
hospitals. Self-paying patients (9 per cent), Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA)
patients (9 per cent), compensable patients (5 per cent) and eligible public patients
(2 per cent) account for the remainder.
Insured patients
  Nearly 6 million Australians are covered by private health insurance — or some 30
per cent of the population. Population coverage in individual jurisdictions ranges
from 24 per cent in the Northern Territory (which has only one private hospital) to
35 per cent in Western Australia (table 3.3). In 1997–98, there were around
1.2 million insured separations in private acute care and psychiatric hospitals and a
further 150 000 insured separations in day facilities (ABS, Private Hospitals
1997–98).
Table 3.3 Membership of health insurance funds, by State and Territory,
September 1999
   NSW
a   Vic   Qld   SA   WA   Tas   NT   Aust.
  Number of persons
covered (‘000)
  2113   1416   1023   472   661   158   46   5890
  Share of population
covered (%)
  31.3   29.9   29.0   31.6   35.3   33.6   23.9   30.9
  a Includes the ACT.
  Source: PHIAC 1999.
Department of Veterans’ Affairs patients
  The DVA provides free hospital treatment to eligible veterans and war
widow/widowers through the Repatriation Private Patient Scheme (RPPS). The
scheme provides treatment for eligible beneficiaries as private patients in public
hospitals, with a safety net system employing contracted and non-contracted private
hospitals.
  Unpublished ABS data indicate that, in 1996–97, 275 private hospitals provided
services to DVA patients, compared with 193 in 1991–92. There were around
135 000 DVA patient separations in private hospitals in 1997–98 (see appendix A)
— a figure expected to increase in the future due, amongst other things, to the




  Compensable patients are those whose hospital treatment is payed for by some form
of compensation scheme. Most suffer from workplace or motor vehicle injuries and
are covered by workers’ compensation and third party motor insurance,
respectively. The number of compensable patients treated in private hospitals
increased by nearly 30 per cent between 1991–92 and 1997–98 to around 73 000
(see appendix A).
Self–paying patients
  As noted above, self-paying patients account for about 9 per cent of private hospital
separations in Australia.
  However, it is important to recognise that self-paying patients provide less than half
of the revenue private hospitals receive directly from patients. As set out in
appendix A, copayments made by insured patients account for the bulk of payments
by individuals to private hospitals.
Eligible public patients
  A small number of public patients currently receive treatment in private hospitals
under contract arrangements with state governments. Unpublished ABS data
indicate that, in 1996–97, there were around 40 000 such separations in more than
60 private hospitals, compared to around 16 000 separations in 1991–92.
Doctors
  In 1997, across Australia, there were nearly 16 000 specialists, or around 86 per
100 000 people. Across jurisdictions, this ratio ranged from 100 in South Australia
to 56 in the Northern Territory (table 3.4).
  Table 3.4 Specialists per 100 000 population, by State, 1997
  Specialty category   NSW   Vic   Qld   SA   WA   Tas   ACT   NT   Aust.
  Internal medicine   25   24   18   28   20   17   26   16   23
  Surgery   15   16   15   19   14   12   15   9  15
  Pathology   4  3  4  5  5  4  4  2  4
  Other specialties   44   49   39   49   38   37   45   29   44
  Total   88   93   75   100   77   69   91   56   86
  Source: AIHW 1999b24 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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  Categorisation of specialists and levels of availability are sensitive to the taxonomy
used. However, in broad terms, most specialists work in ‘internal medicine’ and in
the ‘other specialties’ category which includes specialties such as anaesthesia,
dermatology, ophthalmology, obstetrics, diagnostic radiology and psychiatry. In
1997, less than one-fifth worked in the surgery field.
  The supply of specialists is controlled by medical colleges having regard to such
things as ‘optimal’ specialist to population ratios and the availability of teaching
positions in hospitals. Specialist to population ratios vary widely across individual
specialties — for example, in 1997, there were 5.5 general surgeons, 3.7
orthopaedic surgeons, 0.5 cardiothoracic surgeons and 10.0 anaesthetists per
100 000 population respectively (Commission estimates based on AIHW 1999b).
As noted in chapter 9, there has been ongoing debate about the adequacy of the
supply of some specialities.
  The AIHW data further indicate that in 1997, across Australia, around 3260
specialists worked in private hospitals. They were supported by around 1350
primary care and hospital non-specialist clinicians and some 350 specialists-in-
training. Around three-quarters of these specialists and other clinicians worked in
capital city hospitals, with less than 7 per cent working in hospitals in small country
centres (table 3.5).
  Table 3.5 Clinicians working in private hospitals, by region, 1997
   Capital city   Other
metropolitan









  Specialist   2469   276   343   141   33   3262
  Specialist-in-training   305   34   7  3  2  351
  Primary care   652   113   90   69   74   998
  Hospital non-
specialist
  267   46   23   8  2  346
  Total   3693   469   463   221   111   4957
  Source: AIHW 1999b.
  At the jurisdictional level, Commission estimates based on AIHW data for 1996
suggest that the per capita number of specialists and other clinicians working in
private hospitals is much higher in New South Wales than in the other jurisdictions
(table 3.6). This is despite the fact that the proportion of the population covered by
private health insurance is lower in New South Wales than in a number of the other
states and territories.PRIVATE HOSPITAL
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  Table 3.6 Clinicians working in private hospitals per 100 000 population,
by State, 1996
   NSW   Vic   Qld   SA   WA   Tas   ACT   NT   Aust.
  Specialist   24.3   15.3   11.4   11.7   10.8   16.4   11.7   7.7   16.8
  Specialist-in-training   3.1   1.8   1.2   1.2   1.4   1.7   1.0   1.1   2.0
  Primary care   10.7   2.4   3.1   3.3   1.8   4.6   3.2   1.1   5.4
  Hospital non-
specialist
  2.6   0.9   2.3   1.2   1.0   3.8   1.3   2.2   1.9
  Total   40.6   20.4   18.1   17.4   14.8   26.5   17.2   12.1   26.1
  Source:  Commission estimates based on AIHW 1998; ABS, Yearbook Australia, 1998.
Health funds
  In June 1998, there were 44 registered health funds, of which 28 were open to the
public generally and 16 were restricted membership organisations operating as
‘closed funds’. All but three operated on a not-for-profit basis.
  In June 1998, the five largest health funds accounted for almost three-quarters of
hospital insurance membership, with the three largest funds ¾ Medibank Private,
MBF and National Mutual Health Insurance (now AXA Health Insurance) ¾
covering over half of all fund members (table 3.7).
  Table 3.7 Membership and market shares of major health funds, hospital
insurance, June 1998
  Health Fund   Membership   National market
share
  Cumulative market
share
   (’000)   %  %
  Medibank Private   756   28   28
  MBF   517   19   47
  National Mutual   314   12   58
  HCF   215   8  66
  HBF (WA)   205   8  74
  NIB   136   5  79
  Other open health funds   386   14   93
  Restricted membership health funds   190   7  100
  Total   2 719   100  
  Source: PHIAC Annual Report 1997–98.
  At the state/territory level, concentration is even higher. At June 1997 — the latest
data available to the Commission — two health funds covered 70 per cent or more
of private health insurance membership in each state, other than in New South
Wales where 70 per cent of membership was divided between three funds (table26 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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3.8). This concentration may have implications for rate negotiations between health
funds and private hospitals (see chapter 7).
  Table 3.8 Degree of health fund
a concentration, by State, June 1997
  State   Largest insurer –
percentage of total
membership in state
  Largest two insurers –
percentage of total
membership in state
  Largest three insurers
— percentage of total
membership in state
  NSW
b   26   49   70
  Vic   45   71   86
  Qld   55   91   94
  SA   53   74   87
  WA   73   92   95
  Tas   50   80   99
  NT   60   100   na
  na not applicable
  a Open membership health funds only.
  b Includes the ACT.
  Source: PHIAC Annual Report 1996–97.
Other market participants
State and Commonwealth  governments
  State and territory governments are responsible for the licensing and regulation of
private hospitals. They also influence the industry through their policies in relation
to the management of the public hospital system, privatisation of public hospital
facilities, contracting of public patients and co-locations.
  Commonwealth government legislation similarly has a major influence on the
private hospital industry. Notable examples include the Health Legislation (Private
Health Insurance Reform) Amendment Act 1995 — which regulates agreements
between private hospitals, health funds and doctors — and recent legislation
enacted to encourage health fund membership. Commonwealth policies in relation
to Medicare and public hospital funding also have important flow-on effects for
demand for private hospital services.
  Chapter 6 describes the current regulatory requirements of the Commonwealth and
state and territory governments, with chapters 7 and 9 pursuing some particular




  Private hospitals seek accreditation as a quality assurance measure for patients and
clinicians. There are currently two competing accreditation schemes in Australia run
by:
·  the Australian Council on Healthcare Standards; and
·  the International Standards Organisation.
The role of accreditation agencies and their impact on the private hospital industry
are discussed in chapter 5.
Consumer advocates
While doctors and health funds often act as agents for private hospital patients,
there are several consumer groups that represent patients in a general advocacy
sense and in helping to resolve particular problems. These include the Australian
Consumers’ Association, the Consumer Health Forum and the Council on the





The financial performance of the private hospital industry has implications for all of
the parties involved in the delivery and consumption of private hospital services:
·  Satisfactory financial performance is obviously a pre-requisite for private
hospitals to survive and prosper.
·  The fortunes of hospitals will, in turn, have implications for the quality and
range of services available to patients (see chapter 5) and for the access of
doctors to private hospital facilities.
·  There will also be implications for the capacity of health insurance funds to offer
attractive private hospital cover to their members (see chapter 7).
This chapter looks at the two broad drivers of profitability in the sector, namely
revenues (section 4.1) and costs (section 4.2), before concluding with an analysis of
profitability (section 4.3).
Much of the data in this and subsequent chapters is presented in both ‘current’ and
1991–92 prices. The Consumer Price Index was used as the deflator in all 1991–92
price equivalent calculations.
4.1 Private hospital revenues
Overall picture
Private hospital revenue consists principally of patient revenue (around 92 per cent
of total revenue Australia-wide in 1997–98), with recoveries (5 per cent) and other
items (for example, investment income and bequests) making up the balance.
Around 70 per cent of total revenue comes from health funds. Other sources of
revenue include payments by patients (self-funded treatment and copayments),
funding by the Commonwealth for Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) patients,
and payments made by governments and private insurers for compensable patients
(see appendix A).
During the 1990s, private hospital revenues have grown strongly:30 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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·  In 1997–98, private acute care and psychiatric hospital revenue across Australia
was more than $3.5 billion (table 4.1). In real terms, this represented an increase
of more than 40 per cent since 1991–92. On a ‘per hospital’ basis, revenue
increased from $6.8 million to $11.1 million over the period.
·  The day hospital sector’s revenue grew from around $45 million in 1991–92 to
$145 million in 1997–98 — an increase of some 190 per cent in real terms.
Table 4.1 Private hospital revenue
a, 1991–92 and 1997–98
1991–92 1997–98 Real change
$m $m %
Patient revenue 2075 3249 40
Recoveries 45 175 246
Other 58 93 43
Total revenue 2177 3517 44
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals. The total revenue figures include non-patient revenue which is
excluded from most of the subsequent revenue tables.
Source: ABS Private Hospitals 1997–98.
Strong growth in private hospital revenues occurred in all jurisdictions, with the
largest increases reported in Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia. During
the 1990s, New South Wales/ACT has overtaken Victoria as the leading private
hospital revenue earner (see appendix tables B.6 and B.7).
Average revenue
There are two common ways of presenting information on hospital revenues:
revenue per admission and revenue per patient day. The latter, also known as ‘the
bed day charge’, has to date provided the main basis for rate negotiations between
private hospitals and health funds. However, the concern of the funds to limit
premium increases has seen them put greater emphasis on episodic, or case,
payments as a way of encouraging greater efficiency in the delivery of private
hospital services. Hence, revenue per admission (the ‘admission’ charge) is
becoming an increasingly used indicator.
In 1997–98, the average admission charge for private acute care and psychiatric
hospitals was around $2 050. This was some 14 per cent higher than the average
charge in 1991–92. However, in real terms, the increase was just 2 per cent (table
4.2). Moreover, this increase was entirely due to the rise in average charges by for-
profit group hospitals. Average charges by not-for-profit and stand alone for-profit
hospitals declined in real terms over the period (appendix table A.14).FINANCIAL
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In contrast to the very small increase in average admission charges, the average
charge per patient day increased in real terms by nearly 17 per cent between
1991–92 and 1997–98 (table 4.3). This difference mainly reflects the significant fall
in the average length of patient stay (ALOS) in private hospitals during the 1990s
(see chapter 5). This means that non-accommodation charges, such as theatre
charges, are spread over fewer days, leading to higher total daily charges.












1992–93 1851 1832 2.2
1993–94 1895 1843 0.6
1994–95 1943 1830 -0.7
1995–96 2002 1810 -1.1
1996–97 2054 1832 1.2
1997–98 2049 1828 -0.2
Change: 1991–92 to 1997–98 256 35 2.0
a Patient revenue per separation.
b Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source: ABS Private Hospitals, various years.












1992–93 445 440 3.8
1993–94 458 446 1.4
1994–95 483 455 2.0
1995–96 498 450 -1.1
1996–97 540 482 7.1
1997–98 554 495 2.7
Change: 1991–92 to 1997–98 130 71 16.7
a Patient revenue per bed day.
b Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source: ABS Private Hospitals, various years.32 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Average charges in private acute care and psychiatric hospitals are significantly
higher than those in freestanding day hospitals. This primarily reflects the more
complex procedures performed in acute care hospitals. In 1997–98, the average
admission charge in freestanding day hospitals was a little over $500 (table 4.4) —
or around a quarter of the average admission charge for acute care and psychiatric
hospitals. That said, between 1991–92 and 1997–98, real average admission charges
in day hospitals increased by significantly more (38 per cent) than in other private
hospitals.
Table 4.4 Average charges
a, day hospitals, 1991–92 to 1997–98






1992–93 391 387 16.7
1993–94 396 385 -0.6
1994–95 436 410 6.7
1995–96 451 408 -0.7
1996–97 499 445 9.2
1997–98 512 457 2.7
Change: 1991–92 to 1997–98 180 125 37.7
a Patient revenue per separation.
Source: ABS Private Hospitals, various years.
Effects of increased hospital usage on revenues
The large difference in the growth in private hospital revenues and admission
charges during the 1990s points to the influence of increased hospital usage on the
industry’s financial performance. Indeed, the Commission estimates that more than
90 per cent of private hospital revenue growth over this period can be attributed to
increased admissions (appendix table A.7). (Between 1991–92 and 1997–98,
admissions to private acute care and psychiatric hospitals increased by some 37 per
cent).
Growth in admissions has also been the major factor underlying revenue growth in
most of the individual private hospital ownership and bed size groupings. Only in
the 51–100 bed size category have increases in average charges accounted for the
majority of total revenue growth (appendix table A.8).FINANCIAL
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Revenues and the clinical profile of patients
Over 90 per cent of private hospital revenue comes from accommodation and
theatre charges, with the remainder coming from charges for intensive care,
prostheses and pharmaceuticals (see appendix figure A.1).
The clinical revenue profile of acute care and psychiatric private hospitals has
changed in the 1990s (table 4.5). In particular, the revenue share of advanced
surgery and same day patients has risen, while that of other forms of surgery has
fallen. In the case of advanced surgery, the increase in revenue share has been
associated with only a small rise in the share of separations. In contrast, the similar
increase in the revenue share for same day patients has been accompanied by a
significant increase in the share of separations.
Table 4.5 Private hospital












Advanced Surgery 19 7 25 8
Surgery 29 31 25 21
Obstetrics 7 5 6 4
Medical and minor surgery 31 28 24 21
Psychiatric 7 2 5 1
Rehabilitation 2 0.5 3 1
Nursing home type patient 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1
Same day 6 27 11 44
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b Patient classification applying for Medicare and health fund benefit purposes. Patients undergoing the most
complex treatment (advanced surgery) generally attract the highest daily accommodation and theatre charges.
Source: Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data and HCF Charges Survey 1996.
A similar change in revenue profile is evident across the different hospital size and
ownership groups. The increase in the revenue share of advanced surgery and day
surgery has been strongest in for-profit group hospitals and the smallest hospitals
(0 to 25 beds), respectively (appendix tables A.4 and A.5).
A further indication of the contribution of different treatments to private hospital
revenues is provided by reference to the leading Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG)
revenue episodes. The highest DRG revenue earners are confinement, hip
replacements, knee procedures, lens procedures and major affective disorders
(appendix table A.3).34 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Within the day hospital sector, although general surgery and specialist endoscopy
have made a significant contribution to the growth in total revenues, their revenue
shares have fallen (table 4.6). This has mainly reflected the very strong growth in
revenue of facilities included in the ‘other’ category — such as those specialising in
plastic and cosmetic surgery, sleep disorders, fertility and IVF, oncology and
dental/oral surgery.
Table 4.6 Day hospital patient revenue, by type of specialty, 1991–92 and
1997–98
Specialty 1991–92 1997–98
$000 % $000 %
General surgery 16 355 40 45 087 32
Specialist endoscopy 12 461 30 28 250 20
Ophthalmic 5 823 14 25 622 18
Other
a 6 278 15 40 104 29
Total 40 917 100 139 062 100
a ‘Other’ includes fertility, plastic surgery and sleep disorder clinics.
Source: ABS Private Hospitals, 1991–92, 1997–98.
4.2 Private hospital costs
Overall picture
Over the period 1991–92 to 1997–98, private acute care and psychiatric hospital
recurrent expenditure across Australia rose from just under $2 billion to around
$3.2 billion, or nearly 50 per cent in real terms (table 4.7). On a ‘per hospital’ basis,
recurrent expenditure increased from $6.1 million to $10.2 million.
Labour costs account for nearly 60 per cent of recurrent costs in the industry. Wages
and salaries account for nearly 90 per cent of labour costs, with superannuation (5
per cent); payroll tax (2 per cent); and other on-costs (5 per cent) making up the
remainder.
Non-labour costs in 1997–98 comprised: drugs, medical and surgical supplies (33
per cent); depreciation, interest and contract services (31 per cent); administrative
expenses (20 per cent); food (5 per cent); repairs and maintenance (5 per cent); and
other domestic services (5 per cent).
As is apparent from table 4.7, non-labour costs have grown slightly faster than
labour costs during the 1990s, with growth in capital expenditure being slightlyFINANCIAL
PERFORMANCE
35
higher again. While the majority of capital expenditure has been for the purchase of
land and buildings, the strongest growth in spending has been on medical and
computer equipment (table 4.7).
Table 4.7 Private hospital
a expenditure, 1991–92 to 1997–98
1991–92 1996–97 1997–98 Real change
1991-92 to 1997–98
$m $m $m %
Recurrent expenditure 1 955 3 088 3 232 47
Labour costs 1 189 1 829 1 900 43
Non-labour costs 766 1 258 1 332 55
Gross capital
expenditure
212 307 376 58
Land & buildings 120 166 np




Plant & other equipment 37 53 np
Other 18 14 np
np Not published. Components of gross capital expenditure for 1991–92 and 1996–97 come from unpublished
ABS data.
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source: ABS Private Hospitals, various years; unpublished ABS data.
Average costs
In 1997–98, recurrent expenditure per admission (or ‘average cost’) in private acute
care and psychiatric hospitals was about $2 040, a real increase of a little less than 8
per cent from 1991–92 (table 4.8). As noted, over the same period, real average
charges increased by 2 per cent (table 4.2).
Reflecting the decline in ALOS during the 1990s, increases in average recurrent
expenditure per admission have been significantly lower than the increases in
average recurrent expenditure per patient day. The real increase in average daily
expenditures of 23 per cent between 1991–92 and 1997–98 (table 4.9), was three
times the increase in average expenditure per admission over this period.
In freestanding day hospitals, average recurrent expenditure per admission of $450
in 1997–98 was some 40 per cent higher in real terms than in 1991–92. The general
surgery and endoscopy specialties — which account for the bulk of separations —
were responsible for most of this increase. Average costs for the ‘other specialties’
group of procedures declined in real terms over the period.36 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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1992–93 1705 1687 -0.1
1993–94 1780 1731 2.6
1994–95 1859 1751 1.1
1995–96 1944 1758 0.4
1996–97 2006 1789 1.8
1997–98 2039 1819 1.7
Change: 1991–92 to 1997–98 350 130 7.7
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source: ABS Private Hospitals, various years.











1992–93 409 405 1.2
1993–94 430 418 3.3
1994–95 462 435 4.1
1995–96 483 437 0.3
1996–97 527 470 7.7
1997–98 552 492 4.7
Change: 1991–92 to 1997–98 152 92 23.0
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source: ABS Private Hospitals, various years.
Sources of increases in total costs
A decomposition of the annual changes in recurrent expenditure between 1991–92
and 1997–98 into usage and unit cost components shows that greater use of private
hospitals has driven the growth in total costs in the 1990s (appendix table A.18).
The Commission’s estimates indicate that, over this period, nearly 80 per cent of the
increase in real recurrent expenditure was attributable to growth in admissions. This
proportion, which is only slightly less than the contribution of increased admissionsFINANCIAL
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to growth in private hospital revenues (93 per cent), underscores the impact of
demand growth on recent financial outcomes in the industry.
A similar decomposition according to hospital ownership and size shows that, in all
bar the 51–100 bed size category, increased usage has been a more important
contributor to total cost growth than increases in average costs per admission
(appendix table A.19). Indeed, average costs in the for-profit independent and other
not-for-profit ownership groups, and the 26–50 and over 200 bed size groups fell
between 1991–92 and 1996–97.
Sources of increase in unit costs
Across all private acute care and psychiatric hospitals, increases in non-labour costs
have accounted for some two-thirds of the increase in average real costs per
admission during the 1990s (appendix table A.20).
However, the experience varies considerably across individual hospital size and
ownership groups. For example, real labour costs per separation in
religious/charitable hospitals declined between 1991–92 and 1996–97, meaning that
higher non-labour costs (or outsourced labour costs) accounted for all of the
increase in real unit costs over this period. In contrast, in for-profit group hospitals,
higher unit labour costs accounted for nearly two-thirds of the increase in real
average costs per admission.
Across the industry as a whole, the fastest growing component of labour costs has
been superannuation (up 81 per cent per separation in real terms over the period
1991–92 to 1996–97). In contrast, real wage and salary costs per separation
increased in real terms by only about 1 per cent over this period. The fastest
growing components of non-labour costs have been contract services and medical
and surgical supplies (up 60 and 43 per cent per separation in real terms,
respectively, between 1991–92 and 1996–97). (See appendix tables B. 16–19, 34–
37).
Changes in complexity
The Industry Commission (1997) noted that part of the increase in private hospital
costs reflects the increasing complexity of procedures undertaken. This has
necessitated greater use of high technology equipment and more highly qualified
(and better paid) nursing staff, as well as higher spending on drugs, medical and
surgical supplies.38 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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The impacts of greater casemix complexity on unit treatment costs are likely to be
most significant for that group of patients requiring overnight or more extended
hospital stays. Based on DHFS casemix data, the Commission estimates that, in
1996–97, the average overnight patient in a private acute care hospital was 17 per
cent more costly to treat in real terms than in 1993–94. This was nearly three times
the increase of 6 per cent in the average real unit cost of treating all patients
(including same day patients) over the same period.
4.3 Profitability
A firm’s or sector’s profits can be expressed in a number of ways, including as a
percentage of turnover, or as a percentage of the asset base. For comparisons of
profitability across sectors, the choice of methodology can be critical, with rate of
return on asset measures usually being preferred. However, for comparisons of
profitability within a sector over time, more flexibility is possible, with the nature of
the available data being an important consideration in the choice of methodology.
In this report, the Commission’s has reported four measures of profitability in the
private hospital industry — dollar margins on a per day and per separation basis,
revenue minus operating costs as a percentage of revenue, and revenue minus total
costs as a percentage of revenue. The first three should be regarded as only very
general indicators of changes in profitability, as they include no capital cost
component. Thus, they do not distinguish the impacts of changes in operating
efficiency on profitability from, say, the impacts of investment in new revenue
generating equipment. In contrast, the last measure incorporates interest costs and
depreciation in the cost base and is therefore likely to provide a better indicator of
movements in the industry’s profitability over time.
Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals
Reflecting the larger increases in patient costs than in patient revenues, the
profitability of private acute care and psychiatric hospitals has declined during the
1990s. Specifically, for the industry as a whole, the ‘net operating margin’ (total
revenue minus total recurrent expenditure, divided by total revenue) declined from
10.2 per cent in 1991–92 to 8.1 per cent in 1997–98 (table 4.10). Indeed, in 1997–
98, patient revenues only marginally exceeded expenditures (see tables 4.1 and 4.7).
Hence, the positive operating margin was largely attributable to recoveries and non-
patient revenues such as investment income and bequests.FINANCIAL
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Table 4.10 Private hospital
a profitability, 1991–92 to 1997–98





Per separation 361 365 na na
Per day 85 96 na na
Net profit
c
Per separation 192 186 180 -16.4
Per day 45 49 49 -2.9
%% %
Gross operating margin
d 19.2 16.7 na
Net operating margin
e 10.2 8.5 8.1
na not available.
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b Profit on operations before depreciation, interest expenses and payroll tax are deducted.
c Total revenue less total recurrent expenditure.
d Gross profit as a proportion of total revenue.
e Net profit as a proportion of total revenue.
Source: Commission estimates based on ABS Private Hospitals various years and unpublished ABS data.
Profitability and hospital ownership
The decline in profitability at the industry-wide level in the period to 1996–97
reflected the substantial fall in the margins of the religious/charitable and the for-
profit independent hospital groups (tables 4.11 and 4.12). In contrast, the average
‘net operating margins’ of for-profit group and ‘other’ not-for-profit hospitals
increased slightly over this period. In terms of overall financial performance, for-
profit group hospitals were the strongest performers. Indeed, even allowing for
liability for company tax — which is not reflected in the data — the for-profit group
hospitals would still have had a higher average net operating margin in 1996–97
than the other ownership groups. However, it is important to note that a number of
individual for-profit group operators have recently reported significant reductions in
their profitability.
Profitability and hospital size
Gross dollar operating profits typically increase with hospital size (table 4.13).40 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Table 4.11 Private hospital
a profits, by ownership group, 1996–97
Profit indicator Profit, 1996–97
($)


























Per separation 453 345 303 260 2.0 -23.7 -23.0 -1.8
Per day 121 88 80 64 5.4 -15.8 -9.1 7.0
Net profit
c
Per separation 299 141 94 124 15.0 -49.1 -49.5 7.4
Per day 80 36 25 31 18.9 -43.7 -39.7 20.2
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b Profit on operations before depreciation, interest expenses and payroll tax are deducted.
c Total revenue less total recurrent expenditure.
Source: Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data.
Table 4.12 Private hospital
a operating margins, by ownership group,











b 23.6 23.2 16.5 13.7
Net operating margin
c 13.8 14.2 7.8 5.9
1996–97
Gross operating margin
b 21.2 17.9 12.8 13.9
Net operating margin
c 14.0 7.3 4.0 6.6
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b Gross profit as a proportion of total revenue.
c Net profit as a proportion of total revenue.
Source: Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data.
However, this may simply reflect greater casemix complexity in larger hospitals. As
noted above, greater casemix complexity usually entails higher operating and
capital costs per separation. Hence, higher dollar margins will be required to
provide comparable rates of return to those achieved by hospitals with a less
complex casemix. Significantly, net operating margins have been similar across the
various hospital size groupings (other than the 0 to 25 bed group) (table 4.14).
Table 4.14 also indicates that, in keeping with the overall decline in industry
profitability, the gross and net operating margins of all bed size groups other than
the 0 to 25 category fell between 1991–92 and 1996–97.FINANCIAL
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Table 4.13 Private hospital
a profits, by hospital bed size, 1996–97
Profit indicator Profit, 1996–97
($)
























Per separation 123 305 371 358 432 7.9 -20.0 -2.8 -14.1 -11.5
Per day 26 78 97 101 108 91.9 -1.9 -3.0 -2.4 -4.2
Net profit
c
Per separation 27 147 210 176 214 124.1 -28.0 -7.7 -17.8 -11.6
Per day 6 37 55 50 54 156.1 -13.2 -7.4 -7.1 -3.7
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b Profit on operations before depreciation, interest expenses and payroll tax are deducted.
c Total revenue less total recurrent expenditure.
Source: Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data.
Table 4.14 Private hospital
a operating margins, by hospital bed size,
1991–92 and 1996–97 (per cent)
Profit indicator 0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200
1991–92
Gross operating margin
b 4.3 19.3 20.8 20.6 17.6
Net operating margin
c -3.0 10.3 12.4 10.6 8.7
1996–97
Gross operating margin
b 7.6 16.7 18.4 16.6 15.8
Net operating margin
c 1.7 8.1 10.4 8.1 7.9
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b Gross profit as a proportion of total revenue.
c Net profit as a proportion of total revenue.
Source: Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data.
Other factors influencing profitability
The discussion above suggests that ownership (but not hospital size), has an
influence on the financial performance of private hospitals. This finding is
consistent with some other studies, including a US study by Renn et al (1985), and a
study by Jarden Morgan and Archon (JM&A, 1990) for the Australian Health
Ministers’ Advisory Council.
The Commission also examined a number of other factors that might influence
financial outcomes, including average lengths of patient stay and hospital
occupancy rates.42 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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The unpublished ABS data reveal that, in 1996–97, private hospitals with an
average patient stay of less than three days were more profitable than those with
average patient stays of 3 to 6 days. However, the one-quarter of hospitals with an
ALOS of over 6 days recorded the highest average net operating margin (12.6 per
cent). This latter result is, in turn, consistent with the finding that hospitals treating
longer stay non-surgical patients have been more profitable than those treating
mainly surgical patients (see below).
The unpublished ABS data further demonstrate an expected link between
occupancy rates and profitability. In 1996–97, private hospitals with an occupancy
rate of over 75 per cent achieved the highest average net operating margin (10.2 per
cent), followed by hospitals with 65–74 per cent occupancy (8.2 per cent) and 50–
64 per cent occupancy (5.8 per cent). Hospitals with occupancy rates of less than 50
per cent had an average net operating margin of only 2.9 per cent.
A number of hospital owners consulted during this study also stressed the
importance for good financial outcomes of attracting advanced surgery patients.
However, analysis undertaken by the Commission using unpublished ABS data
indicates that in 1996–97:
·  While surgical hospitals with the largest proportion of advanced surgery patients
recorded the highest dollar profit margins for hospitals in that group, their net
operating margins were slightly below the industry average.
·  The 109 private hospitals with no advanced surgery patients achieved an average
net operating margin more than 50 per cent above the industry average.
Moreover, as noted above, net operating margins do not appear to increase with
hospital size, despite the fact that larger hospitals tend to have greater average
casemix complexity than smaller hospitals. Together, these data suggest that, across
the industry as a whole, charges and health fund benefits relative to treatment costs
are not skewed in favour of advanced surgery patients.
Profitability of day hospitals
Reflecting the short stay nature of day hospital procedures, profits per separation are
generally lower than in private acute care and psychiatric hospitals (table 4.15). The
notable exception is day facilities specialising in ophthalmic procedures, where
profits per separation are similar to the average for the acute care sector.
As in the acute care sector, average operating margins achieved by day hospitals
declined between 1991–92 and 1997–98 (table 4.16). That said, these marginsFINANCIAL
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remained considerably higher than in acute care hospitals. Moreover, there was
some variability in profitability outcomes, with day hospitals specialising in
ophthalmic procedures increasing their operating margins slightly over this period.
Table 4.15 Day hospital profits, 1996–97 and 1997–98
Profit per separation
($)
































48 82 267 81 85 -14.4 -7.4 27.4 -61.4 -7.5
a Profit on operations before depreciation, interest expenses and payroll tax are deducted.
b Total revenue less total recurrent expenditure.
Source: Commission estimates based on ABS Private Hospitals 1996–97, 1997–98 and unpublished ABS
data.








a 24.8 37.5 28.9 34.1 31.2
Net operating margin
b 14.0 30.0 21.4 25.3 22.3
1996–97
Gross operating margin
a 21.8 32.2 31.8 23.9 26.3
Net operating margin
b 14.1 25.9 26.7 18.8 20.0
1997–98
Gross operating margin
a na na na na na
Net operating margin
b 10.0 24.3 21.9 12.3 15.8
na Not available.
a Gross profit as a proportion of total revenue.
b Net profit as a proportion of total revenue.




5 Broader performance indicators
This chapter looks at some non-financial indicators of private hospital performance,
namely:
·  hospital efficiency;
·  service quality; and
·  appropriateness of services provided.
 5.1 Hospital efficiency
  Typically, hospital outputs are expressed in terms of episodes of care, as measured
by separations or patient days. The following sections examine three indicators of
how efficiently these outputs are delivered: cost efficiency, labour productivity and
average length of stay.
  In interpreting the results, it is important to bear in mind a number of broader
factors impinging on the delivery of services by private hospitals:
·  The input of doctors and health funds to the delivery of services means that
hospital operators do not have full, or even significant, control over many
outcomes. Thus, for example, hospital efficiency is affected by how long doctors
take in theatre.
·  While hospital management can vary some costs in the short term, costs related
to such things as infrastructure and equipment can only be changed over the
longer term.
·  The objectives pursued by hospitals differ. For example, not-for-profit hospitals
may put less emphasis on reducing costs and increasing surpluses than for-profit
hospitals, particularly if there is any suggestion of compromising the quality of
care provided.
Cost efficiency
  Widely varying complexity and severity of patient conditions have a significant
impact on the cost of hospital treatments.46 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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  Accordingly, to compare the outputs of different hospitals, it is common to use
case-weighted data. Average casemix-adjusted (recurrent) cost per
separation is often regarded as a good indicator of a hospital’s overall
cost efficiency.
  Figure 5.1 shows the trend in casemix-adjusted costs per separation for all private
acute care hospitals between 1993–94 and 1996–97. Over that period, the real
average cost per casemix-adjusted separation fell by 3 per cent from around $1850
to about $1800, due mainly to a reduction in unit labour costs of 4.5 per cent.
  Figure 5.1 Real cost per casemix-adjusted separation, private acute care






















Source: Commission estimates based on data provided in ABS Private Hospitals 1996–97 and DHFS
Australian Casemix Report on Hospital Activity, 1996–97.
Looking at costs per casemix-adjusted separation according to hospital ownership
and size (tables 5.1 and 5.2) reveals some differences across the industry:
·  Total unit costs in religious/charitable hospitals are considerably higher than for
the other ownership groups — 23 per cent above the next most costly group in
1996–97. (However, as discussed below, care is required in interpreting this
outcome to mean that religious/charitable hospitals are less efficient.)
·  While total costs for the other ownership groups differ little, there is more
variation across those groups in individual cost categories. This is particularly




Table 5.1  Cost per casemix-adjusted separation, private hospitals
a, by
ownership group, 1996–97 ($)










  Total labour costs   1021   1011   1278   1113   1137
  Nursing staff wages & salaries   578   519   658   617   611
  Medical/diagnostic staff salaries   48   71   74   53   61
  Admin/clerical staff wages   102   119   140   112   120
  Domestic/other staff wages   140   149   215   162   174
  Other   43   63   67   47   56
  Staff on-costs
b   110   90   123   123   115
  Total non-labour costs   733   763   905   658   801
  Medical & surgical supplies   204   141   202   128   191
  Drug supplies   55   54   73   51   62
  Administration   150   202   191   123   169
  Contract services   107   83   98   91   100
  Depreciation and interest   93   162   200   137   148
  Other   124   121   141   128   131
  Total recurrent hospital costs   1754   1774   2183   1771   1938
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b Excludes payroll tax.
Source:  Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data.
  Table 5.2 Cost per casemix-adjusted separation, private hospitals
a, by
hospital size, 1996–97 ($)












  Total labour costs   1087   984   1043   1115   1360   1137
  Nursing staff wages & salaries   555   506   568   623   704   611
  Medical/diagnostic staff salaries   60   41   50   52   91   61
  Admin/clerical staff wages   120   112   108   113   148   120
  Domestic/other staff wages   159   152   159   166   215   174
  Other   88   65   50   50   66   56
  Staff on-costs
b   107   108   108   111   136   115
  Total non-labour costs   598   702   729   818   936   801
  Medical & surgical supplies   62   137   173   198   245   191
  Drug supplies   32   49   51   70   73   62
  Administration   172   174   160   175   170   169
  Contract services   98   95   93   98   114   100
  Depreciation and interest   88   124   122   154   186   148
  Other   146   123   130   123   148   131
  Total recurrent hospital costs   1686   1686   1772   1933   2296   1938
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b Excludes payroll tax.
Source: Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data.48 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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·  Costs per casemix-adjusted separation increase with hospital size. Taken at face
value, this might suggest there are diseconomies of scale in service delivery.
However, given the nature of the cross tabulations, it is more likely to simply
reflect the greater prominence of religious/charitable hospitals in the larger bed
size categories. (The Commission did not have access to data on costs for
different hospital sizes within particular ownership groups.)
·  The very smallest hospitals have relatively high labour costs. However, these are
offset by lower non-labour costs.
Labour productivity
As labour accounts for around 60 per cent of recurrent costs, improvements in
labour productivity can provide significant savings to hospitals.
One very simple indicator of changes in labour productivity is the change in
revenue per employee (RPE). Across the industry as whole, this increased by about
5 per cent in real terms between 1991–92 and 1996–97 (table 5.3). While no
correlation between RPE and hospital size was evident, growth in RPE was higher
in the not-for-profit sector than in the for-profit sector over this period.
Table 5.3 Revenue per employee, private hospitals
a, by ownership group
and hospital size, 1991–92 and 1996–97




For-profit group 80.7 91.9 1.5
For-profit independent 74.4 81.3 -2.7
Religious/charitable 65.0 77.0 5.7
Other not-for-profit 62.4 73.9 5.6
Size categories
0–25 beds 51.0 65.3 14.2
26–50 beds 69.2 77.6 0.1
51–100 beds 73.9 84.7 2.2
101–200 beds 68.7 83.3 8.1
Over 200 beds 70.7 83.1 4.9
All hospitals 70.0 82.4 5.1
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source: Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data.
However, care is required in drawing conclusions about movements in labour




·  Greater casemix complexity may involve proportionately greater non-labour
input per separation, leading to higher RPE.
·  Similarly, any change in treatment modes that involves replacing labour input
with equipment or drugs will lead to higher RPE.
The absence of case-weight data prior to 1993–94, meant that the Commission
could not adjust the data in table 5.3 to make an allowance for changes in casemix
complexity. Suffice it to say, that the increase in average casemix complexity
between 1993–94 and 1996–97, of around 6 per cent for the industry as a whole,
exceeded the growth in real RPE over the longer period covered in table 5.3.
Average Length of Stay (ALOS)
The change in the ALOS (adjusted for casemix) is another possible indicator of the
efficiency of hospital resource management and treatment protocols. In most
countries, ALOS has been falling in both the public and private hospital systems.
Amongst other things, this has reflected improved treatment protocols for overnight
patients, the substitution of drug treatments for some surgical treatments and
increased day admissions. (Chapter 8 discusses some of the technological
developments underlying these changes.)
In line with this general trend, both unadjusted and casemix-adjusted ALOS in
Australian private hospitals have fallen considerably during the 1990s (figure 5.2).
Within the industry, the ALOS for the top 15 DRGs in for-profit group hospitals is
on average 5 to 6 per cent lower than for the other ownership groups (table 5.4).
Similarly, ALOS in the smallest hospitals is around 10 per cent lower than in the
largest hospitals (table 5.5).
Some general caveats on the efficiency indicators
Prima facie, the indicators above suggest that for-profit hospitals, and particularly
for-profit group hospitals, are more efficient than their not-for-profit counterparts.
Some would argue that this reflects the commercial disciplines on for-profit
hospitals to operate efficiently.
However, not-for-profit hospitals also have incentives to provide their services
efficiently. For instance, improvements in efficiency could allow a not-for-profit
hospital to treat more disadvantaged patients without compromising overall
viability, or to provide additional funds for the organisation’s other activities.
Hence, it is important to look for explanations other than differences in efficiency
for the variations across ownership groups in the indicators reported above.50 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Source: Commission estimates based on ABS Private Hospitals, 1996–97 and DHFS Australian Casemix
Report on Hospital Activity, 1996–97.
Table 5.4 Average length of stay for top 15 DRGs
a , private hospitals
b, by













674 Vaginal delivery 5.68 5.90 5.71 5.71 5.73
405 Hip replacement 12.95 14.20 12.71 13.14 12.97
421 Knee procedures 1.51 1.50 1.56 1.59 1.53
099 Lens procedures 1.25 1.29 1.35 1.25 1.30
843 Major affective disorders 8.04 10.31 9.09 9.60 8.69
407 Joint & limb reattachment 11.82 12.13 12.22 12.69 12.22
297 Cardiac intervention 3.49 3.37 4.37 5.40 4.13
656 Uterine, adnexa procedures 4.57 4.48 5.12 4.77 4.80
291 Coronary artery bypass 10.19 9.48 10.05 10.18 10.14
367 Cholecystectomy 3.31 3.31 3.76 3.26 3.51
670 Caesarean delivery 7.34 7.82 7.55 7.70 7.56
274 Circulation disorders 1.57 1.82 1.96 1.58 1.81
320 Hernia procedures 2.54 2.53 2.80 2.57 2.66
335 Colonoscopy 1.23 1.20 1.25 1.21 1.23
332 Gastroscopy 1.22 1.17 1.28 1.24 1.24
Average for top 15 separations 5.11 5.37 5.39 5.46 5.30
a Top 15 DRGs by revenue in private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.





Table 5.5 Average length of stay for top 15 DRGs
a , private hospitals
b, by












674 Vaginal delivery 5.27 5.81 5.59 5.90 5.73
405 Hip replacement 12.52 13.43 12.35 13.76 12.97
421 Knee procedures 1.54 1.51 1.51 1.61 1.53
099 Lens procedures 1.21 1.40 1.22 1.31 1.30
843 Major affective disorders 8.81 7.81 9.66 na 8.69
407 Joint & limb reattachment 10.45 12.97 11.62 13.48 12.22
297 Cardiac intervention na 3.15 4.02 4.33 4.13
656 Uterine, adnexa procedures 4.42 4.66 4.98 4.92 4.80
291 Coronary artery bypass na 9.97 9.82 10.35 10.14
367 Cholecystectomy 3.18 3.27 3.60 3.88 3.51
670 Caesarean delivery 7.51 7.55 7.28 7.96 7.56
274 Circulation disorders 2.00 1.42 1.87 1.89 1.81
320 Hernia procedures 2.61 2.60 2.61 2.85 2.66
335 Colonoscopy 1.17 1.21 1.23 1.31 1.23
332 Gastroscopy 1.15 1.19 1.26 1.36 1.24
Average for top 15 separations
d 5.07 5.20 5.24 5.58 5.30
na not applicable.
a Top 15 DRGs by revenue in private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
c Data for hospitals with 25 beds or less cover very small numbers of separations. Hence, the ALOS for this
group essentially reflects outcomes in hospitals with between 26 and 50 beds.
d DRG 297 and DRG 291 were not applicable to hospitals with 0 to 50 beds and so the average for other
hospital sizes was used in calculating the top 15 average. ALOS for DRG 843 for hospitals with over 200 beds
was unusually high due to a small data sample problem, and so again the average ALOS for other hospital
sizes was used in calculating the top 15 average.
Source:  Commission estimates based on DHFS Hospital Casemix Protocol (unpublished data) and
unpublished ABS data.
In this regard, the cost per separation and ALOS indicators do not pick up
differences in the complexity of cases within DRGs. In particular, larger hospitals
are likely to treat proportionately more ‘complex’ cases within individual DRGs
than smaller hospitals. As noted, religious/charitable hospitals are considerably
larger, on average, than hospitals in the other ownership groups (table 2.5). Larger
hospitals may also devote proportionately more resources to non-clinical functions
such as teaching and research, leading to higher measured costs per separation.
Further, the cost per separation and ALOS indicators make no allowance for any
variations in the quality of service delivered to patients. In this context, not-for-
profit hospitals often claim they provide a higher quality service than do for-profit
hospitals, which adds to their costs.52 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Broader influences on efficiency outcomes
Efficiency outcomes in the private hospital industry as a whole reflect a wide range
of factors including the regulatory and policy environment (see chapter 6), and the
market relationships between the hospitals, doctors and health funds (see chapter 7).
However, at this juncture, it is worth emphasising that changes implemented in the
mid 1990s to the framework within which private hospitals and the health funds
negotiate, have strengthened the incentives for private hospitals to deliver their
services efficiently. These changes have reduced the scope for hospitals to pass on
cost increases to health funds and their members. This, in turn, has increased the
pressure on hospitals to avoid unnecessary patient stays or the delivery of excess
services.
5.2 Quality of care
Quality problems in the delivery of hospital services can arise for a number of
reasons (see box 5.1). Clinical quality problems — as distinct from poor quality
accommodation and meals — can range from minor errors to serious and life
threatening events.
The development of indicators of the quality of hospital services has proven
difficult for at least two reasons:
·  Determining the impact of hospital treatments on the health status of patients can
be problematic, particularly if the assessment attempts to go beyond determining
the number of patient misadventures.
·  Separating the contribution of doctors and hospitals to misadventures and other
unsuccessful treatments can also be difficult. This may have contributed to the
reluctance of some hospitals and doctors to embrace transparency in relation to
quality outcomes.
Quality in the hospital sector is currently monitored using a  suite  of methods
including:
·  process indicators that monitor the internal procedures hospitals follow in
providing treatment to their patients. This is the basis for the quality
accreditation regime applying in the sector (see below);
·  clinical performance indicators that record hospital misadventures; and
·  indicators of client satisfaction measured via patient surveys. Some hospitals
have extended this approach to include follow up checks on patient’s health




Box 5.1 Sources of clinical quality problems in hospitals
Most of the serious clinical quality problems in hospitals are the result of human error.
This is sometimes due to acts of commission by doctors or other health care workers
(doing the wrong thing, or the right thing at the wrong time) but, just as often, due to
acts of omission (failing to act when action would have helped). According to Wilson et
al 1999, the most common errors of omission are failing to review all the available
information when making a diagnosis and not organising tests or operations when they
would help.
Wilson et al contend that there are four broad factors contributing to mistakes in
diagnosis:
·  Some doctors are more likely to make mistakes, due to inexperience, poor
judgment, failure to keep up with new medical developments and the like.
·  Some patients — for example, the very young or old — are unable to effectively
communicate with doctors and hospital staff.
·  The work environment may be poor, so that the results of completed tests or patient
records are unavailable when required.
·  The hospital culture may contribute to faulty diagnosis — for example, poor
communication between doctors can be a barrier to second opinions.
Some of these contributing factors are beyond the control of hospital management.
And, their relative significance may vary between the public and private systems.
Another possible quality indicator is the volume of staff resources devoted to
patient care. In this regard, not-for-profit hospitals often point out that they employ
considerably more staff per patient than for-profit hospitals. For example, in
1996–97, religious/charitable hospitals had in the order of 15 per cent more nursing
and 30 per cent more total staff per patient than for-profit group hospitals (see
appendix table B.23).
But while greater staff to patient ratios may facilitate a better service to patients,
they may equally reflect inefficiency in service delivery. Thus, this particular
indicator is not pursued further below.
Quality accreditation
The level of quality accreditation of private hospitals by external agencies provides
one broad indicator of quality in the industry.
Two organisations offer quality accreditation to Australian hospitals:54 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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·  The Australian Council on Healthcare Standards (ACHS) operates the
Evaluation and Quality Improvement Program (EQuIP). This involves an audit
of a hospital’s processes in a broad range of areas (such as staffing levels and
sterilisation procedures), and measurements of clinical performance, such as the
rate of hospital acquired infection.
·  The International Standards Organisation (ISO) has a health-care specific
accreditation process, linked to ISO 9002. As with EQuIP, the process involves
an audit of a range of internal procedures. However, the audit team comes from
an accredited quality assessment organisation, rather than ACHS trained
volunteers from other hospitals.
ACHS accreditation currently sets industry standards, with only a few private
hospitals having sought and achieved ISO accreditation. In 1998, around two-thirds
of private acute care and psychiatric hospitals had ACHS accreditation.
The level of accreditation is strongly correlated with hospital size (see figure 5.3),
with the smallest hospitals seemingly much less likely to be prepared to bear the
costs of achieving accreditation. Levels of accreditation according to hospital
ownership mirror this result — the for-profit groups and religious/charitable
organisations, which own most of the largest hospitals, have the highest levels of
accreditation.
While quality accreditation has been available for more than a decade, the incentive
for hospitals to seek accreditation has increased in recent years:
·  There has been greater pressure from health funds for hospitals to be accredited
— or at least be working towards it. In the past, health funds sometimes
provided extra funding to a private hospital as a ‘reward’ for accreditation. But,
with the introduction of the current contracting framework in 1995 (see chapter
6), it has become common practice for the funds to include accreditation as a
condition of a contract with hospitals; and
·  Commonwealth legislation specifies that, to be eligible for second tier insurance
benefits (see chapter 6), hospitals without a contract with a health fund must be
accredited.
However, the lack of good data on hospital outcomes means that it is hard to





Figure 5.3 Proportion of private hospitals
a with ACHS accreditation, by

































a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source: Commission estimates based on information supplied by the ACHS and DHAC.
Hospital misadventures
  Another indicator of the quality of hospitals is the incidence of ‘service failure’ in
relation to clinical performance. This involves identifying ‘misadventures’ and
developing ways to compare them across hospitals.
  As part of its EQuIP program, the ACHS uses a range of clinical indicators to
measure the quality of patient care in acute health care facilities. These indicators
cover such things as unplanned hospital readmissions, unplanned returns to the
operating room during the same admission, and hospital acquired infections. On the
basis of performance against these indicators, the ACHS (1998) has suggested that
the clinical quality of care in Australian hospitals ¾ both public and private ¾ is in
line with international best practice.56 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Patient satisfaction surveys
Patient satisfaction surveys cover such issues as the patient’s perception of
admission and discharge procedures, hospital catering, the standard of
accommodation and the helpfulness of hospital staff. Most hospitals consulted
during this study said that, in general, over 90 per cent of those filling in patient
survey forms are satisfied with their hospital stay. This percentage is broadly in line
with the results obtained in surveys of public hospital patients (see SCRCSSP 1999,
p. 264).
However, such surveys may offer relatively few insights into clinical concerns or
specific areas requiring improvement. Also, the nature of these surveys means that
the results are difficult to compare across hospitals and are prone to problems such
as selection bias.
Conclusions
  While limited in scope, the quality indicators discussed above paint a reasonably
positive picture of quality in the private hospital industry.
  However, a number of commentators have questioned whether strong conclusions
on quality can be drawn from these sorts of measures. For example:
·  Ibrahim et al (1998) argued that there is a ‘clinically weak and statistically
insignificant relationship between [such] indicators and the overall assessment of
quality of care’.
·  The Report on Government Services (SCRCSSP 1998a) commented that ‘the
lack of generally accepted indicators of the quality of care provided in
Australia’s public acute care hospitals continues to be a major concern’. The
same observation could be applied to the private hospital industry.
·  The ACHS (1998) report contains criticisms by participating hospitals that the
indicators are too broad to be meaningful, and that the definitional conventions
have excluded many of the procedures undertaken in hospitals.
Moreover, it can be very hard for patients (and sometimes even their doctors) to
access the available information on hospital quality. This is because much of the
information is collected for internal management purposes, or to inform
negotiations between hospitals and health funds, rather than to inform consumers.
These concerns reinforce the importance of the range of initiatives underway to




provide better information to consumers on the quality of services on offer (see
chapter 9).
5.3 Appropriateness of care
A related dimension of service quality is whether the treatment provided is
appropriate to the particular condition of the patient. Where inappropriate treatment
leads to significant health problems for the patient, it may be picked up in indicators
of hospital misadventures. However, there may also be instances where a patient
receives:
·  high quality, but unnecessary, treatment; or
·  an expensive treatment when a cheaper treatment would have provided a
comparable health outcome.
Judging what is an ‘appropriate’ treatment, or what is the ‘right’ number of medical
services for a particular patient is not straightforward. And, although hospitals have
some input to decisions on treatments and service levels, doctors make many of
these decisions in consultation with their patients. Thus, the limited data on the
appropriateness of care relate primarily to the treatments provided by doctors in
private hospitals, rather than on the components of care for which the hospitals are
solely or largely responsible — for example, nursing services.
Variations in treatment between public and private hospitals
The Industry Commission (1997) found that patients in private hospitals are more
likely to receive a greater number of in-hospital medical services than they would as
private patients in public hospitals. Similarly, unpublished data from the then
DHFS’s Hospital Casemix Protocol show that, in 1996–97, there was an average of
6.83 medical services per episode in private acute hospitals, compared with 5.32
services per episode for private patients in public hospitals. More specifically, as
part of an international study coordinated by Harvard and Stanford universities,
Richardson and Robertson (1998) looked at variations in the treatment of heart
attack admissions to public and private hospitals in Victoria and Western Australia
over the ten years to 1996. Amongst other things, the Australian study found that
private hospital patients were much more likely to receive ‘expensive high-tech’
medical interventions following a heart attack than patients in public hospitals.
However, as noted by Richardson and Robertson (1998), it is not clear whether this
sort of data is evidence of overservicing in private hospitals or underservicing in
public facilities, or both. Significantly, a new study — the Measures of Appropriate58 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Clinical Care project — is seeking to develop a set of indicators to assess the
appropriateness of clinical care in private hospitals. The project was initiated by the
ACHS and is being funded by the Australian Health Insurance Association.
Measures to promote appropriate high quality care in private hospitals are




6 The regulatory and legislative
environment
This chapter outlines the main government regulations and legislation directly
affecting private hospitals and their relationships with health funds and doctors.
6.1 State and Territory regulation
Licensing controls
Responsibility for licensing (or registering) private acute care and psychiatric
hospitals and freestanding day hospitals lies principally with State and Territory
governments. Where stated, the objectives of these controls primarily relate either
to:
·  ensuring the quality and safety of private hospital services; or
·  encouraging the provision of the ‘right’ level of hospital services, including an
appropriate geographical distribution of those services (see table 6.1).
Licensing controls are one of a number of mechanisms that operate in the industry
to promote quality and safety. Others include:
·  the two quality accreditation schemes for private hospitals (see chapter 5);
·  contracts between health funds and private hospitals which typically contain
quality requirements, including accreditation, that hospitals must meet (see
chapter 7); and
·  the strong commercial and ethical incentives for hospital operators and doctors
to ensure that safety and quality standards are maintained.
Features of licensing controls
Through licensing controls, administering authorities can exercise significant
control over the nature of private hospital services and hospital conduct. The
controls cover a range of matters including:60 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Table 6.1 Some stated objectives of licensing regulations
Jurisdiction Objective
NSW To strengthen standards to ensure patient care and safety, to reduce economic
regulation of the private health sector, to eliminate arbitrary and trivial bureaucratic
interference, and to provide a sound legislative basis for day procedure centres ...
Vic To strike a fair balance between the right of proprietors and developers to conduct
their business dealings freely and the right of the community to ensure that
necessary clinical services which are of high quality are available throughout the
State.
To achieve the orderly development, adequacy, improved distribution and
avoidance of unnecessary and costly duplication of health services in the whole or
part of Victoria.
WA To provide maximum protection for patients by ensuring there are acceptable
minimum standards of care.
SA To rationalise, coordinate and provide health services.
Tas To ensure that hospitals provide care within their staffing and structural capacity
and that procedures or services are offered or undertaken only where appropriate
support services are provided and safe and effective relevant care can be
expected.
Source: Compiled from various Second Reading speeches, relevant health Acts and requirements specified in
schedules to licences. As far as the Commission is aware, objectives are not documented in Queensland, the
Northern Territory or the ACT.
·  location, type of patient or service, and the number of patients or beds (see
below);
·  maintenance and improvements. For instance, in New South Wales, no
alterations or extensions to hospitals can be undertaken unless approved;
·  the type or character of the licensee. In South Australia, for example, the
licensee must be of ‘good character and repute’, be a ‘fit and proper person’ and
have ‘sufficient material and financial resources’. In Queensland, the licensee
must be a medical practitioner, an appropriately qualified nurse, a religious body
or order, an approved society, or an approved body corporate;
·  management and staffing. In Victoria, the hospital must comply with minimum
nursing staff to patient ratios and mix of nursing staff requirements. In
Queensland, a medical practitioner or an appropriately qualified nurse must be in
charge of the hospital. And, if the licence is not held by such a person, there
must be an ‘adequate’ number of registered nurses present at all times, having
regard to the number of patients accommodated in the hospital;
·  premises, facilities and equipment. For example, in South Australia, there are
provisions relating to room access and size, as well as to ablution, electrical,
cooking, ward, storage, cleaning, maternity and surgical facilities;
·  registers and records. These requirements typically require a hospital to record




·  reporting and notification of information. In New South Wales, the licensee
must furnish an annual statement detailing the chief nurse’s authority to practise
and his/her qualifications and the shareholdings of office bearers such as the
director, chief executive and secretary; and a monthly statistical statement. In
Queensland, the licensee must provide monthly reports on admissions,
separations, patient type and occupied bed days, and information on individual
patients.
Licensing provisions also typically include a range of miscellaneous requirements
covering such things as: patient rights; fire safety and emergency evacuation;
hospital administrative practices and policies; the storage and handling of drugs and
chemicals; waste management and disposal; food safety; and infection control. They
may also specify compliance with other legislation or regulations. For example, the
schedule to licences issued in Tasmania requires compliance with certain standards
prepared by the National Therapeutic Goods Committee, the National Health and
Medical Research Council, the New South Wales Department of Health, the
Australian Council on Healthcare Standards, the Society of Hospital Pharmacists of
Australia, and the Pharmaceutical Society of Australia.
Table 6.2 summarises the key features of each jurisdictions’ licensing controls. It is
important to note, however, that some jurisdictions do not enforce particular
requirements. For example, in Tasmania, there is no regular or periodic inspection
of private hospitals despite there being provisions requiring such inspections.
According to Tasmanian authorities, inspections instead occur whenever there is
significant construction work — an arrangement which has apparently resulted in
frequent contact with hospitals. Conversely, between 1994 and 1996, licence
applications in Queensland were assessed against planning criteria, even though
there were no express provisions authorising the administering authority to do so.
Once licensed, hospitals are still subject to inspection and to the reporting
requirements noted above. Failure to comply can lead to cancellation of the licence,
fines, or some other sanction (although an appeals process is usually available).
Licences can be renewed, amended and, in most jurisdictions, transferred.
Planning controls
As set out in table 6.2, licensing arrangements in most jurisdictions include
planning controls which may variously cover the location of private hospitals, the
nature of services available in them, and the number of beds. Underlying these
controls are concerns that relying solely on the market to determine the location and
level of private hospital services could lead to inappropriate outcomes, such as:62 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Table 6.2 Main features of licensing controls for private hospitals, by
jurisdiction
Area of conduct NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas NT ACT
a
















chief nurse or manager 4444 4 4 4 4
medical or nursing staff 4444 4 4 4 4
other staff 4444 4 4 77
Premises, facilities and
equipment
4444 4 4 4 4
Maintenance 4444 7 7
g 47
Improvements 4444 4 4 4 7
Records and registers 4444 4 4 4 4
Reporting and notification 4444 47
d 47
d
a ACT legislation requires private hospitals to be registered rather than licensed.
b Applies to Adelaide only.
c Although there is legislative provision to do so, controls are not applied in practice.
d Although there is no express legislative provision to do so, controls are applied in practice.
e The New South Wales Department of Health did not consider legislative reference to service/patient type to
be a form of planning control. It said that an application for a licence or an amendment cannot be refused on
these grounds.
f Queensland Health emphasised that these controls are based on quality/patient safety criteria, rather than
planning criteria.
g The Tasmanian Department of Community and Health Services said that these matters are in part dealt with
through the adoption of standards, which are ‘not static requirements, but have ongoing obligations’.
Source: State and Territory principle Acts and sub-ordinate legislation: personal communications with State
and Territory administering authorities.
·  over-investment in, and use of, private hospitals, especially if those hospitals are
owned by medical practitioners; and
·  a geographical distribution of hospitals skewed in favour of metropolitan areas.
  Among the sort of planning criteria that may be considered when assessing new
licence applications are:
·  the suitability of the location taking account of the availability of other
community facilities and the safety and amenity of the environment; and
·  whether a new facility would result in ‘over-supply’ of private hospital services




care hospital services allow the Secretary of the Victorian Department of Human
Services and Health to refuse a licence if this would result in more than 4.1 beds
per 1000 of population becoming available in the area concerned (HSPR 1999,
p. 54).
One effect of planning controls has been the creation of a market in bed licences,
with trade between different hospital owners and within the same ownership group.
Indeed, private hospital expansions in a number of jurisdictions have occurred
through the purchase of existing licences, rather than through the issue of new
licences. Anecdotal evidence indicates that, in 1998, the value of bed licences in
individual jurisdictions ranged from negligible to around $20 000.
Views on the effectiveness of the licensing regime
There is widespread acceptance by the industry of governments’ role in ensuring
clinical services are of a high quality and are provided in an atmosphere of
maximum safety. Moreover, private hospital operators told the Commission that
while there are some problems with the current arrangements (and related
regulations) — see box 6.1, in broad terms, they do not impose an excessive
regulatory burden on operators.
  These views may reflect a licensing regime which is working reasonably well.
  But equally they could be consistent with a regime that was inadequate or not well
enforced. Accordingly, the Commission sought further input from the administering
authorities in the States and Territories on the effectiveness and enforcement of
their licensing controls.
According to the administering authorities:
·  Some jurisdictions undertake annual inspections. However, in New South
Wales, there has been a move away from routine inspection towards ‘a risk
management needs based approach’ focusing on such issues as admission of
children, infection control, the history of concerns and complaints. And, as noted
above, inspections in Tasmania only occur when a hospital wishes to undertake
significant construction work.
·  Formal refusal of new licensing applications is uncommon. Most problems tend
to be addressed in early discussions between hospitals and administering
authorities, thus clearing the way for administrative approval. Of those
applications that have been formally refused, the grounds have included breach
of a bed cap and an individual not being a ‘fit and proper person’.64 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Box 6.1 Industry anecdotes on licensing and related controls
·  ‘The standards applied to private hospitals are more stringent than those for public
hospitals. However, NSW Health is pretty flexible when it comes to planning issues.’
·  ‘There are some irritating, antiquated regulations still in existence. For example,
there is a requirement to have an island bathroom in every hospital. In our case, it is
never used for clinical needs and has become a storeroom for orthopaedic
equipment. There is also a requirement to have a patient lounge on every floor,
rather than one central lounge.’
·  ‘Changes in infection control regulations will impose costs of ‘many hundreds of
thousands’ on the hospital.’
·  ‘The licensing system is irritating when amendments need to be made. For
example, it was 12 months before a renal transplant unit was added to the licence.’
·  ‘There is a lack of interaction between States regarding regulatory matters. The
different regulations in each State are irritating and a little costly to national hospital
operators.’
·  ‘Inconsistency between States can lead to some ridiculous situations. For example,
our group closed a hospital in one State and opened a new one just over the border
(within sight of the old hospital). All the doctors and nurses moved across to the new
hospital, but they then had to get used to a whole new set of regulations in areas
such as sterilisation and infection control. It was a nightmare’.
·  ‘Regulatory variations between States are annoying and costly. For example, New
South Wales has higher prescriptive standards for equipment sterilisation than other
States (apparently as a reaction to a number of incidents). The average hospital in
New South Wales faces capital costs of up to $150 000 to comply with sterilisation
standards (plus $15 for each procedure). Some hospitals may never get their
money back on this investment.’
·  ‘[Commonwealth] drug regulations requiring private hospitals to have 150 beds
before they can run their own pharmacy need amending. The regulation is geared
towards the larger not-for-profit hospitals and is now outdated given the complex
work being done by smaller and very competent for-profit hospitals.’
·  ‘The requirement to use a certain size paper for drug scripts and the regulation
requiring an ink signature on scripts and drug charts prevents the computerisation of
scripts. The system causes delays in obtaining scripts and in obtaining the required
permission to dispense needed drugs.’
Source: Industry interviews
·  Problems with breaches of existing licenses are usually addressed cooperatively
before getting to the stage where the administering authority cancels licences or
prosecutes the hospital. If a problem cannot be resolved, the licensee usually
requests cancellation. For example, in New South Wales, the majority of




no jurisdiction appears to publish information about breaches or the outcomes of
inspections.
Licensing arrangements and planning controls are discussed further in chapter 9.
6.2 Commonwealth regulation of the private hospital
industry
Regulation of both public and private health care is an important tool used by the
Commonwealth to help ensure: the provision of quality health care; equitable access
to services; the efficient delivery of services; and satisfaction for consumers and
providers. Where the private sector is involved in service delivery, Commonwealth
regulation also aims to reduce potential cost shifting to the Commonwealth, health
funds and health fund members.
The main pieces of Commonwealth legislation directly relevant to the private
hospital industry can be divided into three groups:
·  legislation governing the ‘declaration’ of hospitals for health insurance
purposes;
·  legislation covering the relationships between private hospitals, doctors and
health funds; and
·  legislation designed to encourage membership of health funds.
Other relevant Commonwealth regulation includes the legislation specifying
‘default’ and ‘second tier’ benefits for ‘non-contracted’ hospital services and the
provisions relating to the ‘Private Patients Hospital Charter’. More general
Commonwealth legislation relating to the taxation of non-profit organisations is
also relevant to outcomes in the industry (see chapter 9).
Hospital declarations
While State and Territory governments are responsible for licensing or approving
private hospitals and day hospital facilities, the Health Insurance Act 1973 and the
National Health Act 1953 require that a hospital be ‘declared’ by the
Commonwealth in order to receive health insurance benefits.
To obtain a declaration, a hospital licensed/approved by a State or Territory must
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However, the general policy has been that the Commonwealth relies on State and
Territory licensing mechanisms. At present, Commonwealth guidelines apply only
to co-located private hospitals and day facilities. These guidelines state that, in
considering a declaration, the Minister for Health and Aged Care should have
regard to whether:
·  the private facility would materially affect access by public patients to a
reasonable range of services;
·  there are adequate arrangements at the public hospital to ensure that patients are
able to exercise freely their right to elect to be treated as public patients;
·  there would be a transfer of costs from the State/Territory to any other party; and
·  the State/Territory and hospital agree to supply data to allow the Commonwealth
to monitor such things as access by public patients to a reasonable range of
services, the adequacy of arrangements for patient election, and costs.
There are also requirements under this legislation relating to the provision by
private hospitals of pharmacy services under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme,
and standards for special care nurseries in private hospitals.
The Commonwealth is currently investigating options to link a wider range of
quality requirements — for example, credential arrangements and clinical pathways
— to health fund benefit payments. The intention is to progressively introduce these
additional requirements within two years. The Department of Health and Aged Care
plans to issue a discussion paper on possible measures in the near future.
Relationships between hospitals, doctors and health funds
Commonwealth legislation has an important influence on agreements between the
parties involved in the delivery of private hospital services. There are two main
pieces of legislation involved — the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA) and the
Health Legislation (Private Health Insurance Reform) Amendment Act 1995
(subsequently referred to as the Amendment Act 1995).
The TPA is administered by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(ACCC) and addresses a range of competition and market power issues relevant in
the private hospital industry. In particular, the formation of hospitals (or doctors)
into negotiating groups risks contravening the restrictive trade practices provisions
of the Act (see box 6.2). However, the ACCC can authorise joint negotiations by
hospitals that are in competition with each other, where the public benefit outweighs




Box 6.2 The Trade Practices Act and private hospitals
General principles
The ACCC has concerns with relationships between health professionals, hospitals
and health funds which may involve breaches of the TPA.
As the focus of the restrictive trade practices provisions in the Act is on preventing
price agreements as a result of collusion or joint negotiation positions, and on
preventing a reduction in competition, the formation of hospitals and doctors into
negotiating groups is not generally allowed, unless it can be demonstrated through the
authorisation process that the public benefit outweighs any anti-competitive cost.
Health funds can jointly negotiate if the conduct does not substantially lessen
competition.
Arrangements between private hospitals and health funds
Hospitals that compete, or that are in a position to compete, cannot collectively
negotiate on price with health funds (nor appoint a negotiator) without risking breaching
the price fixing provisions of the Act.
Arrangements between private hospitals
Arrangements between private hospitals that do not directly focus on price may still
have substantial anti-competitive effects. An example would be an agreement between
hospitals under which each hospital undertakes not to enter into supply arrangements
with health funds for services outside its agreed part of the market.
Private hospitals with market power
Use of market power by private hospitals risks breaching the Act. Say, for example, a
hospital has the only facilities in a region for carrying out a particular procedure and
that it is uneconomic to duplicate those facilities. Suppose also that the hospital
provides the procedure using in-house doctors and refuses to make its facilities
available to other doctors. If the hospital has no spare capacity then the refusal would
be a legitimate commercial decision. But, if the purpose is to prevent other doctors
from competing with the hospital’s preferred doctors, then the refusal may breach the
Act.
Source: ACCC 1995.
The Amendment Act 1995 makes provision for purchaser–provider contractual
agreements between hospitals, health funds and doctors (figure 6.1). While
contracting between health funds and hospitals began in the late 1980s, the
Amendment Act added to this impetus by establishing an explicit contracting
framework and by providing for the involvement of doctors. With contracts
involving agreed charges by hospitals and doctors in place, the intention was that
health funds could offer 100 per cent cover for both hospital treatment and the
associated medical services.68 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Three specific forms of contractual arrangement are permitted under the
Amendment Act 1995:
·  Hospital Purchaser-Provider Agreements (HPPAs). These are contracts between
health funds and hospitals (public and private acute care and/or day hospitals).
Apart from any patient copayment, which must be specified in an HPPA, the
hospital must accept the HPPA price as full payment by the fund for the episode
of care for eligible contributors.







·  Medical Purchaser-Provider Agreements (MPPAs). These are contracts (or
other forms of purchaser-provider agreement) between health funds and doctors
covering the provision of medical services to contributors in hospitals. If an
MPPA is in place, a health fund is able to pay medical benefits in excess of the
MBS schedule fee, thus allowing for the elimination of out-of-pocket expenses
for patients (or limiting them to a pre-determined copayment). Where no MPPA
is in place, the health fund is restricted to paying the gap between the Medicare
rebate and the schedule fee for the medical service concerned.
·  Practitioner Agreements (PAs). These provide for hospitals and doctors to enter
into agreements and for hospitals to receive payment under HPPAs for medical
services provided by those doctors.
These legislated contractual arrangements have a number of objectives including to:
·  promote competition in the delivery of private hospital services and thereby
reduce the costs of hospitalisation and treatment;
·  provide a stronger link between payments to private hospitals and the delivery of
high quality services. (As noted in chapter 5, requirements relating to service




·  provide the opportunity for health funds to eliminate out-of-pocket expenses for
patients treated in private hospitals; and
·  simplify the billing and payment of benefits process by allowing hospitals to
collate the separate medical bills and collect the medical benefits payable for
them.
A number of amendments to the 1995 Amendment Act were legislated in April
1998 via the Health Legislation Amendment Act (No. 2) 1998. As a result:
·  if a hospital has a PA with doctors for in-hospital medical services, health funds
are now able to pay the hospital above the MBS fee for the medical component
of treatment under an HPPA;
·  MPPAs and PAs must include an undertaking by the health fund or hospital to
maintain the professional freedom of doctors to identify the appropriate
treatment for their patients within the scope of accepted clinical practice;
·  any person may request copies of HPPAs, MPPAs or PAs; and
·  patients are now able to assign their Medicare benefits to approved billing
agents for in-hospital medical treatment (thus providing an alternative billing
system to patients if hospitals do not have agreements with doctors and patients
relating to out-of-pocket costs).
The impacts of these contracting arrangements on the private hospital industry are
considered in the next chapter.
Assistance to health fund members
The bulk of private hospital revenue comes from treating privately insured patients
(see chapter 3). Hence, government measures designed to assist health funds and
their members can have a significant effect on demand for private hospital services
and thereby hospitals’ financial performance.
As noted, the Amendment Act 1995 aimed to make private health insurance more
attractive by reducing the cost of private hospital services and providing scope for
health funds to offer 100 per cent cover, thus eliminating medical gaps.
But with continuing upward pressure on premiums and declining fund membership,
subsequent Commonwealth legislation took a more direct route, providing financial
incentives for people to take out (or maintain) private health insurance.
·  As part of its 1996 Budget, the Government announced that there would be
means-tested rebates for people with private health insurance, and a Medicare70 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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levy surcharge on those above (higher) specified income thresholds without
private patient hospital cover.
These measures, which were enacted through the Private Health Insurance
Incentives Act 1997, had a number of objectives:
-  assisting people to keep private health insurance;
-  relieving pressure on public hospitals;
-  encouraging the private provision of hospital services; and
-  providing choice of public and private hospital services. (IC 1997, p. 78)
·  In 1998, the Government announced that the means-tested rebate would be
replaced by a general (non-means tested) 30 per cent rebate on all health fund
premiums. The objectives of the revised rebate scheme — introduced via the
Private Health Insurance Incentives Act 1998 — are similar to those of the
previous rebate arrangements. The new arrangements, which took effect on 1
January 1999, are estimated to cost the Commonwealth between
$1.4 billion and $1.7 billion a year.
The legislation also includes provisions directed at reducing medical gaps.
Under these provisions, health funds have until July 2000 to offer ‘no gaps’ or
‘known gaps’. Funds that do not comply will be unable to provide their members
with the 30 per cent rebate in the form of a premium reduction — the most
popular means of accessing the rebate.
·  The  Health Legislation Amendment Act 1999 incorporated a number of
provisions to give health funds greater flexibility in packaging health insurance
products — including amendments relating to discounts on contributions and
loyalty bonus schemes.
·  In the 1999–2000 Budget, the Government announced that a Lifetime Health
Cover scheme will commence in July 2000. The aim of the scheme is to
encourage people to maintain a lifetime commitment to private health insurance
and thereby to prevent opportunistic opting in and out of cover. Specifically, the
new arrangements provide for lifetime community rating of premiums, with
those not taking out private health insurance by the age of 30 facing a 2 per cent
premium surcharge for every year’s delay thereafter. The surcharge is capped at
70 per cent. Those born on or before 1 July 1934 are automatically entitled to
cover at base rates. The National Health Amendment (Lifetime Health Cover)
Bill 1999 to give effect to the new arrangements was passed by the Senate in
September 1999.






Second tier and default insurance benefits
Under provisions in the National Health Act 1953, Government legislated default
benefits are payable to insured patients treated in eligible private hospitals and day
facilities that do not have an HPPA (or similar arrangement) with the health fund
concerned. To attract second tier default benefits, a hospital must be able
to demonstrate that it:
·  has a simplified billing system in place;
·  has a mechanism in place to inform patients of what expenses they are likely to
incur;
·  is quality accredited by either the Australian Council on Healthcare Standards,
the International Standards Organisation, or other bodies agreed between the
fund and the hospital; and
·  meets quality criteria relating to the episode of care which the fund has specified
in all HPPAs with comparable private hospitals.
Second tier benefits are set at 85 per cent of the average benefit paid by the fund for
the episode of care in all comparable private hospitals with which the fund has an
HPPA (or similar arrangement), in the State/Territory in which the treatment is
provided.
If the health fund has no HPPAs in place in the State or Territory for that episode of
care, or if the hospital fails to meet the second tier default criteria, then the basic
default benefit is payable. This benefit, which is determined by the Minister for
Health and Aged Care, is a little over $200 a day, although it varies somewhat
across jurisdictions. Higher default benefits may apply for insured patients admitted
to hospital in an emergency. As discussed in chapter 9, the default benefit
effectively determines accommodation charges for private patients treated in public
hospitals.
Consumer information
As well as establishing a contracting framework for the private hospital industry,
the Amendment Act 1995 includes consumer information provisions — the ‘Private
Patients’ Hospital Charter’. Under these provisions, the Minister can issue a
statement informing private patients what they can expect from the doctors
providing their treatment, the hospital where the treatment is provided and their72 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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health fund. The statement may also provide advice on matters relevant to a
consumer’s decision on whether to purchase private health insurance.
The Charter was first published in January 1996 and is currently under review. A
revised version, incorporating information on recent private health insurance




7 Competition in the private hospital
market
As noted in chapter 3, competition in the private hospital market is significantly
influenced by the surrounding institutional arrangements:
·  While private hospitals are in the business of providing services to patients,
doctors generate much of that demand on behalf of their patients and health
funds pay most of the bills for treatment on behalf of their contributors.
Accordingly, hospitals must provide an environment in which doctors are
willing to treat their patients, and supply their services at a price which is
attractive to the health funds. The latter requirement has become increasingly
important in recent years, with hospitals now having to compete for contracts
with some of the funds.
·  Private hospitals also compete with public hospitals — both directly for some
private patients and indirectly through the availability of free treatment to public
patients in the public system.
This chapter examines the nature of competition within the private hospital industry
and, in particular, the relationships between the hospitals, doctors and the health
funds. It also draws attention to a number of policy questions that arise from the
analysis, which are explored further in the final chapter of the report. The final
chapter also looks at some of the policy questions that arise in relation to
competition between public and private hospitals.
7.1 The relationship between private hospitals and
doctors
While doctors are not generally involved in the day to day management of private
hospitals, they are an integral part of what hospitals do and how they operate:
·  Doctors, typically in some form of group arrangement, own a significant number
of private hospitals.
·  More importantly, in consultation with their patients, doctors determine whether
hospitalisation is required and, often, in which hospital treatment is provided.
For example, a 1997 survey indicated that doctors determined the institution74 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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used for 64 per cent of admissions (Quints and Marks 1997). This explains why
private hospitals will sometimes go to great lengths to attract and retain doctors’
patronage.
Hospitals compete for the custom of doctors in a number of ways.
Perhaps most importantly, hospitals use the quality of their facilities and equipment
as a way of attracting doctors. Some have termed this the hospital ‘arms race’ (see
box 7.1).
Box 7.1 Some views on the hospital arms race
Private hospitals told the Commission that doctors are continuously seeking new
equipment so they can undertake more advanced surgical procedures. Even if
investment in such equipment is not justified on normal commercial grounds, hospital
management must take into account the risk of losing the business of its doctors if it
does not agree to their requests.
The economics of Intensive Care Units (ICUs) provide a good illustration of these sorts
of trade-offs. It is apparently difficult for private hospitals to make money directly out of
ICUs. However, they are needed for surgery back-up. Hospitals therefore often view
them as ‘loss leaders’ to attract the best doctors doing the most advanced procedures.
A number of hospitals pointed to the downsides of this form of competition between
hospitals for doctors, noting the potential for wasteful duplication of equipment,
particularly in the major cities.
Source: Discussions with private hospital operators.
Location can also provide a private hospital with an edge in attracting doctors. In
particular, co-location of a private and a public hospital allows doctors to treat their
public and private patients on the same site (see box 7.2). But some stand-alone
private hospitals also have a competitive edge because of their location. The
operator of a private hospital in Sydney, for example, pointed to the benefits that
come from the hospital’s location at both a catchment area crossroads and close to
two public teaching hospitals.
Further, private hospitals can influence demand for their services by cultivating
relationships with medical practitioners. In this regard, one new private hospital said
that senior hospital representatives had visited numerous population centres in the
catchment area to ensure that general practitioners and specialists were aware of the




Box 7.2 The impact of co-located private and public facilities
New co-located private hospitals may cater for previously unmet demands, as well as
drawing business from the adjacent public hospital and other private hospitals.
Competitors of co-located hospitals said that it has proved difficult to compete against
their big drawcards for doctors of convenience and time savings. In this regard, smaller
hospitals seem to be particularly vulnerable. One for-profit group said that the opening
of a co-located private hospital would often result in 3 or 4 small hospitals closing.
These impacts have led some competitors to talk of ‘unfair competition’. For example,
one private hospital raised questions about ‘special’ financial relationships between co-
located private and public hospitals. And, the ACT Legislative Assembly held an inquiry
into the establishment of the co-located National Capital Private Hospital amid
concerns that the hospital would gain an unfair advantage from service contracts with
Canberra (public) Hospital. (The ACT government argued that competition from the
new hospital would increase choice, service standards and efficiency in Canberra’s
private hospital sector.)
Source: Discussions with private hospital operators.
Agreements between private hospitals and doctors
As described in chapter 6, the Amendment Act 1995 includes provisions for
Practitioner Agreements (PAs) between hospitals and doctors which allow hospitals
to receive payments under Hospital Purchaser Provider Agreements (HPPAs) for
medical services provided by those doctors.
Amongst other things, PAs are a vehicle for simplifying billing arrangements for
patients. Yet, to date, there has been little enthusiasm for them. This may have
partly reflected the provision under the original legislation that restricted
reimbursement to a hospital under an HPPA for treatment provided by a doctor
covered by a PA to the MBS fee. As described in section 6.2, that issue has now
been addressed through the 1998 amendments to the legislation which allow for
payments above the schedule fee. However, it is still too early to say whether the
amended legislation will increase interest in PAs.
Implications for private hospitals
Given the integral nature of doctors to hospital services, private hospitals will
struggle to survive unless they can obtain and maintain the custom of doctors. As
discussed, to attract doctors, hospitals must provide acceptable terms of access,
equipment and support staff. Also, the practices of doctors can have a significant76 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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influence on a hospital’s financial performance. Thus, hospitals will sometimes
need to negotiate with doctors on the clinical services to be provided.
In cases where the practising doctors also own a hospital, any imbalance of
negotiating power may be of little consequence. More generally, some of the largest
hospitals may be able to negotiate with doctors in the knowledge they will not need
to make concessions inimical to the hospital’s interests. For example, one religious
group said that the specialists who work in its hospitals tend to share its public-
spirited values and are happy to be associated with the prestige teaching facilities.
Similarly, a private hospital enjoying a regional monopoly will be in a stronger
negotiating position than one operating in a market serviced by several providers.
That said, doctors will often be in a strong negotiating position — especially when
dealing with small hospitals (see box 7.3). In this regard, one hospital manager said
that his small hospital faced financial problems when its two regular surgeons took
holidays or attended conferences. But it is also the case for larger hospitals in some
regional centres and metropolitan areas like Central/East Melbourne where the
population is not sufficient to fully support the available number of hospital beds.
Box 7.3 Views on the relationship between private hospitals and
doctors
One private hospital likened the relationship with its doctors and patients to travel
agents making block bookings in hotels for tourists. The tourists (patients) have fairly
limited knowledge and rely on the agents (doctors) to sort out their accommodation.
And hospitals, like hotels, rely on the agents to bring continuing business. If the odd
tourist (patient) has an unpleasant stay at a hotel (hospital), this may not be a major
problem. But the hotel (hospital) cannot afford to get the agents (doctors) offside as
they might take their business elsewhere.
One for-profit hospital group observed that hospitals have to work hard to keep
doctors, saying that ultimately they ‘just have to give doctors everything they want to
keep them sweet’. As noted, this can include purchasing high technology equipment.
Another private hospital told of a plastic surgeon who wanted to perform a non-urgent
operation on a public holiday. Notwithstanding the additional financial cost for the
hospital, it went along with the surgeon’s request because he supported the hospital
throughout the year.
One large hospital that missed out on a contract with a major health fund noted how
much more devastating it would be to lose the patronage of its doctors. Some hospitals
also commented on the difficulties of dealing with doctors who spend much longer than
average in surgery, or who consistently use more consumables than average, or who
‘waste’ prostheses.




In one sense, the often strong negotiating position of doctors reflects their very
important role in the delivery of hospital services. In policy terms, an issue would
only arise if there was evidence that doctors were misusing their bargaining power
when dealing with the hospitals.
However, it is important to recognise that ‘misuse’ of market power could take
forms other than demanding overly generous access to hospital facilities, or
excessive equipment and staffing levels. For example, there would be legitimate
concerns if, by virtue of their strong bargaining positions, doctors were able to
provide sub-standard services without fear of challenge. This raises the question of
whether enhanced clinical performance indicators would reduce the scope for any
such problems to arise. And, there is the broader question of whether restrictions on
the number of training positions and access for overseas trained specialists are
artificially enhancing the negotiating power of some doctors (see chapter 9).
7.2 The relationship between private hospitals and
health funds
Given that the bulk of private hospital revenue comes from treating insured patients,
negotiations between a hospital and the health insurance funds can have a crucial
bearing on the hospital’s financial performance and its ongoing viability.
Specifically:
·  Negotiations will determine the rates a private hospital receives for various
services provided to health fund members (such as accommodation and theatre),
and for various patient types (advanced surgery, medical, obstetrics etc).
Moreover, these rates will set charges for most self-paying patients.
·  To secure contracts, hospitals may have to make changes to their service
delivery. In particular, the funds can place significant pressure on hospitals to
reduce costs and/or meet a range of quality requirements.
·  Failure to obtain a contract from a health fund is likely to see many members of
that fund seeking treatment in other, contracted, hospitals. As discussed in
chapter 4, high occupancy levels are important for hospital profitability.
Importantly, there have been major changes in the contracting process in recent
years.
Until the mid-1990s, private hospitals typically set their charges on a cost-plus basis
with the health funds automatically passing on cost increases to members in the
form of higher premiums. Moreover, the funds and hospitals worked together to sell
the ‘difference’ between private and public care. This contributed to the switch by78 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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many insured patients from subsidised beds in public hospitals to private hospitals
— a major source of premium increases in the 1990s (IC 1997, pp. xxxvi).
But, in the second half of the 1990s, against a backdrop of falling membership and
rising premiums, the funds have become far more pro-active in rate negotiations
with the hospitals. The new legislative contracting framework, introduced in 1995,
has underpinned this shift in approach.
Agreements between private hospitals and health funds
Contracting between health funds and hospitals — which began in Victoria and
South Australia in the late 1980s — was given significant impetus by the 1995
Amendment Act. This established an explicit contracting framework (see chapter 6)
and has encouraged health funds to use their bargaining power to negotiate lower
prices and more comprehensive services with hospitals and medical providers.
In September 1998, there were around 11 800 HPPAs in place across Australia.
Reflecting this rapid uptake, around 66 per cent of insured separations in private
hospitals were covered by these agreements in 1997–98 (although the shares varied
considerably across the States (figure 7.1)). Across Australia, some 90 per cent of
private acute care and day facilities have an HPPA with at least one health fund.























a Includes freestanding day hospitals.




Who contracts with whom?
Many of the major health funds have contracted with nearly all private acute care
hospitals in their areas of operation.
This partly reflects legislative provisions which limit the grounds for health funds
not entering into contracts with hospitals. For example, failure to contract cannot be
based on the size of a hospital or its ownership.
More fundamentally, the funds have strong commercial incentives to contract with a
broad range of hospitals. This is because failure to provide 100 per cent cover for
accommodation costs in popular hospitals would see many members shift to funds
that did have contracts with those hospitals. Also, it is clear that the funds regard
contracting as a way of influencing the costs and quality of hospital services.
That said, commercial imperatives will not necessarily require a fund to enter into
HPPAs with all hospitals in its area of operation. This is illustrated by AXA Health
Insurance’s policy of excluding a proportion of hospitals from its contracts. AXA
uses a competitive tendering process to select private hospitals with which it will
contract for 100 per cent cover (see box 7.4). In 1997–98, this process provided for
100 per cent cover for some 70 to 80 per cent of private hospital beds in Victoria
and South Australia. Medibank Private and MBF also use a tendering approach.
Box 7.4 AXA’s Participating Provider Program
In response to falling private health insurance membership and lower occupancy rates
in private hospitals, AXA Health Insurance (then National Mutual) introduced the
Participating Provider Program in 1997. An important objective of the program is to
improve the value of health insurance to the fund’s members by ‘purchasing high
quality health care services at an affordable price’. The Program involves:
·  a move away from ‘the adversarial model of negotiating annual price increases with
all hospitals’ towards a ‘cooperative model of creating longer term relationships with
select providers’;
·  the use of a competitive process to select participating hospitals; and
·  entering into agreements with medical providers or ‘medical purchaser provider
agreements’ (see section 7.3).
The competitive tendering process consists of a number of stages including an
‘invitation to tender’ and interviews. Eight criteria are used to assess tenders:
location/demand; range of specialties; capacity; vision; performance; facilities; quality
and price. Hospitals need to achieve a minimum score for each criterion to be offered a
contract.
Source: Discussions with AXA Health Insurance.80 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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The contract negotiation process and issues covered in HPPAs
Contract negotiations between health funds and private hospitals generally occur
each year, although some funds are now entering into longer contracts. For
example, AXA contracts are for three years and another major fund said it would
sign two-year contracts if it was ‘comfortable’ with its relationship with a hospital.
While the issues covered in contract negotiations are extensive (see box 7.5), there
are usually two distinct parts to the process:
·  discussion of the main provisions; and
·  negotiation of the rates to be paid by the health fund for accommodation, theatre,
ICUs and so on.
The clauses and conditions are usually similar across HPPAs, but the negotiated
rates can vary quite significantly.
Box 7.5 Issues covered in a Hospital Purchaser-Provider Agreement
A Reference Schedule
B Definition of Terms
C Main Provisions
1 Interpretation
2 Duration of Agreement
3 Agreement Services













D Agreement Services — Basis For
Charging
E Non–Agreement Services
F Quality and Outcomes
G Forms/Certificates
H Health Fund Members’ Level of
Cover
I Hospital Charges and Health Fund
Benefits
Source: A major health fund.
For hospitals, the starting point for rate negotiations is typically the rates necessary




were last fixed. For the health funds, the concern is to provide good hospital
coverage for members while minimising increases in premiums.
Within this framework, a range of factors can influence outcomes (see box 7.6).
However, the underlying driver will be the relative bargaining strength of the two
parties. As discussed in the next section, this is the subject of much discussion in the
industry.
Box 7.6 Factors determining private hospital rate outcomes
According to the industry, the rates negotiated between a private hospital and a health
fund will depend upon such factors as:
Hospital features and performance
·  the standard of the hospital;
·  the credibility of the hospital’s doctors;
·  the hospital’s commitment to outcomes;
·  benefits paid in the previous period;
·  the hospital’s ALOS outcomes; and
·  whether the hospital is achieving cost efficiencies.
Local market factors
·  how dominant the hospital is in the local market;
·  what is happening to levels of demand in the market; and
·  whether the market is high or low cost in terms of the mix of treatments provided.
Health fund specifics
·  the hospital’s patient volumes with the fund;
·  how attractive the hospital is to the fund’s members;
·  whether the hospital has complied with previous contracts; and
·  the historical rates paid to the hospital and how those compare with the average
rates paid for that particular hospital type.
Source: Industry interviews.
Implications for private hospitals
There are widespread concerns in the private hospital industry about the current
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Hospitals Association (APHA), has been advocating the development of a code of
practice for contract negotiations between hospitals and the funds.
The hospitals’ primary concern is that the health funds have excessive bargaining
power and that the rates negotiated under HPPAs are insufficient to cover legitimate
cost increases. They also contend that the funds have imposed unreasonable
contract clauses and employed inappropriate negotiation practices — for example,
deferring contract re-negotiations, allegedly often for many months after the
contract expiry date.
In contrast, insurers have argued that the health funds need contracts with hospitals
as much as the hospitals need contracts with the funds. In particular, they contend
that funds must have contracts with sufficient hospitals to ensure adequate
geographic and clinical coverage for their members. Also, the funds claim that the
requirement for them to pay a legislated minimum default benefit for the treatment
of a member in a hospital not covered by an HPPA acts as an additional balancing
force in negotiations (see, for example, IC 1997).
Outside the industry, the Senate Committee (SCALC 1996) reviewing the current
contracting legislation found that the health funds are generally in a much stronger
negotiating position than the hospitals. In contrast, the ACCC (1999c) has expressed
the view that the balance of negotiating power will depend on the circumstances
involved.
But even if there was unanimous agreement on where the balance of negotiating
power lies, determining what constitutes a misuse of that power would still be
difficult. This can be illustrated drawing on the following quotation attempting to
define market power in the private hospital industry:
The existence of market power can best be described by considering the position of the
hospital. If acceptance of a price offered by a health fund places the hospital’s future in
jeopardy and not accepting a price offered by a health fund also places the hospital’s
future in jeopardy, then the health fund has market power.’ (Herring Health and
Management in evidence to the ACCC 1999a).
Some would argue that threatening a hospital’s existence is a clear misuse of market
power. But is it necessarily misuse of market power to force an inefficient hospital
to improve its performance or exit the industry? And how should the benefits to
consumers of lower premiums be set against reduced diversity of private hospital
services? Moreover, as the ACCC (1998) noted in relation to an application by a
group of private hospitals to negotiate jointly with health funds (see section 7.4), it
is not necessarily anti-competitive for the funds to use negotiating power for the





One indicator of the impact of contracting on the relative bargaining positions of the
hospitals and the funds is movements in average benefits paid over time.
Between 1995–96 and 1997–98 — after the advent of the current contracting
legislation — average daily benefits increased in real terms by about 4 per cent
(table 7.1). Prima facie, this does not suggest a harder negotiating approach by the
health funds. However, as noted in chapter 5, the average length of patient stay has
recently been declining by 2 to 3 per cent a year, and the average casemix
complexity increasing by around 2 per cent a year. Allowing for the impact of these
changes would suggest that remuneration to hospitals was a little less generous in
1997–98 than two years earlier.
Table 7.1 Patient revenue
a and health fund benefits
b, private acute care










1995–96 532 - 479
1996–97 578  7.2 504  3.8
1997–98 578 0.0 505 0.2
a Based on patient revenue for private hospitals involved in the APHA’s PICS benchmarking exercise.
b Benefits paid by health funds to all private acute care hospitals.
Source: PHIAC Annual Reports; APHA unpublished data.
Another possible indicator of the distribution of market power would be variations
in (casemix-adjusted) rate outcomes for hospitals of different size and ownership. A
common view is that these variables influence the bargaining strength of a hospital
and hence the outcome of negotiations with the health funds:
·  The 17 largest private hospitals (over 200 beds) account for 23 per cent of
industry separations. Thus, the funds would risk losing a significant number of
members if they did not reach agreement with these hospitals.
·  Conversely, the lesser market presence of small hospitals might be expected to
reduce their bargaining strength. Also, small hospitals have less scope to
dedicate resources to the negotiating process. The private hospitals which did not
receive contracts in AXA Health Insurance’s 1998 Victorian tender were
predominantly small facilities.
·  Group hospital networks can have significant negotiating resources, as well as
access to a data set covering all of the individual hospitals in those networks.
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Practices Act (TPA) allows them to pool information on negotiated rates for
their individual hospitals.
Somewhat surprisingly, data for 1996–97 on average casemix-adjusted
accommodation benefits by hospital ownership show relatively little variation
between for-profit group, independent for-profit and religious/charitable hospitals
(table 7.2). Similarly, there was little variation in average casemix-adjusted benefits
for hospitals of more than 50 beds. (While average benefits were significantly lower
for small hospitals, particularly for those of less than 25 beds, these facilities tend to
have a much higher proportion of day surgery patients).
Table 7.2 Average private hospital
a accommodation benefits, by hospital
ownership and size, 1996–97 ($)





For-profit group 347 342
For-profit independent 332 338
Religious/charitable 361 346
Other not-for-profit 306 310
Size categories
0–25 beds 196 209
26–50 beds 303 312
51–100 beds 345 346
101–200 beds 349 345
Over 200 beds 377 347
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source: DHFS Hospital Casemix Protocol (unpublished data).
One interpretation of these relatively uniform rate outcomes is that the health funds
are not ‘driving to the limit’ when negotiating with individual hospitals.
However, because the data in table 7.2 are aggregated across Australia, they could
conceal significant variations in outcomes in regional and local markets. As noted in
box 7.5, the funds indicated they are likely to pay a higher rate to a hospital if it has
a strong position in the local market.
Few private hospitals in major Australian cities could consider themselves to have a
dominant market position — most treatments are available in several private and




On the other hand, some hospitals offering highly specialised services, or meeting a
substantial part of demand in a particular market, may be in stronger bargaining
position when dealing with health funds. For example:
·  In Queensland, large private hospitals in regional centres such as Mackay,
Rockhampton and Toowoomba attract patients from surrounding areas. This
suggests they may have some bargaining power when dealing with the funds
(although this will vary by treatment and according to public hospital
competition).
·  In Western Australia, the St John of God hospital chain provides 40 per cent of
the private hospital beds in that State. Failure of a health fund to negotiate
contracts with this chain could therefore severely compromise its ability to offer
acceptable hospital coverage to members.
Summing up
While the quantitative indicators reported above provide a somewhat mixed picture,
they are not inconsistent with the view that there has been a shift in the balance of
negotiating power towards the health funds. But, of itself, this does not advance the
debate all that far. The real policy questions are whether negotiating power is being
misused and whether there are changes that could be made to the negotiating
framework to deliver more efficient outcomes.
In this regard, some hospitals said that the trend towards case-based payments has
increased the complexity of negotiations and made them more adversarial. They
also raised concerns about the quality and amount of data they receive from the
health funds.
An adequate two-way flow of information between the parties is essential for an
effective negotiating process. Indeed, information flows will become even more
important if selective tendering by the health funds becomes more widespread. For
example, access to information on ‘indicative’ prices required to secure a contract
might help hospitals determine how much they need to reduce their costs to be
competitive. This in turn raises questions about the provisions in the current
contracting legislation which prohibit stand-alone hospitals from sharing
information on the outcomes of recent rate negotiations.  This issue is explored
further in chapter 9.86 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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7.3 The relationship between health funds and doctors
Contracts negotiated between health funds and doctors practising in private
hospitals generally lie outside the hospitals’ sphere of influence.
Nonetheless, these contracts can have significant implications for hospitals. In
particular, medical gaps are a major concern for fund members and affect the take-
up of health insurance and thereby the demand for private hospital services. (In
1997–98, insured patients met an average of just over 20 per cent of the costs of
medical treatments provided in private hospitals (DHAC 1999)). Also, any
provisions in contracts relating to clinical practice can similarly affect a hospital’s
operating procedures or occupancy levels.
Contracting between doctors and health funds occurs within a broader system under
which doctors usually specify the treatment that patients receive. Thus, as noted
earlier, in consultation with their patients, doctors generally decide whether
hospitalisation is required and the length of stay, and often which hospital is used.
This means they effectively control the level of benefits paid out by health funds for
the treatment of individual patients.
The efficacy of Australia’ fee-for-service approach has been subject to much
debate. Suffice it to say that most parts of the medical profession are strongly
opposed to changes that would lessen their control over patient treatment and fees
charged.
Agreements between health funds and doctors
As described in chapter 6, the Amendment Act 1995 provides for contracts between
health funds and medical providers known as Medical Purchaser Provider
Agreements (MPPAs). (Prior to this legislation, such contracts were prohibited).
Where an MPPA (or other form of purchaser provider agreement) is in place, a
health fund can pay medical benefits in excess of the schedule fee. This provides an
opportunity to eliminate out-of-pocket expenses for private patients for medical
services received in hospital (or to limit them to a pre-determined copayment).
While eliminating gaps will put upward pressure on premiums, it can make private
health insurance a more attractive product.
Because of resistance from doctors to contracting with health funds, relatively few
have signed MPPAs. According to the Department of Health and Aged Care, only
53 agreements were in place in February 1999, involving only AXA Health




While individual MPPAs can cover treatment provided by a number of doctors,
information on payments by health funds to doctors above the schedule fee
reinforces the point that uptake of these contracts has been low. In the June Quarter
of 1998, services paid at over the schedule fee represented less than two per cent of
all medical services and benefits paid by the health funds (table 7.3).
Table 7.3 Medical services and benefits paid above the schedule fee,









No. (000) $000 No. (000) $000
September Quarter 1996 2 812 59 771 <1 13
June Quarter 1997 2 722 58 711 10 256
June Quarter 1998 2 630 57 537 48 968
Source:   PHIAC, Annual Report 1997–98.
It is also important to note that much of the strong percentage growth in the
payment of benefits above the schedule fee apparent in table 7.3, appears to be due
to the impact of AXA Health Insurance’s Mediplus EzyClaim scheme (see box 7.7),
rather than to the uptake of MPPAs. Under this scheme, doctors have an agreement
(not a contract) with AXA whereby they can be paid above the schedule fee for
treating the fund’s patients (who are left with no out-of-pocket costs). Within a year
of the scheme commencing in February 1998, it accounted for approximately 40 per
cent of all AXA’s medical claims. AXA believes that, by the end of 1999,
EzyClaim might account for 70 to 80 per cent of its medical claims.
With the Commonwealth’s 30 per cent health insurance rebate legislation placing an
onus on health funds and doctors to eliminate medical gaps for insured patients (see
chapter 6), there is likely to be growth in agreements between doctors and the funds.
In this regard, Medibank Private has recently announced the introduction of its
GapCover scheme, which will apparently operate in a similar way to EzyClaim.
Implications for private hospitals
As noted, private hospitals have a strong interest in the outcomes of negotiations
between the health funds and doctors, particularly in relation to eliminating or
reducing gap payments. The adequacy of the supply of doctors — which in turn can
influence the level of gap payments — is therefore an issue of some relevance to the
private hospital industry. Supply-side issues are canvassed in chapter 9.88 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
IN AUSTRALIA
Box 7.7 AXA Health Insurance’s Mediplus EzyClaim scheme
Mediplus EzyClaim is a ‘no medical gap’ scheme that allows specialists to bill any
number of claims to AXA at an agreed rate. It was established in December 1997 with
the first trials commencing in February 1998, supported by the National Association of
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists.
EzyClaim operates on a doctor-by-doctor basis with no interference from the health
fund in the doctor-patient relationship. Participating doctors can choose whether to
charge a patient under EzyClaim or outside the scheme. AXA evaluates what total
payment for a particular procedure will be attractive to most doctors, and then pays
doctors the difference between that rate and the Medicare payment of 75 per cent of
the schedule fee.
EzyClaim has widespread clinical coverage including cardiac surgery and obstetrics.
However, the fund said it still prefers to have pathology and radiology providers
covered by MPPAs as it is important that all members are assured of no gaps in these
areas.
Source: AXA Health Insurance (personal communication).
It is also important to note that the often strong negotiating position of doctors when
dealing with the funds may have flow-on effects for contracts between the hospitals
and the funds. A case in point is the way that the funds have sought to address the
control that doctors have on the volume of hospital admissions and thus on the total
benefits payable for private hospital services. In essence, the funds have looked to
indirectly limit patient volumes by constraining payments to hospitals. For example:
·  Medibank Private places volume caps on total benefit payments for services in
some hospitals. If a hospital exceeds the cap, Medibank Private reduces the daily
benefit on extra services to the basic default level.
·  The selective hospital tendering process adopted by some funds is partly aimed
at reducing total benefit payments by limiting the number of hospitals able to
offer 100 per cent hospital cover to fund members.
Such ‘external influences’ on contracts between health funds and private hospitals
are likely for as long as fee-for-service arrangements for doctors continue to
dominate.
7.4 The Trade Practices Act and the ACCC
As noted in chapter 6, contracting in the private hospital industry must also comply
with the relevant provisions of the TPA. In particular, the formation of hospitals or




can authorise joint negotiating arrangements that reduce competition if it judges
them to be in the public interest. The ACCC has previously recognised the
‘promotion of equitable dealings in the market’ as one potential public benefit.
Prima facie, authorisation of joint negotiations is a mechanism for giving private
hospitals more negotiating power in their dealings with health funds. But, as the
1998 application by five Queensland private hospitals for authorisation of an inter-
hospital agreement (see box 7.8) shows, this route is likely to be time consuming
and uncertain in outcome.
The principal objectives of this agreement included:
·  sharing and collective presentation of cost and price information;
·  wider dissemination of cost reduction strategies amongst members; and
·  increased efficiency of purchaser provider contracts entered into by members.
The proposed arrangement was similar to the approach taken by large hospital
networks, such as HCOA and Ramsay.
As set out in box 7.8, the ACCC changed its position on the application on three
occasions. And, while ultimately granting a conditional authorisation for the
proposed agreement, it has attached conditions that, amongst other things, limit the
capacity of the five hospitals to share price information.
Whatever the merits of this particular application, it points to the differential
impacts of the TPA across ownership structures. Group hospital networks have a
significant advantage over stand alone private hospitals because their integrated
ownership means they can share information (including on rates) in their dealings
with health funds, without any TPA concerns. This issue is canvassed further in the
final chapter.
7.5 Other competitive aspects of the private hospital
market
Competition between private hospitals for patients
While the fortunes of private hospitals depend heavily on their ability to attract
doctors and to secure workable contracts with health funds, there is still some scope
for them to compete directly for patients.90 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Box 7.8 Application to the ACCC for an inter-hospital agreement
In June 1998, the Friendly Society Private Hospital Bundaberg, St Stephen’s Private
Hospital Maryborough, St Andrew’s Private Hospital Toowoomba, St Andrew’s War
Memorial Hospital Brisbane and the Wesley Hospital Brisbane applied to the ACCC for
authorisation of an agreement which would permit them to:
·  exchange fee and non-fee related information; and
·  establish a common agent to facilitate the exchange of aggregated data and to
assist in the negotiation of HPPAs.
In support of their application, the five hospitals submitted that the exchange of
information would allow them to improve efficiency and service quality, and that a
common agent would assist in redressing an imbalance of negotiating power between
health funds and the individual hospitals. They also argued that the agreement would
not result in a substantial lessening of competition.
The health funds argued against authorisation, principally on the grounds that there is
no imbalance in negotiating power between hospitals and the funds, and that the
exchange of price-related information is contrary to the Amendment Act 1995.
In an initial draft determination in December 1998, the ACCC concluded that the
proposed agreement would not substantially lessen competition and would assist the
hospitals to improve their efficiency and quality of service. The ACCC also said there
would be public benefit in the provision of countervailing negotiating power to the
hospitals. It granted a draft authorisation for five years, subject to certain conditions
(ACCC 1998).
However, following a subsequent pre-decision conference in February 1999 and taking
account of further submissions, the ACCC reversed this decision in a second draft
determination (ACCC 1999b). It said that, in the light of the additional input, it was
concerned that the agreement would not deliver a public benefit sufficient to outweigh
its anti-competitive effects.
In its final determination in September 1999, the ACCC again modified its position. It
said that for the purposes of the determination it had revised its definition of the
relevant markets and concluded that the proposed conduct would not result in a
substantial lessening of competition in either the hospital-patient or private hospital-
health insurer markets. The ACCC did, however, argue that some aspects of the
proposed arrangement could potentially negate the arrangement’s public benefits. It
therefore granted a conditional authorisation for three years. Some of the attached
conditions will restrict the sharing of price information by the five hospitals (ACCC
1999c).
Source: ACCC 1998, 1999a,b,c.
Notably, such competition is not normally price-based. For insured patients, charges




also have a strong influence on charges for the relatively small number of self-
paying patients. Indeed, health funds generally discourage hospitals from offering
discounts to self-paying patients (see appendix A).
However, around one-third of patients decide the hospital in which they will receive
treatment (Quints and Marks 1997). Hence, hospitals can compete for custom
through marketing their:
·  location and thereby ease of access for patients and their visitors;
·  facilities;
·  range of services and procedures;
·  prestige and reputation; and/or
·  contracts with health funds.
In many respects, the way hospitals compete for patients is little different from the
way they compete for the custom of doctors. Just as hospitals expend resources to
market themselves to specialists and general practitioners, they will often seek to
inform potential patients about their services and facilities. In some cases, this will
involve advertising in the media. In others, it will involve a lower key approach. For
example, one small for-profit surgical hospital in Victoria told the Commission that
it markets itself to the general public through letter box drops. It went on to say that
this marketing takes on a different dimension around Christmas when the few
surgeons who bring in the bulk of business take leave. At this time of the year, the
hospital more actively seeks medical and respite care patients.
Competition between private and public hospitals
In 1997–98, some 19 per cent of insured private patients across Australia received
their treatment in public hospitals (AIHW, Australian Hospital Statistics, 1997–98).
Prima facie, this suggests that there is considerable competition between the two
hospital sectors in the treatment of private patients.
However, views differ on the actual extent of such competition.
Some consider that private and public hospitals operate in largely different markets.
They contend that the focus of the public system is on treating the acutely and
seriously ill and those with chronic conditions, whereas the focus of the private
system is on treating those with less-urgent clinical needs, including elective
surgery. (See, for example, Hall 1999). Some go on to argue that insured patients
will usually seek to avoid public hospital waiting lists for non-urgent treatments by
using the private hospital system. To support this point, they note that a significant92 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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proportion of private patients treated in public hospitals initially enter as
‘emergency’ patients and/or receive treatments not available in nearby private
facilities.
But while there is a much greater emphasis on elective treatments in private
hospitals, this does not mean there is no competition for private patients with public
hospitals. Many private hospitals are now offering services and treatments that were
previously only available at major public teaching hospitals. Thus, insured patients
and/or their doctors will often have a choice of hospital provider. One result has
been that the public sector’s share of the private patient market has been declining
steadily (19 per cent of insured separations in 1997–98 compared with 36 per cent
in 1993–94).
The commonality in the leading DRG groups for insured patients treated in public
and private hospitals is another indication of the scope for some competition
between the two sectors. As indicated in table 7.4, four of the top 10 DRGs for
insured patients are common to public and private acute care hospitals.
Table 7.4 Top 10 DRGs by number of insured separations, private acute
care hospitals and private patients in public hospitals, 1996–97
Private acute care hospitals Private patients in public hospitals
332 Gastroscopy (non–digestive diseases) 678 Post abortion diagnoses
335 Colonoscopy 572 Renal dialysis
780 Chemotherapy 332 Gastroscopy (non–digestive diseases)
572 Renal dialysis 335 Colonoscopy
674 Vaginal delivery 943 Other factors influencing health status
099 Lens procedures 349 Oesophagitis, gastroent & mdd
421 Knee procedures 353 Digestive system diagnoses
128 Dental extractions & restorations 674 Vaginal delivery
843 Major affective disorders 941 Rehabilitation
484 Skin, subcut. tissue & breast procedures 939 Aftercare of malignancy
Source:  DHFS, Hospital Casemix Protocol 1996–97 (unpublished data).
Overall, there is little doubt that there is competition between private and public
hospitals for some private patients. And, any extension of current initiatives to
contract out the delivery of some public patient services to private hospitals could,
in future, lead to greater competition between the two sectors. Such competition
raises a number of issues in relation to the application of the competitive neutrality
principles specified in the National Competition Policy. These issues are discussed
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8 Broad drivers of demand for private
hospital services
The fortunes of individual private hospitals will depend on a range of sector-
specific factors discussed in previous chapters, including their location and
facilities, their capacity to attract doctors, and their cost efficiency.
However, there are also two groups of broader factors that will influence overall
demand for private hospital services:
·  policy factors such as the level of funding for the public hospital system, and
regulatory and policy arrangements affecting the cost and quality of private
hospital services and the affordability of private health insurance; and
·  non-policy drivers of demand such as income levels and dispersion, population
growth and the age structure of the population, and technological capacity.
This chapter looks at some of the key non-policy drivers of demand for private
hospital services. Some of the more important policy-related influences on demand
are canvassed in the final chapter.
8.1 Income growth and distribution
It is widely accepted that health services are ‘luxury’ goods meaning that, as
incomes rise, spending on these services increases more than proportionately. One
consequence is that spending on health care as a proportion of GDP tends to
increase over time:
·  Expenditure on health services in Australia is currently equivalent to around 8.5
per cent of GDP. This share is 10 per cent higher than a decade ago, and almost
50 per cent higher than in 1971 (AIHW, Australia’s Health, various years).
·  While inflation in health costs over and above the general rate of inflation helps
to explain some of this growth in expenditure share, there has also been a
significant increase in consumption of health care services. Between 1975–76
and 1995–96, real per capita expenditure on health care rose by around 2.2 per
cent a year (AIHW Australia’s Health,  1998), compared with an average94 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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increase in real per capita income of around 1.5 per cent a year over the same
period.
Some commentators have suggested that the luxury good status of health care
primarily reflects the impact of increases in government spending rather than
spending by individuals. In this regard, Richardson and Robertson (1999) argue
that:
… personal income elasticities are very low… While poorly articulated in the literature
there is clearly an ‘institutional income effect’ which operates through the growth of
budgetary allocations to health authorities that are roughly improportional to income
growth and adjusted upwards or downwards by either a ‘betterment’ or an ‘efficiency’
factor. (p. 350)
But this is not to deny the possibility that future increases in income may lead to
proportionately larger increases in non-government spending on private hospital
services. This is particularly the case given the significant discretionary component
of many private hospital treatments — some treatments may be genuinely optional
from a health perspective, while in other cases, treatment at some personal cost in a
private hospital is a way of avoiding queues in the public hospital system, or
accessing a higher standard of accommodation.
The increasing share of health care expenditure going to private hospital services
over the last decade serves to illustrate this point. Between 1984–85 and 1995–96,
expenditure on private hospital services as a share of total recurrent expenditure on
health care rose from 5.6 to 8.2 per cent (AIHW, Australia’s Health, 1998, p. 167).
Moreover, the ABS (1995) found that high income households were five times more
likely to have private health insurance than those on low incomes. This suggests
that, other things equal, income growth may lead to higher health fund membership
and thereby greater use of private hospital services.
At the same time, the impacts of income growth on the demand for private hospital
services are likely to depend partly on how that growth is dispersed across the
population:
·  There is evidence to suggest that income growth over the past twenty years in
Australia has been concentrated at the upper end of the income distribution.
(See, for example, Harding 1997). Many higher income earners will already
have private health insurance. Thus, if the recent pattern of income growth
continues, the resulting increase in demand for private hospital services is likely
to be lower than if income growth were more evenly distributed across the
population.
·  Against this, incomes of older people have been increasing faster than for the
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superannuation coverage and higher female workforce participation are likely to
see this trend continue in the future. As discussed below, older Australians are
the highest users of the health care system. Hence, any improvement in their
relative income status is likely to result in proportionately higher spending on
private hospital and other health care services.
8.2 Population growth and ageing
Two aspects of demographic change are of particular relevance to demand for
health care services in general and private hospital services in particular.
First, and most obviously, population growth will increase demand for these
services. While an unremarkable observation in an aggregate sense, the precise
effects of population growth will depend on the composition and distribution of that
growth. For example, the availability of private hospital services is significantly
lower in rural and regional areas than in the major cities (see chapter 2). Hence, the
more any overall increase in population is focussed in rural and regional areas, the
smaller may be the total increase in demand for private hospital services. Similarly,
population growth associated with migration may have less of an impact on demand
for hospital services than natural population growth — at least in the short to
medium term. Apart from the hospital services often involved in child birth, the first
year or so of life is usually a period of relatively high usage of health care services.
Second, in common with most other developed countries, Australia’s population has
been ageing over the last 25 years. This has seen a change in the age profile of the
population with a larger proportion of Australians aged 45 and older. If, as
expected, this trend continues, by the middle of the next century the majority of
Australians could be older than 50 and a significant proportion older than 70
(McDonald and Kippen 1999).
The impact of ageing on the demand for health services has been the subject of
considerable debate.
Some — for example, the National Commission of Audit (1996) — have suggested
that the effect will be very significant. Such views are premised on the observation
that per capita health expenditures rise significantly from about the age of 65. In this
regard, Commission estimates based on AIHW hospital usage data show that the per
capita number of patient days in private hospitals in the 75 and over age cohort is
more than 2.5 times that in the 55–64 cohort. And even in the 65–74 cohort, per
capita usage is nearly 60 per cent higher than in the 55–64 cohort. Similarly,
consultants to a recent review of NSW Health by the Independent Pricing and96 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Regulatory Tribunal indicated that people aged over 65 are 4.5 times more likely to
require a hospital stay than those under 65. (IPART 1998, p. 78)
But other commentators suggest that, of itself, increased longevity is likely to
reduce per capita expenditures on health care services in the older age cohorts. They
contend that the period of highest health expenditure for individuals is usually the
last few years of their lives. In this regard, US statistics indicate that, on average, 40
per cent of health expenditures are in the last two years of life with 30 per cent in
the last year alone (Fuchs 1984). The implication is that, outside of this two-year
sunset period, the major impact of increased longevity on health care expenditure is
to delay the onset of the period of high expenditure.
Modelling by Richardson and Robertson (1999), which makes adjustments for this
effect, suggests that the impact of ageing on health care expenditures may be quite
small (see box 8.1). Indeed, Richardson and Robertson conclude that:
Application of the simple needs model suggests that the impact of future ageing on the
need for medical services will be so small that, in the absence of other factors, the size
of the health sector would diminish in relation to GDP. (p. 348)
Prima facie, there is some tension between the assumption underlying this
conclusion — namely that greater longevity will reduce per capita health care
expenditures in older age cohorts — and the increase in these expenditure levels in
recent years. (As noted in box 8.1, the Richardson and Robertson modelling
indicates that there would be a substantial increase in the health expenditure share
of GDP if the recent growth in expenditure levels in the older age cohorts
continues).
However, there is widespread agreement that recent increases in expenditure on
health care services in the older age cohorts have reflected a number of factors
additional to the ‘pure ageing’ effect. In particular:
·  Improvements in treatments used primarily by older people — for example,
better joint replacement therapies and prostheses — are likely to have
encouraged greater spending on health care and hospital services by this age
group. (The impact of technological change on demand is considered in the next
section).
·  Greater uptake of these treatments by older people will have been facilitated by
their faster than average income growth in recent years (see above).
·  Some have also suggested that supplier-induced demand has been a contributing
factor to higher per capita expenditures (see chapter 9).
More generally, these observations highlight the high degree of interaction between
the key non-policy drivers of demand for health care services.DRIVERS OF DEMAND 97
Box 8.1 Estimating the impact of ageing on the demand for health care
services
Using a model made available through the Australian Private Hospitals Association
website, Richardson and Roberts (1999) examined the impacts of ageing on health
care expenditures under a number of different scenarios. Under each of the scenarios,
adjustments were made to allow for reductions in per capita age cohort expenditures
as a result of increased longevity (see text).
Amongst, other things, the modelling suggested that:
·  If the only source of expenditure growth on health care was ageing of the
population, and holding GDP constant, expenditure as a percentage of GDP would
rise from a little over 8 per cent to about 10.4 per cent in 2006 and to 11.8 per cent
in 2051.
·  If population and GDP growth (ranging from 2.1 to 3.6 per cent a year) are added to
the ageing effect, expenditures on health care as a percentage of GDP would
decline.
·  If age cohort expenditures continue to grow, then total health care expenditure as a
percentage of GDP could rise markedly in the next century. For example, under a
‘limiting case’ scenario where expenditures in under 65 age cohorts continued to
grow at the same rate as between 1981 and 1994, and those in the over 65 cohorts
grew at double their rate over that period, expenditure on health care as a
percentage of GDP could be more than 20 per cent by 2051.
Richardson and Robertson went on to test their hypothesis that the pure effect of
ageing on health care expenditures is quite small with reference to historical and cross
sectional health care expenditure data for Australia and a number of other countries.
They concluded that the results of these analyses also ‘… cast very significant doubt
on the belief that age/sex based need has been or will be a significant determinant of
demand for health services’.
Source: Richardson and Robertson 1999.
8.3 Technological developments
Technological developments over the last few decades have greatly increased the
capacity to treat illness and disabling conditions.
Some of these have provided for completely new treatment options, for example:
·  organ transplants;
·  hip and knee replacements;
·  micro-surgery; and98 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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·  gene therapy.
But equally important have been developments that have improved the safety of
treatments and the likelihood of successful outcomes. For instance, advances in
anaesthetics have reduced the risk of most operations. And, perhaps even more
importantly, there have been dramatic improvements in diagnostic techniques — for
example, the development of magnetic resonance scanners and better resolution
ultrasound scanners.
While the benefits of these sorts of technological improvements have come at a
considerable financial cost to patients and the community, some other developments
have had the added bonus of reducing treatment costs. A case in point is minimal
access surgery, performed through small incisions. Apart from involving less pain
for patients, it facilitates shorter hospital stays and recovery times than traditional
surgery methods. A range of procedures can be performed in this way, including the
removal of gall bladders and appendixes, bladder surgery, ulcer repair,
hysterectomies, and bowel and knee operations. Similarly, advances in
pharmacology have eliminated the need for surgery in the treatment of some forms
of cancers and ulcers.
Such technological developments have had significant impacts on the level of
demand for private hospital services:
·  They have allowed private hospitals to offer a wide range of new and improved
treatments.
·  They have extended treatment options to a wider range of patients. For example,
improvements in anaesthetics and diagnostic techniques, and the introduction of
minimal access surgery, have made it possible to treat increasingly frail older
people.
They have also been an important factor underlying the changing composition of
services in the private hospital sector. For example, minimal access surgery and
improved lens procedures have been major contributors to the significant growth in
day procedures (see chapter 2). In this regard, one CEO of a private hospital
commented that:
New technology is providing a lot of opportunities, especially in day surgery. Day
surgery [now] accounts for 60 per cent of our patients ...
Looking to the future, technological change will undoubtedly continue to have
significant impacts on the private hospital industry. While it is obviously impossible
to specify precisely what these impacts will be, it seems likely that future
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demand for day procedures. This is particularly the case, given the more general
trend away from institutionalised health care (see next section).
Such changes may, in turn, reduce the rate of growth in expenditure on hospital and
other health care services. In this regard, Robertson and Richardson note that:
It should not … be assumed that the inflationary pressures from technologies of the
past will continue. Technology in the US is an endogenous variable and the US market
has been undergoing a significant shift from one which rewards cost creation to one
which rewards cost cutting. (p. 350)
8.4  Community attitudes to health care
Changing community preferences in regard to health care treatment and the effects
of health care education will be further broad influences on demand for public and
private hospital services alike.
As noted, lengths of stay in hospitals have been decreasing and day surgery is
growing rapidly.
While cost pressures and advances in technology may have been the primary drivers
of these changes, a concern to minimise time spent out of the home environment has
also been a factor. Greater emphasis on home-based treatment has been very much
evident in palliative health care. But in areas like child birth, the trend to minimise
time spent in an institutional environment has also been apparent.
A greater emphasis on community and home-based services has also been evident
in the provision of medical care to the elderly. There is now a focus on the elderly
being able to choose to live in a supportive environment that is as close to their
social and geographic community as possible (OECD 1996). Partly as a result of
this, nursing homes are increasingly providing medical care that would previously
have been provided by the hospital sector.
A continuation of these sorts of developments will have obvious ramifications for
the nature and level of demand for private hospital services.
This will particularly be the case if governments move to integrate funding for
various forms of community, aged and hospital care. In Australia and a number of
other developed countries, governments have begun to canvass funding options
which would allow people to move more easily between what are currently quite
separate components of the care system.
Private health insurers are also beginning to look at similar sorts of initiatives. For
example, three early discharge trials are currently being conducted in Victoria and
South Australia. Each trial involves an agreement between the participating private100 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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health insurers and hospitals to substitute outreach services for in-hospital care for
an agreed daily benefit. The ultimate objective of these trials is to assess the scope
to extend private health insurance to cover clinically appropriate (and potentially
cheaper) alternatives to in-hospital care.
Health care education
Much health care education is designed to help individuals monitor and improve
their state of health and thereby reduce their subsequent need to access ‘remedial’
health care services. Examples include:
·  the skin cancer awareness campaign initiated in the early 1980s. The program
emphasises the importance of prevention and early detection and treatment of
melanoma and other types of skin cancer;
·  the provision of information on the role of nutrition and exercise in preventing
osteoporosis;
·  various anti-smoking campaigns; and
·  the campaign emphasising the importance of regular screening to assist early
detection of breast and cervical cancer.
While successful campaigns of this sort will often reduce demand for private
hospital and other remedial health care services, this will not always be the case.
For instance, skin cancer campaigns may encourage people to seek treatment for
conditions that they would not previously have done so.SOME FUTURE
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9 Some future policy issues
The main aim of this report has been to describe the Australian private hospital
industry and to look at some of the factors affecting its performance.
Some of these are beyond the power of governments to influence directly.
Developments in medical technology and other non-policy drivers of demand for
private hospital services as described in chapter 8, are cases in point.
But equally, future government health care policies and regulations governing the
operation of private hospitals will have a critical bearing on outcomes in the
industry. While it is not the purpose of this report to pronounce on what future
policy settings should be, the discussion in earlier chapters raises a range of issues




Restrictions on the number of beds
As set out in chapter 6, planning controls in most States and Territories restrict the
number of private hospital beds. There are several related rationales for these
controls, including:
·  facilitating ‘orderly’ industry development, particularly through reducing the
level of unused bed capacity in private hospitals;
·  promoting equitable access to private hospital services;
·  guarding against supplier-induced demand; and
·  containing health care costs by limiting access to expensive, high technology
equipment.
However, questions arise in relation to all of these:102 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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·  In most markets, the possibility of substantial unused capacity is accepted as a
price worth paying for the efficiency benefits that usually come from
competition between suppliers.
·  It seems unlikely that bed controls improve access to private hospital services in
‘disadvantaged’ areas. The controls limit access in areas where demand for
services exceeds the number of beds made available through the planning
process. However, it is not apparent why any such capping effect should be
matched by improved access in those areas and regions that do not have the
economic capacity to support the number of beds that would be allowed under
the planning controls. In this regard, a discussion paper released for the current
review of Victoria’s Health Services and related Acts (see box 9.1) concludes
that bed licensing has manifestly failed to promote equitable access to private
hospital services in Victoria (HSPR 1999, p. 56).
·  The supplier-induced demand hypothesis — which postulates that, in response to
an increase in the total number of medical providers, individual providers will
supply more services to patients so as to maintain income levels or workloads —
has been questioned by some commentators (see section 9.2). In any event,
hospitals in their capacity as the providers of beds would seemingly have less
scope than doctors to influence levels of demand.
·  As noted in the HSPR discussion paper (p. 56), there are now various market
pressures on private hospitals to contain costs. Indeed, the hospitals argue that
the current market environment places undue pressure on their costs (see chapter
7).
While the benefits of bed controls seem questionable, equally, the direct costs do
not appear to be large. As noted in chapter 6, in some jurisdictions the value of a
bed licence is negligible, with the maximum cost of a licence in any individual
jurisdiction being around $20 000. Using a discount rate of 10 per cent, this equates
to an annual ‘leasing’ cost of $2000 or less than 2 per cent of average revenue per
bed. The implication of these low values is that, in most parts of Australia, the
controls are not significantly reducing the available number of private hospital beds.
Moreover, trade in bed licences (see chapter 6) will mitigate any tendency of the
controls to reduce efficiency in the delivery of private hospital services. In essence,
a market for bed licences provides less efficient operators with financial incentives
to sell their licences to those who can deliver services more efficiently. That said, it
would be unrealistic to expect this mechanism to work perfectly — particularly
given the significant role of not-for-profit hospitals.
In sum, the need to retain bed controls is far from clear. Significantly, the Victorian
Health Services Policy Review has proposed that this component of that State’sSOME FUTURE
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licensing arrangements be dismantled (see box 9.1). A number of other jurisdictions
are currently reviewing their licensing arrangements for private hospitals.
Box 9.1 Some proposals for legislative reform in Victoria
In March 1999, a review team commissioned to look at the Victorian Health Services
and related Acts released a discussion paper. In accordance with National Competition
Policy legislative review requirements, the paper addresses a range of constraints on
competition in public and private health care markets. Some of the key proposals in the
paper are set out below.
Planning controls: The Review argues that controls on the number of private hospital
beds provide little or no benefit in terms of containing health care costs, ensuring
equitable access to private hospital services, or limiting the market power of health
funds. In contrast, it contends that the controls increase hospital costs by a small
amount and impede industry restructuring. It has proposed the controls be abolished.
Licensing of private hospitals: While supporting the need for licensing, the Review
argues that many of the current requirements do not advance patient safety and can
be dealt with in other ways. It has proposed a simplified licensing regime.
Taxation of private hospitals: The Review argues that not-for-profit private hospitals
have an unfair competitive advantage over their for-profit counterparts by virtue of their
exemption from paying sales tax, payroll tax, land tax, local rates and charges, stamp
duty and financial transactions taxes. It has proposed that these exemptions end.
Competition between public and private hospitals: The Review documents a range
of competitive advantages and disadvantages for public hospitals in treating private
patients. It has proposed various measures to address these, including: requiring
public hospitals to set commercial fees for private patients and removing controls which
can prevent them from doing so; allowing public hospitals to retain private fee income;
treating public and private hospitals equally for health insurance purposes; and
removing exemptions for public hospitals from input taxes. (The Review specifies that,
as an adjunct to the last proposal, there should be increased funding for services
provided to public patients to offset the loss of input tax exemptions on those services.)
Day procedure private centres: The Review proposes that registration requirements
for day procedure centres should be the same as for acute care private hospitals, and
that there should be a redefinition of what constitutes a centre.
Promoting consumer choice and confidence: The Review proposes: consideration
be given to establishing a 24 hour call centre in Victoria to provide health information to
consumers; the publication of risk-adjusted, clinical performance indicators for public
and private hospitals and day procedure centres; enhanced measures to guard against
sub-standard performance by health care providers; and giving consumers right of
access to their health care records.
Source: HSPR 1999.104 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Other licensing issues
During the Commission’s discussions with the industry, a number of concerns about
other aspects of the licensing arrangements emerged, including:
·  delays in the processing of licence variations, antiquated requirements and
inconsistencies in requirements across jurisdictions. As set out in box 6.1, these
can sometimes entail not insignificant costs for hospital operators;
·  less restrictive inspection requirements for day procedure facilities than for acute
care hospitals. In this regard, the ACT Government (1998, p.8) said that:
Once a private day surgery facility has met the initial approval requirements of the
Department, it is not subject to routine re-inspection unless required under other public
health legislation ... Therefore, a day surgery facility could, while remaining in the
same premises, change its practices (eg from ophthalmology to plastic surgery) without
ever being subject to further clinical inspection. There is no mechanism to ensure that
clinical protocols, practices and the quality of patient care are being maintained and
suited to the procedures conducted. Private hospitals, by comparison are required to be
inspected annually.
·  restrictions limiting day procedure hospitals to treating patients who enter and
exit the hospital on the same calendar day, rather than who are treated for less
than 24 hours.
The Commission notes that the Victorian Health Services Policy Review has
proposed changes to align the registration procedures for acute care and day care
hospitals, and to simplify licensing arrangements for private hospitals more
generally (see box 9.1). Such initiatives may also be relevant to licensing regimes in
other jurisdictions.
Taxation arrangements for private hospitals
The efficient delivery of goods and services will usually require that individual
providers are neither advantaged nor disadvantaged by government policies or
regulations. The National Competition Policy embodies formal ‘competitive
neutrality’ requirements where government business activities compete with private
businesses. However, the underlying principles can be equally relevant to
competition between private providers, or where the delivery of core government
services involves an element of competition with the private sector.
This section looks at some competitive neutrality issues raised by the different tax
treatment of particular types of private hospital. The broader competitive neutrality
issues arising in relation to competition between public and private hospitals are




Exemptions from input taxes such as the Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT), payroll tax,
sales tax and financial transactions taxes have given not-for-profit hospitals an
advantage over for-profit hospitals in competing for patients. Impending changes to
some of these taxes will reduce this advantage:
·  The Goods and Services Tax (GST), to take effect from 1 July 2000, will be
accompanied by the abolition of sales tax and some financial transaction taxes.
Services provided by private hospitals — whether for-profit or not-for-profit —
will not generally attract the GST.
·  Not-for-profit hospitals are to be subject to FBT, although a tax free threshold
for fringe benefits provided to employees will apply.
Nonetheless, there is still the question of whether the remaining input tax exemption
advantages for not-for-profit private hospitals are justified.
The major argument put in favour of exemptions is that they help not-for-profit
hospitals to provide a more caring environment and services to disadvantaged
patients, and to support other community services:
·  Staffing levels are higher in not-for-profit hospitals than in for-profit facilities
(see appendix tables B.22 and B.23), although it is not clear to what extent these
higher levels translate to greater levels of care.
·  Some religious groups said their hospitals provide a range of services for which
there is no fee — services which governments would have to take over if the tax
concessions were abolished.
·  Another religious group noted that not-for-profit hospitals contribute
significantly to community services such as aged care facilities.
The same sorts of arguments have been put for input tax exemptions for charitable
institutions (see IC 1995) and not-for-profit nursing homes (see PC 1999a).
However, while the financial savings from the exemptions could be used to promote
these aims, they could also be used to compensate for inefficiencies in not-for-profit
hospitals. Alternatively, they could allow not-for-profit hospitals to increase
remuneration levels for staff, thereby giving these hospitals a competitive edge in
attracting and retaining staff. In this regard, one for-profit group said that salary
packaging made possible by the current exemption from FBT potentially allows
not-for-profit hospitals to set their nursing salaries 15 per cent higher than in for-
profit hospitals. The Victorian Health Services Policy Review (1999, p. 64) said that
salary packaging in the not-for-profit sector has been increasing with inflationary
effects across the whole of the industry.106 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
IN AUSTRALIA
Assessing the extent to which input tax exemptions have been used to underwrite
inefficiencies in not-for-profit hospitals, or to bolster their competitiveness against
the for-profit sector, is well nigh impossible. While unit costs in the not-for-profit
sector are generally higher than in the for-profit sector, determining the causes of
these cost differences is difficult (see chapter 5).
Suffice it to say that input tax concessions create the potential for resource
misallocation to arise. Reflecting this concern, the Victorian Health Services Policy
Review has proposed an end to input tax exemptions for not-for-profit private
hospitals (p. 64).
However, if support provided to not-for-profit organisations by input tax
concessions is significant and governments wish to continue that support, it may be
difficult to identify alternative mechanisms that do not involve even higher
efficiency costs (IC 1995, pp. xxxv). And, as the Commission noted in its report on
nursing homes, if the value of the exemptions is very small, even the administrative
costs of taking action to remove them might exceed the ensuing efficiency gains
(PC 1999a, p. 101).
Aside from data on payroll tax payments by for-profit hospitals, information
indicating the value of the input tax concessions received by not-for-profit hospitals
is limited:
·  Some years ago, Health Care of Australia estimated that input tax exemptions
reduced the total costs of not-for-profit hospitals by around 5 per cent (IC 1995).
·  It appears that payroll tax exemptions would have accounted for about half of
this cost reduction. According to unpublished ABS data, all but two of the 177
for-profit hospitals paid payroll tax in 1996–97. The average tax paid as a share
of total hospital expenditure ranged from 2.1 per cent for the very largest
facilities to more than 3 per cent for some smaller and medium sized facilities
(table 9.1).
As noted above, the introduction of the GST and the changes to FBT arrangements
will remove a significant part of the non-payroll tax component of the advantage
currently enjoyed by not-for-profit private hospitals. This, in turn, suggests that
payroll tax exemptions should be the focus of any future initiatives to address non-
neutralities in the input tax treatment of the two sectors.SOME FUTURE
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Table 9.1 Payroll tax paid by for-profit private hospitals
a, by hospital bed
size, 1996–97
Average tax paid per
hospital
Average tax paid as a share of total
expenditure per hospital
$000 %
0–25 beds 35 3.2
26–50 beds 108 3.1
51–100 beds 260 3.2
101–200 beds 614 2.9
Over 200 beds 1 119 2.1
All for–profit hospitals 250 2.6
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source: Unpublished ABS data.
Income tax exemptions
Exemption from income tax might be seen as providing not-for-profit private
hospitals with a further competitive advantage over their for-profit rivals. For
example, a common contention is that the capacity of not-for-profit hospitals to use
untaxed surpluses to invest in improved facilities and infrastructure gives them an
advantage in attracting doctors and patients.
However, the extent of any such advantage and the scope to address it, is far from
clear:
·  For tax paying entities, interest costs are an allowable deduction from income.
Hence, for the component of private hospital infrastructure funded by debt, the
income tax exemption would seemingly have no impact on the relative
competitive position of the two sectors.
·  Addressing any competitive advantage for not-for-profit hospitals from their
capacity to fund infrastructure (or subsidise charges) from untaxed earnings or
donations, could be administratively complex. In particular, not-for-profit
entities will always spend money so as to report a zero taxable profit. Thus,
without deeming or similar measures, it would be difficult to collect income tax
from a not-for-profit hospital. The Commission’s report on Charitable
Organisations (IC 1995, pp. 274-275) elaborates further on the difficulties of
defining and measuring ‘income’ for not-for-profit organisations.
In the face of these considerations relating to significance and practicality,
addressing any competitive advantage for not-for-profit hospitals from income tax
exemptions may not be a high priority.108 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
IN AUSTRALIA
Contracting frameworks
Contracting between hospitals and health funds
As discussed in chapter 7, private hospitals argue that the current contracting
framework gives health funds too much bargaining power which they are using to
unfairly reduce rates paid to hospitals. Apart from compromising their financial
performance, the hospitals contend that this pressure on rates has flow-ons for the
quality of care they can deliver.
However, in the Commission’s view, there would be little merit in returning to an
approach which effectively allowed hospitals to automatically pass on cost
increases to health funds and their customers. Rather, the more relevant policy
question is whether the new contracting framework needs to be modified to produce
better outcomes for the community from the negotiating process.
In this regard, one aspect of the current policy framework that warrants further
attention is the prohibition on private hospitals (other than those within the one
ownership group) voluntarily sharing information on the outcomes of recent rate
negotiations. While this prohibition may help to prevent collusion between
hospitals, it may also impose costs. For example, as discussed in chapter 7, some of
the major health funds are no longer offering contracts to all private hospitals. In
these circumstances, the sharing of information on prices may help individual
hospitals determine what performance improvements are necessary to secure
contracts. As the ACCC noted in relation to the application by the five Queensland
hospitals for authorisation of a joint negotiating agreement:
... the exchange of price related information may enable [the hospitals] to improve their
overall cost efficiency (1999b, p. 50).
In effect, the current arrangements disadvantage stand-alone hospitals given that
hospitals in the one ownership group can readily and legally share price
information.
As well as revisiting this aspect of the current legislative framework, there may also
be value in implementing a voluntary code of conduct for rate negotiations between
hospitals and the health funds. This could be a low cost way of ameliorating some
of the hospitals’ concerns about the negotiating practices of the funds.
Contracting between hospitals and doctors
As the discussion in chapter 7 indicates, medical specialists have considerable
power in negotiations about their terms of access to private hospitals and theSOME FUTURE
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equipment a hospital purchases. Hospitals also have only limited scope to influence
the clinical practices of specialists operating on their premises.
An issue for future policy is whether this influence is excessive and impedes
efficient hospital management. Such problems are more likely to arise if there are
inadequate numbers of specialists. Some policy considerations pertaining to the
supply of medical specialists are discussed in section 9.2.
The Trade Practices Act
To guarantee they do not breach the price fixing provisions of the TPA, doctors and
hospitals (or hospital groups) must negotiate with the funds on an individual basis.
While the ACCC can authorise joint negotiations, the limited experience to date
(see section 7.4) suggests that this may be a time consuming and uncertain process.
Also, like the current contracting legislation, the TPA gives group hospitals a
negotiating advantage over stand-alone hospitals. This is because, for the purposes
of the TPA, group hospitals are treated as single entities, thereby allowing them to
share information (including on rates) in their dealings with health funds, without
risking being in breach of the Act.
The impact of different ownership structures on the incidence of the TPA is not an
issue for the private hospital industry alone. However, it may warrant consideration
in a wider context. (See, for example, PC 1996, pp. 69–70).
Quality of service and consumer information issues
Traditionally, quality objectives in the private hospital industry have been pursued
primarily through licensing requirements for hospitals and the professional staff
working in them. Word of mouth and the reluctance of doctors to treat patients in
sub-standard facilities also provided a discipline on quality. More recently, the
accreditation regime and the need for hospitals to secure contracts with health funds
have sharpened the incentives for them to provide quality services.
In some markets, benchmarking of service quality is used to complement explicit
quality assurance mechanisms. For example, the Steering Committee for the
Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision collects and tabulates
performance indicators for services such as education, health and justice (see
SCRCSSP 1999).
Such indicators can help individual providers identify areas where there is scope to
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available. Increasing the capacity of consumers to make informed choices promotes
competition and thereby increases the onus on providers to operate efficiently and
effectively.
As discussed in chapter 5, performance indicators for the hospital sector generally,
and private hospitals in particular, are at an early stage of development. Indeed,
there are divergent views amongst some of the main players about the nature and
form of appropriate indicators.
However, there is general recognition that better information on outcomes is
required and that more information should be available to prospective patients and
their families. To this end, there are a range of initiatives underway. For example, in
addition to the EQuIP clinical indicators and the Measures of Appropriate Clinical
Care project noted in chapter 5:
·  a range of work has been undertaken or is in train for the National Hospitals
Outcomes Program; and
·  there have been various initiatives at the State Government level (see, for
example, HSPR 1999, chapter 11).
Those working in this area face many challenges in developing widely accepted
indicators. Part of the problem is that outcomes from hospital treatment must be
targeted through clinical indicators of successful treatments and misadventures. Yet,
even if these are tabulated for individual DRGs, differences in outcomes across
hospitals can reflect variations in the complexity of cases rather than in clinical
practice. Also, such indicators will not directly identify whether performance
differences are attributable to the input of hospitals or of doctors, or even of
patients.
To address these challenges, the Victorian Health Services Policy Review has
proposed that the Commonwealth and the States collaborate to develop a set of risk-
adjusted clinical performance indicators (HSPR 1999, p. 137). Cross tabulating
results for doctors who operate in several hospitals would potentially allow
separation of their contributions to observed outcomes from those of the hospitals.
Of course, developing better indicators is only the first step. There is the related
question of how they should be used. In some states of the USA, for example, there
are published ‘scorecards’ for doctors and hospitals. And in the UK, ‘league tables’
comparing various National Health Service facilities are now published (HSPR, pp.
128–32).
While such scorecards have a number of attractions, they also have drawbacks.
Apart from opposition from the medical profession who may become reluctant toSOME FUTURE
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treat high-risk patients, there is a problem in balancing the objective of simplicity
with the need for indicators to be meaningful. For example, a scorecard showing a
hospital’s performance averaged across all treatments might provide little
information to a patient seeking cardiac treatment. Hence, published information
may need to differentiate between procedures — a quite complex output for many
consumers. Finding the right balance between simplicity and useful information will
not be easy. As part of this process, the Commonwealth Government’s Consumer
Benchmarking Project is aiming to provide consumers with information on the
quality of both private hospital and health insurance products and services.
Another possible use of clinical indicators is to assist health funds, hospitals and
health departments deal with sub-standard performance by doctors. This could build
on the peer review systems already in place in the private hospital industry. Thus,
the Victorian Health Services Policy Review has raised the prospect that, where a
practitioner’s results against clinical indicators are significantly below average, he
or she could be counselled, required to undertake additional training, or even
prevented from performing certain procedures (HSPR 1999, p. 137). However,
doctors have argued that such proposals amount to interference in the patient doctor
relationship and are a harbinger of ‘managed care’.
Future policy initiatives will need to be sensitive to these divides. But, at the same
time, such divides should not be allowed to jeopardise efforts to improve
information on the quality of service provided in either the private or public hospital
systems. Importantly, the absence of good information on service quality could
hamper broader initiatives to improve the delivery of hospital services through
initiatives such as competitive tendering for the delivery of public patient services
(see next section).
9.2 Some broader health policy issues
In addition to the sort of sector-specific issues discussed above, a range of broader
health care policies will influence future outcomes in the private hospital industry.
Some of these — for example, funding for public hospitals and the general
framework for private health insurance — have been widely addressed in other
contexts, including by the Commission in its report on private health insurance (IC
1997).
This section looks at two less widely canvassed health policy issues of relevance to
the private hospital industry — namely competition between the public and private
hospital systems and the supply of medical specialists. It also comments briefly on112 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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the recent Commonwealth initiatives to encourage people to take out, or retain,
private health insurance.
Competition between private and public hospitals
The principle of competitive neutrality discussed above in relation to competition
between different types of private hospital, is equally relevant to competition
between private and public hospitals.
Traditionally, competition between the two hospital sectors has mainly been for
private patients.
However, the role of the private sector in treating public patients is increasing (see
chapter 2). In some cases, this involves governments funding existing private
hospitals to deliver some public patient services. More recently, governments have
involved the private sector in the financing, construction and operation of new
public patient facilities through BOO/BOOT type arrangements. In the future,
competitive neutrality issues may arguably be more important in these areas than in
the delivery of services to private patients.
Competition for private patients
A number of regulatory/policy arrangements advantage public hospitals in
competing with private hospitals for private patients. For example:
·  As discussed above, private hospitals face additional, though relatively small,
costs from the bed licensing system. For-profit private hospitals also pay a range
of taxes from which public hospitals are exempt.
·  Accommodation charges for private patients in public hospitals have been set at
levels which have not generally covered costs. This is because charges higher
than the benefits paid by health funds — generally equal to the minimum default
benefit set by the Commonwealth of a little over $200 a day — would see many
of these private patients instead opt for treatment as public patients to avoid out-
of-pocket costs. Suffice it to say that, on average, accommodation charges for
private patients in public hospitals are only about half those in private hospitals,
providing an incentive for self-paying private patients in particular, to seek
treatment in public facilities.




·  Their capacity to actively compete for private patients is constrained. In
particular, they do not have access to capital market funding for refurbishment of
facilities, in order to match the quality of facilities available in the private sector.
And, they have not been allowed to give fee-paying private patients preference
over public patients.
·  The financial incentive for them to treat more private patients, or to seek to
negotiate accommodation benefits with health funds that more closely reflect the
costs of treating their private patients, may be limited. One concern is whether
higher private patient income might lead to reduced levels of Commonwealth
hospital funding. Also, unlike private hospitals, they cannot access the
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme for inpatients, meaning that the cost of drug
treatments provided to private patients must come from their general drug
budgets. (However, proposed Commonwealth arrangements which will extend
PBS subsidies for pharmaceuticals provided by public hospitals to all non-
admitted patients and to admitted patients on discharge, and for chemotherapy
drugs provided to public and private day-only admitted patients, would partially
address this disadvantage.)
The Commission’s report on Private Health Insurance (IC 1997) and the discussion
paper for the Victorian Health Services Policy Review elaborate on these and other
competitive non-neutralities.
However, the pursuit of competitive neutrality in this area is likely to prove
complicated.
At a practical level, while public hospitals are the responsibility of the States and
Territories, some of the possible policy changes would have implications for
Medicare arrangements and Commonwealth taxes. Hence, cooperation between the
States and the Commonwealth Government would be required.
More fundamentally, it is important that the pursuit of competitive neutrality
objectives has regard to the broader social goals underlying the operation of the
public hospital system. For example, queue jumping by private patients in public
hospitals would challenge a key tenet of the Medicare system, namely equity of
access to public hospital and other basic health care services. The need to temper
efficiency goals with broader social considerations is the reason why the National
Competition Policy makes provision for a public interest test in determining
whether to apply competitive neutrality policies to a particular market.
Yet in the absence of a major change to the raison de’etre of the public hospital
system, it is a moot point whether reforms that made it more financially attractive
for public hospitals to treat private patients would have a significant impact on their114 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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private patient volumes. Similarly, the high proportion of private patients who
already receive their treatment in private hospitals suggests that addressing
competitive advantages currently enjoyed by public facilities may also have only a
limited impact on the distribution of patients across the two hospital sectors.
Treatment of public patients by the private sector
As noted, the increasing role of the private sector in delivering public patient
services again raises the spectre of competitive neutrality. Indeed, failure to take
account of any significant non-neutralities is likely to confuse assessments of
whether the public or private sector can deliver particular services more efficiently
and effectively.
The increasing role of the private sector in the delivery of public patient services
also puts a much greater premium on governments having access to good
information on the quality of services and clinical outcomes in both public and
private hospitals. In addition, further research and evaluation of policy
experimentation will be necessary to help determine which forms of private sector
involvement are best suited to particular circumstances.
In this latter regard, the Victorian Health Services Policy Review compared and
contrasted a number of different approaches:
·  opening up opportunities ‘at the margin’ for private operators to tender for
public patient funding;
·  opening up large parts of funding for public patients to competition (‘the core
business competition model’). The discussion paper identifies two variants of
this option — wider application of the BOO/BOOT approach where capital
replacement or augmentation is required, and shorter term contracting potentially
involving the transfer of public infrastructure to the private sector; and
·  allowing private operators to compete for the right to manage public facilities.
(HSPR 1999, chapter 9).
The Review pointed to weaknesses in all of these approaches. In relation to the
large scale tendering approach, it raised particular concerns about high transactions
costs and the need to ensure ‘that the public sector thrives as an alternative service
delivery model’. It also argued that, in Victoria, a significant amount of competition
at the sub-contractor level occurs under current arrangements. The Review went on
to conclude:
... we believe that there is insufficient evidence at this stage to support the wholesale
tendering of public patient services in Victoria ... The next few years should provide
rich evidence of the success or otherwise of that model of service delivery as privatelySOME FUTURE
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operated hospitals are established and placed under the social microscope. Further,
tendering under that model should await the outcome of rigorous evaluation. (HPSR
1999, p. 108).
Incentives to take out private health insurance
As set out in chapter 6, in the last few years, there have been several
Commonwealth Government initiatives to try to stem the flow away from private
health insurance. These have included rebates that have reduced the cost of private
health insurance and the introduction of lifetime community rating arrangements.
By increasing the potential number of private hospital patients, these initiatives will,
in turn, benefit the private hospital industry.
The lifetime community rating arrangements are broadly in line with proposals in
the Commission’s report on private health insurance (IC 1997). As noted in chapter
6, the arrangements provide for higher premiums for those taking out health
insurance later in life. As such, they will reduce hit and run entry to fund
membership, as well as the more general ‘adverse selection’ problems associated
with the community rating of premiums. The latter has led to an ongoing cycle of
lower risk consumers abandoning private health insurance, an increase in premiums
to reflect the higher risks of those continuing to hold insurance, leading to further
declines in membership.
The latest rebate to those holding private health insurance is projected to cost
between $1.4 billion and $1.7 billion a year. Given the large budgetary cost
involved, it will be important for the government to monitor the impacts of the
rebate over time.
The supply of medical specialists
The supply of specialists has an important impact on outcomes in both the public
and private hospital systems. As well as influencing the cost of hospital services, the
availability of specialists influences access to services. Some of the particular
implications for private hospitals were described in chapter 7.
The supply of medical specialists is controlled in the first instance by limits on the
number of training places in professional medical colleges. The colleges set
numbers of places having regard to such things as indicative specialist to population
ratios and the availability of training places in teaching hospitals. There are also
restrictions on the accreditation of specialists trained in other countries.
There are several rationales for these controls on supply, including to:116 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
IN AUSTRALIA
·  ensure that specialists are appropriately qualified and trained;
·  balance the number of trainees with the capacity of teaching hospitals to provide
the necessary practical training; and
·  guard against problems with over-servicing of patients, or so called supplier-
induced demand.
However, there have been longstanding concerns that some of the colleges have
unduly restricted supply to increase specialists’ incomes and general bargaining
power. Paterson (1994) provided a range of evidence suggestive of such outcomes
for a number of the specialties at that time.
From a policy perspective, more research on supplier-induced demand seems
particularly important. As well as providing a major rationale for arrangements that
have the potential to indirectly increase the cost of hospital services, the theory of
supplier-induced demand influences policies in a number of other health care areas.
Yet the theory, and the supporting empirical evidence, remain controversial:
·  Critics argue that conventional economic analysis can explain much of the
supplier-induced demand phenomenon. For example, Paterson (1994) contends
that where consumers value medical services sufficiently to contribute to their
cost, an expansion in services in response to increased numbers of suppliers may
be no more than the market operating efficiently to satisfy unmet demand.
·  However, others argue that this line of reasoning depends on an assumption that
consumers of medical services are well informed about their treatment needs.
They go on to contend that if this is not the case, there is likely to be scope for
doctors to over-service, even when consumers are prepared to contribute to the
costs of their treatment.
In terms of future policy, the key issue may not be whether there is scope for
supplier-induced demand in the provision of medical services, but rather the extent
to which it is a significant determinant of demand. It will also be important to
establish whether any observed ‘supplier-induced demand’ for particular services
can be explained in terms of a normal market response to insurance rebates set at
levels which obviate the need for a patient contribution to the cost of treatment, as
distinct from a genuine market failure.REVENUES, CHARGES
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Table A.1 shows the sources of private hospital revenue for 1991–92 and 1996–97.
The data include day hospital revenues which accounted for a little over 3 per cent
of total private hospital revenue in 1996–97.
Table A.1 Sources of private acute care and day hospital revenue, 1991–
92 and 1996–97
1991–92 Share 1996–97 Share
$m % $m %
Commonwealth Government 107 4.8 354 10.1
Health funds 1 635 73.3 2 437 69.8
Individuals 346 15.6 288 8.2
Other
a 143 6.4 415 11.9
Total expenditure 2 232 3 493
a ’Other’ includes expenditure by workers’ compensation and compulsory third party motor vehicle insurers, as
well as non-patient sources of private hospital income, such as investment income.
Source: AIHW Health Expenditure Bulletin, 1997–98
Revenue from the Commonwealth Government
The Commonwealth Government’s contribution to revenue comes through funding
for Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) patients treated in private hospitals.
This source of revenue has become increasingly important for private hospitals
during the 1990s. Between 1991–92 and 1996–97, the number of private hospitals
providing services to DVA patients increased from 193 to 275, DVA separations
rose from 39 000 to 109 000, and DVA bed days rose from 240 000 to 600 000.
DVA separations and bed days in private hospitals increased again in 1997–98 to118 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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135 000 and 715 000, respectively (AIHW, Australian Hospital Statistics,
1997–98).
Revenue from the health funds
The health funds are by far the largest contributors to private hospital revenue,
accounting for some 70 per cent of total revenue in 1996–97. However, the health
funds’ share of total revenue has declined somewhat during the 1990s, despite an
increase of over 50 per cent in the number of insured patients treated in private
hospitals.
Revenue from individuals
  Payments made by individuals to private hospitals fall into two categories —
copayments made by insured patients and payments by self-paying patients:
·  DHFS data for 1996–97 indicate that gap payments by insured patients
represented around 6 per cent of hospital charges (DHFS, Hospital Casemix
Protocol, 1996–97).
·  Unpublished ABS data for 1996–97 indicate that self-paying patients accounted
for 4.3 per cent of private hospital patient days. If payments by this group of
patients are broadly in proportion to their share of patient days, then they would
have accounted for about 4 per cent of private hospital revenue in 1996–97.
·  The implied total contribution from individuals to revenue of 10 per cent is
broadly consistent with the 8.2 per cent share for individuals reported in table
A.1.
  As shown in table A.1, payments by individuals to private hospitals fell in absolute
as well as share terms between 1991–92 and 1996–97. However, a significant
increase in gap payments in 1997–98 to around 7.7 per cent of total private hospital
charges (DHAC 1999), suggests that total payments by individuals may well have
grown in the last couple of years.
  Revenue from compensable patients
  Growth in revenue from compensable patients was the major contributor to the
increased revenue share reported in table A.1 for the ‘other’ category. The number
of compensable separations rose from around 53 000 in 1991–92 to more than




  Patient revenue components
  There are a number of components to private hospital patient revenue (table A.2).
The significance of these in relation to individual patients will depend on the nature
of the treatment provided.
Table A.2 Key patient revenue components
Component Factors affecting the overall charge
Overnight patients
Accommodation Patient type (eg surgical, medical)
Room type (single, shared room)
Special needs (eg ICU, CCU, neonatal)
Theatre Theatre band
Other hospital services/supplies Pharmaceuticals, prostheses
Same day patients
Accommodation/theatre Same day band (1–4), unbanded
Other hospital services provided Pharmaceuticals, prostheses
Over 90 per cent of revenue in acute care and day private hospitals comes from
accommodation and theatre charges.
However, as shown in figure A.1, the balance between these two components varies
across the two sectors:
·  In acute care facilities, accommodation charges provide around 70 per cent of
total revenue.
·  In day facilities, theatre charges provide around 50 per cent of total revenue.
Revenue by DRG group
In 1996–97, the top 15 Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) accounted for about one-
quarter of total patient revenue earned by private acute care hospitals (table A.3).
Confinement was the top revenue earner — accounting for over 3 per cent of all
revenue — followed by hip replacements. Both of these DRGs involve significant
hospital stays for patients. However, lens procedures which ranked fourth typically
have very short lengths of stay. Their high revenue ranking reflects the large
number of procedures performed.120 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Figure A.1 Share of revenue from accommodation, theatre and other





















Note: Accommodation charges in acute care hospitals include labour ward charges. Pharmaceuticals account
for 0.2 per cent of revenue in day hospitals. ICU revenue covers the payments received from all critical care
units, including coronary care units and combined ICU/CCUs. As noted in chapter 3, a small, but growing
number of private hospitals have these facilities.
Source: DHFS Hospital Casemix Protocol (unpublished data).
Revenue profiles by hospital ownership and size
Revenue shares for broad types of treatment, by ownership group and hospital size
are shown in tables A.4 and A.5. The key feature for all ownership and size groups




Table A.3 Top 15 DRG revenue episodes
a, private acute care hospitals,
1996–97
DRG Revenue Share of total revenue)
$m %
674 Vaginal delivery without complications 103 3.27
405 Hip replacement 72 2.29
421 Knee procedures 62 1.96
099 Lens procedures 62 1.95
843 Major affective disorders 60 1.90
407 Joint and limb reattachment 59 1.87
297 Cardiac intervention 52 1.60
656 Uterine, adnexa procedures 48 1.51
291 Coronary bypass 45 1.42
367 Cholecystectomy 44 1.39
670 Caesarean delivery 40 1.28
274 Circulation disorders 39 1.24
320 Hernia procedures 33 1.04
335 Colonoscopy 28 0.89
332 Gastroscopy 24 0.77
Total Top 15 771 24.4
Balance 2 392 75.6
Total 3 163 100.0
a Top 15 DRGs by total hospital charges for insured patients only.
Source: Commission estimates based on DHFS Hospital Casemix Protocol (unpublished data); DHFS
Australian Casemix Report on Hospital Activity 1996–97; and ABS Private Hospitals 1996–97.
Table A.6 provides a breakdown of leading DRG revenue earners according to
hospital ownership and size.
Because for-profit group and religious/charitable hospitals between them account
for the bulk of industry revenue (84 per cent in 1996–97), their DRG rankings are
similar to the industry as a whole. However, for both groupings, more complex
coronary and cardio procedures are a more important revenue earner than for the
industry as a whole. In contrast, for-profit independent and other not-for-profit
hospitals earn a much greater share of their revenue from rehabilitation than does
the industry as a whole.
Cardiac and coronary procedures again feature prominently as revenue earners in
the over 200 bed category. Also, the very smallest hospitals (0–25 beds) have a very
different clinical revenue profile from the other hospital types. Indeed, the only
DRG in common with any other hospital type is major affective disorders. These
small hospitals are primarily bush nursing hospitals in Victoria and the small
community hospitals in South Australia and the Northern Territory.122 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Table A.4 Private hospitals
a clinical revenue profile
b, by ownership group,
1991–92 and 1996–97

























16 16 24 17 24 20 28 18
Surgery 30 33 28 28 25 25 25 23
Obstetrics 5 4 9 9 6 2 8 7
Medical and
minor surgery
25 31 31 40 23 19 25 30
Psych/rehab 18 11 2 .. 11 22 3 8
Nursing Home
Type
0.3 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.1 .. 0.4 1.2
Day bands 6 5 6 6 12 13 11 13
Patient revenue
($m)
665 240 950 220 1 296 238 1 372 256
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b Based on average HCF charges for each patient type.
Source: Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data and HCF Charges Survey 1996.
Table A.5 Private hospitals
a clinical revenue profile
b, by hospital bed size,
1991–92 and 1996–97
Revenue share, 1991–92 (%) Revenue share, 1996–97 (%)














5 12 15 23 27 9 19 20 28 31
S u r g e r y 1 2 3 1 3 1 2 92 7 1 22 52 62 6 2 4
Obstetrics 5 4 7 8 8 1 2 8 7 7
Medical and
minor surgery
45 28 28 29 33 40 21 22 26 26
Psych/rehab 19 18 13 6 1 12 20 13 4 1
Nursing Home
Type
7 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 3 1 .. 0.1 0.2
Day bands 6 5 7 5 5 23 12 11 11 11
Patient
revenue ($m)
64 283 634 578 516 70 327 810 1 067 890
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b Based on average HCF charges for each patient type.
Source: Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data and HCF Charges Survey 1996.REVENUES, CHARGES
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Table A.6 Top 5 DRG revenue episodes
a, private acute care hospitals, by
ownership group and hospital bed size, 1996–97
Ownership categories Bed size categories
For-profit group 0–25 beds
674 Vaginal delivery 846 Eating disorders
843 Major affective disorders 252 Heart failure and shock
405 Hip replacement 843 Major affective disorders
421 Knee procedures 056 Dementia & related disturbances
291 Coronary bypass 942 Other factors influencing health status for
  persons aged over 79
For-profit independent 26–50 beds
941 Rehabilitation 843 Major affective disorders
674 Vaginal delivery 941 Rehabilitation
843 Major affective disorders 421 Knee procedures
421 Knee procedures 099 Lens procedures
656 Uterine, adnexa procedures 656 Uterine, adnexa procedures
Religious/charitable 51–100 beds
674 Vaginal delivery 674 Vaginal delivery
405 Hip replacement 941 Rehabilitation
297 Cardiac intervention 843 Major affective disorders
291 Coronary bypass 656 Uterine, adnexa procedures
407 Joint and limb reattachment 099 Lens procedures
Other not-for-profit 101–200 beds
674 Vaginal delivery 674 Vaginal delivery
099 Lens procedures 405 Hip replacement
656 Uterine, adnexa procedures 407 Joint and limb reattachment
405 Hip replacement 656 Uterine, adnexa procedures







a Top 5 DRGs by total hospital charges for insured patients only.
Source: DHFS Hospital Casemix Protocol (unpublished data).
Decomposition of recent revenue growth
As noted in chapter 4, increased numbers of admissions have been responsible for
most of the growth in private hospital revenues during the 1990s. Indeed, the
Commission estimates that, between 1991–92 and 1997–98, admissions growth124 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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accounted for more than 90 per cent of the increase in real patient revenues (table
A.7)
Table A.7 Decomposition of changes in real patient revenue
a, private
hospitals
b, 1991–92 to 1997–98
c
Real change in patient
revenue
Usage component Average charge
component
$m % %
1992–93 128 65 33
1993–94 102 83 17
1994–95 160 111 -10
1995–96 164 118 -17
1996–97 191 82 17
1997–98 77 108 -8
1991–92 to 1997–98 822 93 7
a Estimated by holding charges per admission constant and calculating the effect on revenue over a defined
period if only hospital usage had changed (and vice versa).
b Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
c 1991–92 prices. Components may not add to 100 per cent due to rounding and the existence of an
‘interaction’ factor. ‘Interaction’ factors were evenly distributed between the two components.
Source: Commission estimates based on ABS Private Hospitals, various issues.
The contributions of changes in usage and average charges to revenue growth for
different ownership and hospital size categories are shown in table A.8. By and
large, the results are the same as for the industry as a whole — greater usage
explains most of the growth in revenue. Only for hospitals in the 51–100 bed
category were increases in average charges the major contributor to revenue growth.
A.2 Charges
Charging and health fund benefit arrangements
Insured patients in contracted hospitals
For most insured separations, the patient’s health fund and the hospital will have a
contract arrangement. As part of this arrangement, they will have agreed on the fees
and charges applicable to the full range of hospital services and treatments.
There are six principal service categories for charging purposes ¾ accommodation,
theatre, critical care, single use items, prostheses and pharmaceuticals. As notedREVENUES, CHARGES
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above, the first two are by far the most important, accounting, on average, for more
than 90 per cent of total private hospital revenue.
Table A.8 Decomposition of changes in real patient revenue, private
hospitals
a, by ownership group and hospital bed size, 1991–92
to 1996–97
b








$m % % %
Ownership categories
For-profit group 491 74 80 20
For-profit independent -27 -11 96 5
Religious/charitable 274 29 114 -14
Other not-for-profit 9 4 212 -111
Size categories
0–25 beds -2 -2
cc
26–50 beds 9 3
cc
51–100 beds 88 14 41 56
101–200 beds 374 65 86 9
Over 200 beds 277 54 111 -7
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b 1991–92 prices. Components may not to 100 per cent due to rounding and the existence of an ‘interaction’
factor. ‘Interaction’ factors were evenly distributed between the two components.
c The decomposition for hospitals with up to 50 beds results in very high numbers due to a large increase in
separations and large decrease in the average charge component. These results are meaningless in the
context of real revenue remaining virtually the same over the period.
Source: Commission estimates based on ABS unpublished data.
The traditional basis for private hospital accommodation  charges and the
accompanying health fund benefits is a daily rate:
·  Charges and benefits for overnight patients vary according to the patient type ¾
such as advanced surgical, surgical, and medical. Step-down benefits after a
specified period of hospitalisation usually apply to each patient classification,
while discounted rates sometimes apply to pre-surgical bed days.
·  Separate charging arrangements apply to same day patients, with health fund
benefits dependent on the procedure performed.
While the items included in the accommodation charge vary somewhat between
health funds, the coverage in a major fund’s standard HPPA contract shown in box
A.1 is broadly representative.
Theatre charges cover:
·  theatre staff salaries and related charges;126 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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·  equipment maintenance and depreciation charges;
·  all theatre consumables and specified single use items; and
·  specified pharmaceuticals.
  Hospitals and health funds usually base theatre charges and benefits on the National
Procedure Banding Committee’s recommended theatre banding of MBS Item
Numbers.
Box A.1 Representative components of an accommodation charge
Accommodation is charged on an all inclusive basis including, but not limited to, the
following:
·  all nursing salaries and related charges, including the charge for extra nursing as
required;
·  allied health services;
·  specified pharmaceuticals;
·  all consumables;
·  rehabilitation therapy and associated salaries and charges provided as part of
approved rehabilitation programs;
·  psychiatric therapy and associated salaries and charges provided as part of
approved psychiatric programs;
·  housekeeping type services, including all meals, television, local telephone calls
and hospital linen and laundry (excluding personal laundry) services; and
·  general hospital overhead charges (including administration and hotel services).
Source: A major health fund
Case payments
  As noted in the body of the report, a recent development in contracts between health
funds and private hospitals has been the emergence, on a limited scale, of episodic
or ‘case’ payments.
  These case payments are based on DRGs — usually high volume surgical
procedures with limited historical variation in length of patient stay and costs.
However, some health funds also include medical and same day treatments. Box
A.2 provides an example of the coverage of episodic payments in an HPPA
negotiated by one of the major funds.REVENUES, CHARGES
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Box A.2 Examples of private hospital DRG episodes subject to case-
based payments
  The HPPA states that case-based payments will apply to:
  (1) An obstetrics episode of care where the admission is classified into one of the
following nine AN–DRGs:
·  670 Caesarean delivery without complicating diagnosis
·  671 Caesarean delivery with moderate complicating diagnosis
·  672 Caesarean delivery with severe complicating diagnosis
·  687 Caesarean delivery with multiple complicating diagnosis, at least one severe
·  674 Vaginal delivery without complicating diagnosis
·  675 Vaginal delivery with moderate complicating diagnosis
·  676 Vaginal delivery with severe complicating diagnosis
·  677 Vaginal delivery with complicating operating room procedures
·  688 Vaginal delivery with multiple complicating diagnosis, at least one severe
(2) A hip replacement episode of care where the admission is classified into one of
the following two AN–DRGs:
·  404 Hip replacement with complications
·  405 Hip replacement with uncomplicated procedures
(3) A knee replacement episode of care where the admission is classified into one of
the following two AN–DRGs:
·  406 Other major joint and limb reattachment procedures with complications
·  407 Other major joint and limb reattachment procedures, uncomplicated procedures
(4) A coronary artery bypass graft episode of care where the admission is classified
into one of the following five AN–DRGs:
·  287 Coronary artery bypass graft with invasive procedure and major complications
·  288 Coronary artery bypass graft with invasive procedure age > 64, or with non–
major complications
·  289 Coronary artery bypass graft with invasive procedure age < 65, or without
complications
·  290 Coronary artery bypass graft without invasive procedure with major
complications
·  291 Coronary artery bypass graft without invasive procedure without major
complications.
Source: A major health fund128 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
IN AUSTRALIA
  In most cases, all of the relevant services normally associated with the episode of
care are bundled into the one payment. A case-based payment for a hip replacement
might, thus, cover costs incurred for accommodation, theatre, critical care,
pharmaceuticals, prostheses and physiotherapy services.
However, one major health fund keeps accommodation and theatre fees separate in
its case-based payments. It told the Commission that a case-based accommodation
benefit provides the hospital with sufficient incentive to treat patients efficiently. It
went on to comment that, if an episode calls for a theatre visit, there is usually little
the hospital can do to reduce this component of costs.
Insured patients in non-contracted hospitals
If a hospital does not have a contract with a health fund as a ‘preferred provider’,
there are three options for the payment of benefits to insured patients treated in the
hospital:
·  supplementary benefits;
·  second tier default benefits; and
·  basic default benefits.
Supplementary benefits, sometimes known as ‘brochure rates’, are paid to insured
patients treated in hospitals that are not preferred providers under an HPPA, but
which have a contract in place with the health fund. For example, AXA Health
Insurance pays supplementary benefits for treatment in those hospitals in Victoria
and South Australia that were not successful in its selective tender process (see
chapter 7). Supplementary benefits are a little higher than second tier default
benefits (see below).
Government legislated default benefits are payable to insured patients treated in
eligible private hospitals and day facilities that do not have an HPPA (or similar
arrangement) with the health fund concerned. To attract second tier default
benefits, a hospital must be able to demonstrate to the fund that it:
·  has a simplified billing system in place;
·  has a mechanism in place to inform patients of what expenses they are likely to
incur;
·  is quality accredited by either the Australian Council on Healthcare Standards,
the International Standards Organisation, or other bodies agreed between the
fund and the hospital; andREVENUES, CHARGES
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·  meets quality criteria relating to the episode of care which the fund has specified
in all HPPAs with comparable private hospitals.
Second tier benefits are set at 85 per cent of the average benefit paid by the fund for
the episode of care in all comparable private hospitals with which the fund has an
HPPA (or similar arrangement), in the State/Territory in which the treatment is
provided.
If the health fund has no HPPAs in place in the State or Territory for that episode of
care, or if the hospital fails to meet the second tier default criteria, then the basic
default benefit is payable. This benefit, which is determined by the Minister for
Health and Aged Care, is a little over $200 a day, although it varies somewhat
across jurisdictions. Higher default benefits may apply for insured patients admitted
to hospital in an emergency.
Self-paying patients
As noted above, self-paying patients account for nearly 9 per cent of private
hospital separations and some 4 per cent of hospital revenue.
Charges for these patients are generally set by charges/benefit rates for insured
patients. The health funds discourage discounting because it ‘sends the wrong
signals’ to members. Indeed, some funds apparently look to penalise hospitals found
to be offering discounts to self-paying patients. The penalty will generally take the
form of a lower rates offer at the next round of negotiations.
Nevertheless, some private hospitals (both not-for-profit and for-profit) discount
charges for self-paying pensioners and other low income patients. One large
religious group said that while only around one per cent of patients receive free
treatment, a much larger number benefit from discounted fees.
Other patients
Charges for treatment provided to eligible veterans and war widow/widowers
through the Repatriation Private Patient Scheme (RPPS) are negotiated between the
Department of Veterans Affairs and hospitals. These arrangements can include
provision to tender for the supply of treatment to eligible veterans and their spouses.
Treatment for most compensable patients is covered by workers’ compensation or
third party motor insurance. The usual basis for payment by the insurance company
is a lump sum according to the nature of the injury or illness.130 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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The level of charges
Charges for accommodation, theatre and other hospital services
As noted in chapter 4, in 1997–98, the average charge per private hospital episode
was around $2050 and the average daily charge around $550.
However, charges vary considerably for individual episodes, depending on whether
surgery, critical care and prostheses are involved. As shown in table A.9, these
components can add considerably to the total charge.
Table A.9 Average charge per episode
a for accommodation, theatre and
other services, private acute care hospitals, 1996–97 ($)
Accommodation 1465
Theatre 737




a Average charge for those episodes involving the provision of a particular service. While virtually all episodes
will involve charges for accommodation and pharmaceuticals, many will not involve surgery or prostheses
components. Even fewer will involve critical care. Hence, the sum of the individual service components
reported in the table greatly exceeds the average charge for all services.
Source: DHFS Hospital Casemix Protocol (unpublished data).
As noted, accommodation charges are usually levied on a daily basis and vary
across the different patient types. Table A.10 shows a major health fund’s average
daily agreed charges for its contracted private acute care hospitals during the second
half of 1997. Significantly, the accommodation charge for an advanced surgery
patient was 14 per cent higher than for a standard surgical patient and 25 per cent
higher than for a medical patient. While these relativities presumably reflected
differences in treatment costs, the Commission was told that it is financially
advantageous for private hospitals to attract advanced surgery patients.
Theatre charges also vary according to the complexity of the procedure. In
1997–98, they ranged from around $125 to in excess of $5000. The highest volume
theatre band is ‘Band 2’ — which includes procedures such as treating dislocations
and fractures, and the removal of adenoids. The average theatre charge for Band 2
procedures was around $325 in 1997–98. Bands 5 and 6 — which include such
procedures as hysterectomy, lens extraction and knee reconstructions — are the
next most common bands and account for the largest proportion of health fund
benefits. Average theatre charges for Band 5 and 6 procedures in 1997–98 were
$795 and $980, respectively.REVENUES, CHARGES
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Table A.10 Average daily charges for accommodation
a by patient type,








Nursing home type patient 73
Same day patients 156
All patients 370
a Shared room basis. The average private room supplement was $35 a day.
b Six months to December 1997.
Source: A major health fund.
Total charges by clinical profile
Indicative private hospital charges per admission by patient category are provided in
table A.11. These show that average total charges for advanced surgery patients are
considerably greater than for other surgery and medical patients. However, average
total charges for psychiatric/rehabilitation patients are even higher than for
advanced surgery patients because of the much longer ALOS.
Table A.11 Average private hospital charges
a, by patient category, 1992
and 1996
Average charge per admission Average charge per day
1992 1996 Change 1992 1996 Change
$$ % $ $ %
Advanced surgery 5 490 7 005 28 654 887 36
General surgery 2 027 2 604 28 579 789 36
Obstetrics 3 075 3 379 10 496 563 14
Medical 2 375 2 659 12 325 391 20
Psych/rehab 9 084 8 950 -1 377 384 2
All overnight
patients
2 912 3 628 25 470 585 24
Same day patients 455 581 28 455 581 28
All patients 1 832 2 008 10
b 470 591 26
a Insured patients in private acute care and day hospitals.
b The fact that this increase is much lower than the increase in the average charges for both overnight and
same day patients, reflects the significant growth in the share of same day patients over this period (see
chapter 4).
Source:  HCF Annual Charges Survey 1996.132 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Average total charges for the most common DRGs are shown in table A.12. Apart
from confinement, the most common DRGs have an average length of stay of one to
two days.







332 Gastroscopy (non–digestive diseases) 444 358
335 Colonoscopy 530 430
099 Lens procedures 1601 1232
780 Chemotherapy 260 232
128 Dental extractions & restorations 699 657
421 Knee procedures 1430 933
572 Renal dialysis 229 214
674 Vaginal delivery 3224 563
683 Abortion, curettage or hysterotomy 626 571
484 Skin, subcut. tissue & breast procedures 925 638
a Top 10 DRGs by separations for insured patients in private acute care hospitals.
Source: DHFS Hospital Casemix Protocol (unpublished data); DHFS Australian Casemix Report on Hospital
Activity 1996–97.
It is also interesting to note that total charges for day procedures are lower on
average in day facilities than in private acute care hospitals (table A.13). However,
caution is required in drawing conclusions about the relative efficiency/charging
practices of the two hospital types given the potential for variations in the
complexity of treatment within specific DRGs.
Table A.13 Comparison of day and private acute care hospital charges for
top 10 day hospital DRG episodes
a, 1996–97 ($)
Day hospitals Acute hospitals
332 Gastroscopy (non–digestive diseases) 350 444
335 Colonoscopy 456 530
099 Lens procedures 1358 1601
683 Abortion 526 626
484 Skin, subcutaneous tissue & breast procedures 535 925
330 Gastroscopy (digestive diseases) 346 632
128 Dental extractions & restorations 585 699
421 Knee procedures 996 1430
505 Skin grafts & debridement 673 1295
318 Anal & stomach procedures 599 1310
a Top 10 DRGs by separations for insured patients in freestanding day hospitals.
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Charges by hospital ownership and size
As noted in chapter 2, real average charges in private acute care hospitals have
increased by little more than 2 per cent during the 1990s. Moreover, this small
increase has primarily reflected increased charges by for-profit group hospitals.
Indeed, between 1991–92 and 1996–97, real average charges for the other
ownership groups fell (table A.14).
As table A.14 also indicates, average charges tend to increase with hospital size
(although this was not the case in the early 1990s). In a statistical sense, this reflects
the fact that for-profit groups and religious charitable organisations — which have
the highest average charges — own most of the larger hospitals. However, one
underlying driver is the greater average complexity of procedures performed in
larger hospitals. When allowance is made for differences in casemix, there is a
flattening in the variations in average charges across hospital ownership and size
groups (table A.15), although the adjustments do not alter the relative charge
rankings in either category.
Table A.14 Average charges
a, private acute care hospitals, by ownership
group and hospital bed size, 1991–92 and 1996–97







For-profit group 1620 2027 11.6
For-profit independent 1677 1870 -0.6
Religious/charitable 2020 2184 -3.6
Other not-for-profit 1652 1775 -4.2
Size categories
0–25 beds 2214 1510 -39.1
26–50 beds 1712 1734 -9.7
51–100 beds 1570 1897 7.8
101–200 beds 1712 2034 6.0
Over 200 beds 2329 2518 -3.6
All hospitals 1793 2054 2.2
a Patient revenue per separation.
Source: Commission estimates based on ABS Private Hospitals 1991–92 and 1996–97 and unpublished ABS
data.
Another perspective on the impact of casemix is obtained by comparing charges
across hospital types for individual DRGs (tables A.16 and A.17). Significantly, the
correlation between charges and hospital ownership and size is weaker, again134 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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pointing to the role of variations in casemix complexity in explaining differences in
average charges across the industry.
Table A. 15 Casemix-adjusted average charges
a, private acute care
hospitals, by ownership group and hospital bed size, 1996–97
($)
Hospital type Average charge Casemix adjusted charge
Ownership categories
For-profit group 2027 1997
For-profit independent 1870 1906
Religious/charitable 2184 2092
Other not–for–profit 1775 1800
Size categories
0–25 beds 1510 1608
26–50 beds 1734 1785
51–100 beds 1897 1905
101–200 beds 2034 2009
Over 200 beds 2518 2315
a Patient revenue per separation.
Source: Commission estimates based on ABS Private Hospitals 1991–92 and 1996–97, unpublished ABS
data and DHFS Australian Casemix Report on Hospital Activity 1996–97.
Table A.16 Private acute care hospital charges for top 10 DRG episodes
a,











674 Vaginal delivery without
complications
3 209 3 146 3 252 3 205 3 224
405 Hip replacement 10 859 11 331 10 560 9 822 10 706
421 Knee procedures 1 461 1 405 1 421 1 389 1 430
099 Lens procedures 1 681 1 657 1 584 1 416 1 601
843 Major affective disorders 2 699 3 089 3 073 3 034 2 850
407 Joint and limb reattachment 9 688 9 602 9 980 9 517 9 856
297 Cardiac intervention 9 198 9 091 9 563 8 882 9 400
656 Uterine, adnexa procedures 2 768 2 750 3 092 2 733 2 899
291 Coronary bypass 12 475 11 113 11 854 11 272 11 989
367 Cholecystectomy 3 066 2 983 3 153 2 807 3 073
Average charge for top 10 DRGs 5710 5617 5753 5408 5703
a Top 10 DRGs by revenue for insured patients in private acute care hospitals.




Table A.17 Private acute care hospital charges for top 10 DRG episodes
a,











674 Vaginal delivery without complications 2 295 2 859 3 181 3 167 3 413
405 Hip replacement na 10 496 11 080 10 567 10 651
421 Knee procedures 1 039 1 444 1 425 1 422 1 445
099 Lens procedures 1 263 1 611 1 690 1 519 1 561
843 Major affective disorders 1 550 2 858 2 653 3 062 6 784
407 Joint and limb reattachment 6 657 8 425 10 193 9 724 10 370
297 Cardiac intervention na na 8 915 9 448 9 464
656 Uterine, adnexa procedures 1 698 2 569 2 798 3 006 3 052
291 Coronary bypass na na 12 096 11 959 11 967
367 Cholecystectomy na 2 832 3 015 3 053 3 328
Average charge for top 10 DRGs na na 5 705 5 693 6 204
na not available.
a Top 10 DRGs by revenue for insured patients in private acute care hospitals.
Source: DHFS Hospital Casemix Protocol (unpublished data); DHFS Australian Casemix Report on Hospital
Activity 1996–97.
A.3 Costs
As noted in section 4.2, greater usage of private hospitals has been responsible for
the bulk of the increase in total private hospital costs. The Commission estimates
that, between 1991–92 and 1997–98, greater usage accounted for some 78 per cent
of total growth in real recurrent expenditure in the industry (table A.18).
Table A.18 Decomposition of changes in real recurrent expenditure, private
hospitals




Usage component Average cost
component
$m % %
1992–93 74 103 -3
1993–94 137 60 39
1994–95 193 86 13
1995–96 195 95 5
1996–97 201 76 23
1997–98 128 64 36
1991–92 to 1997–98 928 78 22
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b 1991–92 prices.
Source: Commission estimates based on ABS Private Hospitals, various issues.136 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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A similar story emerges from a decomposition of changes in real recurrent
expenditure by hospital size and ownership group (table A.19). In all bar the 51–100
bed category, increased usage has been a more important contributor to cost growth
than increases in average costs per admission.
Table A.19 Decomposition of changes in real recurrent expenditure, private
hospitals
a, by ownership group and hospital bed size, 1991–92
to 1996–97
b









$m % % %
Ownership categories
For-profit group 455 77 78 22
For-profit independent -10 -5 235 -134
Religious/charitable 347 37 91 9
Other not-for-profit 7 3 241 -141
Size categories
0–25 beds -4 -6
cc
26–50 beds 19 7 185 -85
51–100 beds 107 19 33 68
101–200 beds 384 71 82 18
Over 200 beds 292 58 102 -1
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b 1991–92 prices. Usage and average charge components may not add to 100 per cent due to rounding and
the existence of an ‘interaction’ factor. ‘Interaction’ factors were evenly distributed between the two
components.
c The decomposition for hospitals with 0–25 beds results in very high numbers due to a large increase in
separations and a large decrease in the average charge component. These results are meaningless in the
context of real recurrent expenditure remaining virtually the same over the period.
Source: Commission estimates based on ABS unpublished data.
Changes in input costs
Section 4.2 of the report provides information on increases in average costs per
separation during the 1990s. Table A.20, indicates that, for the industry as a whole,
higher non-labour costs have accounted for the bulk of these increases in unit costs.
However, the experience varies considerably across hospital ownership and size
groupings.
Tables A.21 and A.22 provide a further disaggregation of the data to show the
contributions of increases in different types of labour and non-labour costs.REVENUES, CHARGES
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Table A.20 Disaggregation of real changes in recurrent expenditure per
separation, private hospitals
a, 1991–92 to 1996–97








All hospitals 100 32 68
Ownership categories
For-profit group 193 65 35
For-profit independent 102 50 50
Religious/charitable 56 -61 161
Other not-for-profit -75 78 22
Size categories
0–25 beds -995 79 21
26–50 beds -92 92 8
51–100 beds 175 63 37
101–200 beds 159 32 68
Over 200 beds -15 -280 180
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b Wages and salaries, superannuation, payroll tax and other labour on-costs.
Source: Commission estimates based on ABS unpublished data.
Table A.21 Percentage changes in real costs, private acute care hospitals,











Wages and salaries 78.5 -6.9 26.8 -1.1 34.3 45.7
Medical & surgical
supplies
155.7 7.0 78.7 16.8 90.4 15.9
Contract services 235.4 13.5 79.4 54.7 111.8 9.2
Depreciation 138.3 71.7 65.6 42.2 79.1 8.7
Admin expenses 29.2 -10.5 58.3 9.0 33.5 7.4
Superannuation 86.1 73.5 139.0 170.9 143.2 6.0
Pharmaceuticals 114.2 19.2 92.9 32.0 85.3 5.0
Other on-costs 45.1 -25.2 30.5 -6.4 26.1 2.1
Repairs and maintenance 64.1 -24.2 39.1 0.8 35.1 1.8
Payroll tax 155.8 -13.3 -15.0 -75.5 46.8 1.6
Food supplies 52.2 -23.3 9.9 6.1 18.7 1.1
Fuel, light and power 47.7 -19.6 12.4 -21.7 16.3 0.7
Patient transport 89.2 5.4 371.2 161.4 123.2 0.1
Other domestic services -26.0 -47.5 10.2 -40.4 -16.3 -0.4
Other recurrent expenses 38.5 -35.8 -97.3 -91.6 -47.8 -1.0
Interest payments -69.9 -22.2 -16.3 -52.8 -39.9 -4.1
Total 76.5 -4.8 37.4 3.4 40.9 100.0
Contribution to growth 56.9 -1.3 43.4 0.9 100.0
Source: Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data.138 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Table A.22 Percentage changes in real costs, private acute care hospitals,













Wages and salaries -16.3 2.3 17.2 62.2 47.7 34.3 45.7
Medical & surgical
supplies
32.9 45.7 68.1 128.2 92.9 90.4 15.9
Contract services na 55.7 84.8 na na 111.8 9.2
Depreciation 51.0 51.1 80.2 111.3 61.9 79.1 8.7
Admin expenses 23.2 1.7 -7.1 104.7 52.3 33.5 7.4
Superannuation 39.8 91.0 102.5 204.7 175.5 143.2 6.0
Pharmaceuticals 57.6 56.4 29.7 160.7 88.2 85.3 5.0
Other on-costs 0.7 -14.1 16.5 22.2 87.5 26.1 2.1
Repairs and maintenance 16.8 0.3 13.4 47.5 63.5 35.1 1.8
Payroll tax 12.8 16.2 9.7 71.2 na 46.8 1.6
Food supplies -9.1 0.0 -1.4 42.6 39.1 18.7 1.1
Fuel, light and power -19.5 -3.1 -4.1 34.0 41.9 16.3 0.7
Patient transport na -69.7 na na na 123.2 0.1
Other domestic services 3.3 -36.7 -33.0 -7.1 12.8 -16.3 -0.4
Other recurrent expenses na -69.9 na -35.1 -50.0 -47.8 -1.0
Interest payments -73.1 -44.6 -54.1 -32.9 -25.0 -39.9 -4.1
Total -6.0 7.4 18.6 70.8 58.4 40.9 100.0
Contribution to growth -0.5 2.4 13.5 48.1 36.5 100.0
na Not available
Source: Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data.PERFORMANCE AND
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B Additional hospital performance and
state-based structural data
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Table B.1 Private hospital
a number and size, by State, 1991–92
NSW and
ACT
Victoria Qld SA and
NT
WA Tas Aust
No. of hospitals 92 111 49 38 21 8 319
Capital city 70 78 18 32 19 4 221
Rest of State or
Territory 22 33 31 6 2 4 98
Hospital size
0–25 beds 2 39 11 12 2 2 68
26–50 beds 42 35 7 12 3 1 100
51–100 beds 38 23 14 8 12 3 98
101–200 beds 8 9 14 4 3 2 40
Over–200 beds 2 5 3 2 1 — 13
Available beds 6037 6014 4090 2280 1774 550 20 745
Capital city 4558 4979 2045 2162 np np 15 690
Rest of State or
Territory
1479 1035 2045 118 np np 5055
Approved beds 6421 6256 4397 2424 1965 667 22 130
np Not published
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92.
Table B.2 Private hospital
a number and size, by State, 1997–98
NSW
and ACT
Victoria Qld SA and
NT
WA Tas Aust
No. of hospitals 91 97 51 41 26 11 317
Capital city 62 68 20 31 23 5 209
Rest of State or
Territory
29 29 31 10 3 6 108
Hospital size
0–25 beds 5 26 10 15 6 4 66
26–50 beds 34 31 5 12 4 1 87
51–100 beds 37 22 16 8 9 3 95
101–200 beds 12 13 15 5 4 3 52
Over 200 beds 3 5 5 1 3 — 17
Available beds 6476 6133 5008 2269 2409 796 23 091
Capital city 4547 5125 2520 2105 np np 16 968
Rest of State or
Territory
1929 1008 2488 164 np np 6123
Approved beds 6683 6403 5384 2425 2716 892 24 503
np Not published
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1997–98.142 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Table B.3 Private hospital









339 325 227 131 99 37 1157
Bed days (000) 1313 1478 1015 573 378 136 4891
Average length
of stay (days)
3.9 4.5 4.5 4.4 3.8 3.7 4.2
Occupancy
rate (%)
59 67 68 69 58 67 64
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92.
Table B.4 Private hospital









446 438 339 147 165 51 1585
Bed days (000) 1592 1629 1338 560 551 188 5859
Average length
of stay (days)
3.6 3.7 4.0 3.8 3.3 3.7 3.7
Occupancy rate
(%)
67 73 73 68 63 65 70
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1997–98.PERFORMANCE AND
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Table B.5 Private hospital
a separations, bed days and beds per 1000
population, by State, 1991–92 and 1997–98
NSW
and ACT






55 73 76 90 60 79 68
Bed days per
1000 (No.)
214 333 338 394 229 289 285




68 95 100 88 92 108 86
Bed days per
1000 (No.)
242 354 394 336 307 398 316
Beds per 1000 0.98 1.33 1.47 1.36 1.34 1.68 1.25
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92 and 1997–98, 1999 Year Book Australia.
Table B.6 Private hospital




Victoria Qld SA and
NT
WA Tas Aust
Patient revenue 591 662 367 218 175 62 2075
Recoveries 15 14 6 4 5 2 45
Other 17 19 10 6 5 1 58
Total 622 695 383 227 185 65 2177
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92.
Table B.7 Private hospital




Victoria Qld SA and
NT
WA Tas Aust
Patient revenue 950 932 684 259 310 114 3249
Recoveries 58 51 24 14 21 6 175
Other 29 25 20 4 14 1 93
Total 1037 1008 728 277 344 121 3517
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1997–98.144 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Table B.8 Expenditure by private hospitals









317 403 209 127 97 36 1189
Drug, medical and
surgical supplies
64 55 29 19 16 5 188
Food supplies 14 17 8 5 4 1 49
Other domestic
services
19 16 10 6 6 2 58
Administrative
expenses
60 58 27 16 12 5 177
Repairs and
maintenance
11 13 7 6 3 1 41
Other 68 81 45 29 21 8 252
Total 553 642 335 208 159 58 1955
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92.
Table B.9 Expenditure by private hospitals









533 544 403 158 188 74 1900
Drug, medical and
surgical supplies
153 121 78 34 43 13 442
Food supplies 19 22 14 5 7 2 70
Other domestic
services
20 16 16 5 8 3 69
Administrative
expenses
79 84 52 21 24 10 270
Repairs and
maintenance
20 19 14 5 5 2 65
Other 126 121 75 39 41 13 416
Total 950 928 653 267 316 117 3232
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source: ABS, Private Hospitals, 1997–98.PERFORMANCE AND
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Table B.10 Private hospital












Revenue/separation 1680 1737 2143 1736 1882
Revenue/day 434 403 480 395 445
Revenue/bed 95 533 87 559 123 844 90 612 104 943
Revenue/employee 80 661 74 469 64 984 62 438 70 007
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.11 Private hospital












Revenue/separation 2140 1927 2373 1871 2192
Revenue/day 572 491 627 464 576
Revenue/bed 143 763 109 194 168 922 113 593 146 925
Revenue/employee 91 948 81 254 77 018 73 932 82 485
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.12 Private hospital














1620 1677 2020 1652 1793
Patient revenue/day 419 389 452 376 424
Patient revenue/employee 77 783 71 868 61 256 59 401 66 716
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.146 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Table B.13 Private hospital














2027 1870 2184 1775 2055
Patient revenue/day 542 476 577 440 540
Patient revenue/employee 87 108 78 856 70 893 70 159 77 313
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.14 Private hospital












Expenditure/separation 1448 1490 1976 1633 1689
Expenditure/day 374 345 442 372 400
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.15 Private hospital












Expenditure/separation 1840 1786 2278 1747 2006
Expenditure/day 492 455 602 433 527
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.PERFORMANCE AND
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Table B.16 Private hospital












Total staff recurrent expenditure 853 874 1224 1038 1028
Total staff wages & salaries 720 771 1132 955 921
Total staff on-costs (excluding
super & payroll tax)
57 37 56 66 55
Superannuation 29 24 34 15 29
Payroll tax 47 41 3 2 23
Nursing staff wages & salaries 448 475 655 590 552
Medical officers & other
diagnostic staff salaries
26 25 62 27 41
Admin and clerical staff wages
& salaries
81 85 123 96 100
Other staff wages & salaries 165 186 292 242 228
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.17 Private hospital












Total staff recurrent expenditure 1096 1037 1334 1098 1188
Total staff wages & salaries 925 903 1205 977 1042
Total staff on-costs (excluding
super & payroll tax)
60 35 61 64 59
Superannuation 52 53 68 57 59
Payroll tax 60 46 0 0 28
Nursing staff wages & salaries 587 509 687 608 623
Medical officers & other
diagnostic staff salaries
49 70 77 53 63
Admin and clerical staff wages &
salaries
103 117 146 110 122
Other staff wages & salaries 186 207 295 206 234
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.148 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Table B.18 Private hospital
a non-staff costs per separation, by ownership
group, 1991–92 ($)










595 616 752 595 662
Medical & surgical
supplies
113 103 140 105 122
Administration 164 176 150 107 153
Depreciation 46 39 114 72 76
Interest payments 71 76 71 61 70
Contract services 45 57 68 56 57
Other 156 165 209 194 184
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.19 Private hospital
a non-staff costs per separation, by ownership
group, 1996–97 ($)










744 749 945 649 817
Medical & surgical
supplies
207 138 210 127 195
Administration 152 198 200 121 172
Depreciation 79 85 159 106 115
Interest payments 15 74 50 30 36
Contract services 108 81 103 90 102
Other 183 173 223 175 197
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.PERFORMANCE AND
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Table B.20 Private hospital












Capex/separation 78 96 281 261 184
Capex/bed 4412 4826 16 226 13 616 10 235
Land & buildings/separation 30 31 180 139 104
Land & buildings/bed 1714 1577 10 422 7258 5793
Medical equipment/separation 20 25 35 23 27
Medical equipment/bed 1113 1258 2013 1191 1495
Plant & other
equipment/separation
19 20 41 52 32
Plant & other equipment/bed 1090 996 2387 2736 1788
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.21 Private hospital












Capex/separation 169 218 202 310 200
Capex/bed 11 336 12 368 14 353 18 853 13 375
Land & buildings/separation 75 95 116 229 108
Land & buildings/bed 5037 5406 8256 13 912 7228
Medical equipment/separation 43 44 37 44 41
Medical equipment/bed 2886 2497 2653 2681 2737
Plant & other
equipment/separation
36 62 29 25 34
Plant & other equipment/bed 2423 3533 2089 1505 2308
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.150 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Table B.22 Private hospital











FTE staff/1000 separations 20.8 23.3 33.0 27.8 26.9
FTE staff/occupied bed 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.3 2.3
FTE nursing staff/1000
separations
11.9 13.1 17.1 15.2 14.5
FTE nursing staff/occupied bed 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.3
FTE medical officers & other
diagnostic staff/1000
separations
0.5 0.7 1.3 0.6 0.9
FTE admin and clerical
staff/1000 separations
2.4 2.8 3.9 3.1 3.2
FTE domestic and other
staff/1000 separations
4.8 5.4 8.8 7.6 6.9
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.23 Private hospital











FTEstaff/1000 separations 23.3 23.7 30.8 25.3 26.6
FTE staff/occupied bed 2.3 2.2 3.0 2.3 2.6
FTE nursing staff/1000
separations
13.6 12.3 15.7 14.4 14.4
FTE nursing staff/occupied bed 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.4
FTE medical officers & other
diagnostic staff/1000
separations
0.9 1.6 1.4 0.9 1.1
FTE admin and clerical
staff/1000 separations
2.9 3.2 4.0 3.1 3.4
FTE domestic and other
staff/1000 separations
5.0 5.2 8.0 5.8 6.3
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.PERFORMANCE AND
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All patients 3.87 4.31 4.47 4.39 4.23
Overnight patients na na na na na
Advanced surgery patients 6.97 7.43 8.36 8.15 7.83
Surgery patients 2.38 2.43 2.98 2.82 2.66
Medical patients 6.28 7.38 5.28 6.34 5.95
Obstetrics patients 5.89 6.10 6.86 6.52 6.49
na Not available
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.












All patients 3.74 3.93 3.79 4.03 3.80
Overnight patients 5.98 6.81 5.73 6.67 6.00
Advanced surgery patients 7.01 5.04 7.64 7.46 7.21
Surgery patients 3.14 2.75 3.49 3.39 3.28
Medical patients 6.85 8.53 6.07 6.79 6.62
Obstetrics patients na na 5.91 5.85 5.86
na Not available
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.26 Private hospital
a occupancy rates, by ownership group,










Occupancy – all patients 60 60 71 63 65
Occupancy – overnight
patients
na na na na na
Average theatre time/week 38 44 43 30 40
na Not available
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.152 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Table B.27 Private hospital
a occupancy rates, by ownership group,










Occupancy – all patients 69 61 74 67 70
Occupancy – overnight
patients
61 53 66 59 62
Average theatre time/week 39 28 44 32 39
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.28 Private hospital
a revenue, by hospital bed size, 1991–92
($)
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
Revenue/separation 2349 1769 1636 1802 2473 1882
Revenue/day 277 366 431 449 571 445
Revenue/bed 64 275 77 263 93 122 113 415 158 056 104 841
Revenue/employee 51 002 69 197 73 933 68 707 70 670 70 007
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.29 Private hospital
a revenue, by hospital bed size, 1996–97
($)
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
Revenue/separation 1624 1823 2013 2159 2727 2192
Revenue/day 341 463 529 611 682 576
Revenue/bed 76 018 98 954 122 275 165 636 207 661 146 925
Revenue/ employee 65 306 77 630 84 744 83 302 83 107 82 485
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.30 Private hospital
a patient revenue, by hospital bed size, 1991–92
($)
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
Patient
revenue/separation
2214 1712 1570 1712 2329 1793
Patient revenue/day 261 355 413 427 538 424
Patient revenue/employee 48 058 66 986 70 917 65 291 66 557 66 716
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.PERFORMANCE AND
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Table B.31 Private hospital
a patient revenue, by hospital bed size, 1996–97
($)
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
Patient
revenue/separation
1510 1734 1897 2034 2518 2055
Patient revenue/day 317 441 498 576 629 540
Patient revenue/employee 60 722 73 837 79 859 78 452 76 722 77 313
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.32 Private hospital
a recurrent expenditure, by hospital bed size,
1991–92 ($)
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
Expenditure/separation 2419 1587 1433 1611 2257 1689
Expenditure/day 285 329 377 401 521 400
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92.
Table B.33 Private hospital
a recurrent expenditure, by hospital bed size,
1997–98 ($)
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
Expenditure/separation 1501 1675 1803 1979 2695 2039
Expenditure/day 338 439 504 571 663 552
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1997–98.154 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Table B.34 Private hospital
a staff costs per separation, by hospital bed
size, 1991–92 ($)
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
Total staff recurrent
expenditure
1705 971 851 980 1375 1028
Total staff wages & salaries 1568 846 749 869 1282 921
Total staff on-costs
(excluding super & payroll
tax)
63 65 44 64 54 55
Superannuation 56 26 25 25 40 29
P a y r o l l  t a x 1 73 33 3 2 2 0 2 3
Nursing staff wages &
salaries
894 499 462 548 715 552
Medical officers & other
diagnostic staff salaries
17 7 27 23 91 41
Admin and clerical wages &
salaries
159 89 81 92 149 100
Other staff wages & salaries 498 251 179 206 327 228
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.35 Private hospital
a staff costs per separation, by hospital bed
size, 1996–97 ($)
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
Total staff recurrent
expenditure
1035 994 1077 1156 1495 1188
Total staff wages & salaries 922 851 931 1017 1331 1042
Total staff on–costs
(excluding super & payroll
tax)
45 55 54 56 71 59
Superannuation 55 50 54 56 77 59
P a y r o l l  t a x 1 43 83 8 2 7 1 6 2 8
Nursing staff wages &
salaries
521 491 566 631 766 623
Medical officers & other
diagnostic staff salaries
56 40 49 53 99 63
Admin and clerical staff
wages & salaries
113 109 108 114 160 122
Other staff wages & salaries 232 211 208 219 306 234
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source: ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.PERFORMANCE AND
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Table B.36 Private hospital
a non-staff costs per separation, by hospital
bed size, 1991–92 ($)
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
Total non-staff recurrent
expenditure
714 615 583 630 881 662
Medical & surgical supplies 63 93 96 122 197 122
Administration 186 169 162 120 173 153
Depreciation 61 55 50 75 141 76
Interest payments 93 71 54 83 78 70
Contract services 67 61 47 59 68 57
Other 244 166 174 171 224 184
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.37 Private hospital
a non-staff costs per separation, by hospital
bed size, 1996–97 ($)
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
Total non–staff recurrent
expenditure
561 682 726 828 1018 817
Medical & surgical supplies 58 133 172 201 267 195
Administration 161 169 159 177 185 172
Depreciation 65 82 96 115 161 115
Interest payments 18 39 26 40 41 36
Contract services 92 93 92 99 124 102
Other 167 166 181 196 240 197
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.38 Private hospital
a capital expenditure ratios, by hospital bed
size, 1991–92 ($)
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
Capex/separation 221 120 138 277 167 184
Capex/bed 6047 5241 7855 17 434 10 673 10 250
Land & buildings/separation 142 43 64 205 64 104
Land & buildings/bed 3886 1878 3643 12 902 4090 5794
Medical equipment/separation 28 19 28 20 41 27
Medical equipment/bed 766 830 1594 1259 2620 1504
Plant & other
equipment/separation
30 47 na na 47 32
Plant & other equipment/bed 821 2052 na na 3004 1783
na Not available
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.156 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Table B.39 Private hospital
a capital expenditure ratios, by hospital bed
size, 1996–97 ($)
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
Capex/separation 70 234 167 228 196 200
Capex/bed 3257 12 686 10 117 17 458 14 955 13 375
Land & buildings/separation 33 125 81 130 109 108
Land & buildings/bed 1555 6767 4906 9937 8304 7228
Medical equipment/separation 11 48 35 45 42 41
Medical equipment/bed 520 2607 2098 3482 3177 2737
Plant & other
equipment/separation
16 40 35 41 24 34
Plant & other equipment/bed 749 2184 2131 3119 1806 2308
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source: ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.40 Private hospital
a staffing, by hospital bed size, 1991–92
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
FTEstaff/1000 separations 46.1 25.6 22.1 26.2 35.0 26.9
FTE staff/occupied bed 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.9 2.3
FTE nursing staff/1000
separations
23.2 13.5 12.5 14.9 17.3 14.5
FTE nursing staff/occupied
bed
1.0 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.3
FTE medical officers & other
diagnostic staff/1000
separations
0.2 0.1 0.6 0.4 1.9 0.9
FTE admin and clerical
staff/1000 separations
5.1 2.7 2.6 3.0 4.5 3.2
FTE domestic and other
staff/1000 separations
12.1 5.9 5.4 6.6 9.5 6.9
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.PERFORMANCE AND
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Table B.41 Private hospital
a staffing, by hospital bed size, 1996–97
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
FTEstaff/1000 separations 24.9 23.5 23.8 25.9 32.8 26.6
FTE staff/occupied bed 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.7 3.0 2.6
FTE nursing staff/1000
separations
12.7 12.4 13.0 14.7 16.9 14.4
FTE nursing staff/occupied bed 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.4
FTE medical officers & other
diagnostic staff/1000 separations
1.5 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.8 1.1
FTE admin and clerical staff/1000
separations
3.4 3.1 3.0 3.2 4.4 3.4
FTE domestic and other
staff/1000 separations
5.5 5.5 5.6 6.1 8.0 6.3
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.42 Average length of stay in private hospitals
a, by hospital bed
size, 1991–92 (days)
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
All patients 8.48 4.83 3.80 4.01 4.33 4.23
Overnight patients na na na na na na
Advanced surgery patients 6.60 6.18 7.26 8.12 8.56 7.83
Surgery patients 2.29 2.50 2.57 2.62 3.10 2.66
Medical patients 9.49 8.32 5.97 4.71 4.96 5.95
Obstetrics patients 6.44 5.68 6.36 6.49 7.02 6.49
Minor surgery patients na 1.56 1.36 1.63 na 1.48
na Not available
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.43 Average length of stay in private hospitals
a, by hospital bed
size, 1996–97 (days)
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
All patients 4.76 3.93 3.81 3.53 4.00 3.80
Overnight patients 11.24 6.63 6.00 5.33 6.25 6.00
Advanced surgery patients 4.77 4.83 6.24 7.48 8.41 7.21
Surgery patients 2.55 2.78 3.06 3.26 3.91 3.28
Medical patients 8.98 8.59 6.90 5.38 6.98 6.62
Obstetrics patients 4.55 na 5.98 na na 5.86
Minor surgery patients na na na na na na
na Not available
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.158 PRIVATE HOSPITALS
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Table B.44 Private hospital
a occupancy rates, by hospital bed size,
1991–92 (percentage of capacity)
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
Occupancy – all patients 64 58 59 69 76 65
Occupancy – overnight
patients
na na na na na na
Average theatre time/week 12 29 40 44 49 40
na Not available
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1991–92; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.45 Private hospital
a occupancy rates, by hospital bed size,
1996–97 (percentage of capacity)
0 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 200 Over 200 Total
Occupancy – all patients 61 59 63 74 83 70
Occupancy – overnight
patients
53 51 56 66 74 62
Average theatre time/week 15 31 31 44 54 39
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
Source:  ABS, Private Hospitals, 1996–97; unpublished ABS data.
Table B.46 Medical services and charges
 for top 12 DRGs, by private
hospital










For-profit group 5.06 183 924
For-profit independent 4.65 186 868
Religious/charitable 4.89 199 973
Other not-for-profit 4.74 194 922
Bed size
0–50 4.35 212 920
51–100 4.71 185 873
101–200 5.08 186 946
Over 200 5.20 198 1029
All hospitals 4.89 191 934
a Private acute care and psychiatric hospitals.
b Based on 12 of the leading 15 revenue DRGs for all private acute care hospitals. Excluded are DRGs 274
(circulation disorders), 291 (coronary bypass) and 297 (cardiac intervention).
Source: DHFS Hospital Casemix Protocol 1996–97 (unpublished data).REFERENCES 159
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